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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between insider trading and stock volatility 
by investigating the stock dealing of corporate directors and chief executives in the listed 
corporations in Hong Kong in their own companies between 1993 and 1998. In theory, 
corporate insiders prefer riskier investment projects which are usually associated with 
higher stock volatility. Since the insiders own private information about the direction 
and extent to which the firm value may change, they can accordingly adopt some trading 
strategies to earn profits when the stock market is highly volatile. This thesis conducts 
event study to investigate the stock volatility changes surrounding insider trading events 
and uses vector autoregression (VAR) Granger causality test to study the lag dependence 
of insider trading and volatility variables. 
Our event study demonstrates that insider trading is more likely to take place 
after a rise in stock volatility than after a decline. In addition, stock volatility is lower 
immediately after insider trading and then drops further. However, in the intermediate 
term, insider trading is more likely to give rise to an increase instead of a decrease in 
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stock volatility. Granger causality test shows that a larger number of insider transactions 
induces higher market return volatility and in turn higher volatility also induces a larger 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Insider Trading and Corporate Governance 
Tirole (2001) in his survey paper of corporate governance states the standard 
definition of corporate governance among economists and legal scholars as the defense 
of shareholders' interests. There is now widespread awareness that firm managers may 
take actions that hurt shareholders. This basic principal-agent problem also suggests a 
possible definition of corporate governance as addressing both an adverse selection 
problem and a moral hazard problem. Holding this view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
give the following definition to corporate governance: "corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting 
returns on their investments". 
The principal reason that investors provide external equity financing to firms is 
that they receive ownership and decision-making rights in exchange. External equity 
financing is a contract between the corporation as a legal entity and the financiers, which 
gives the financiers certain rights on the assets of the corporation. If firm managers 
violate the terms of the contract, then the financiers have the right to appeal to the courts 
to enforce their rights. However, even in some advanced market economies, the legal 
systems leave managers with considerable discretion. As a result, legal protection alone 
is insufficient to ensure that investors can get their money back. 
Insider trading is one of many examples that result in the principal-agent 
problem in the context of corporate governance. Corporate managers can themselves 
engage in stock trading activities to earn private benefits because they own better 
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information than the outside stakeholders; they gain with their private information at the 
expense of other investors. This demonstrates an agency problem between corporate 
managers and outside investors. Broadly speaking, insiders are those individuals with 
better information about a company than the general public. They mainly include 
directors, chief executives, managers, (senior) employees, large shareholders, 
accountants, investment bankers and attorneys. Insider trading or insider dealing means 
insiders engaging in stock trading activities. Different informed individuals have 
different kinds and amounts of private information, and hence different incentives of 
insider trading. In order to suppress insider dealing, companies have to disclose all 
material information to the market in a timely manner. By doing so, the participation of 
better-informed individuals in insider trading activities can be directly reduced since 
their nonpublic information is limited. Hence, mandatory disclosure is necessary. 
By general perception and from the above discussion, informed trading would 
hurt other stakeholders in a company and thus regulation on insider dealing is a critical 
issue for corporate governance. On the other hand, there are advocates of insider trading 
and they view insider dealing prohibitions unfavorably. The issue has been debated on 
two main levels, namely the fairness and economic efficiency. Since the definition of 
“fair or unfair" is vague and ambiguous, this aspect of insider trading is difficult to be 
addressed directly. However, the impact of insider trading on economic efficiency and 
welfare is more susceptible and valuable to economic analysis. Hence, most literature 
discusses the issue from an economic point of view. 
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1.2 Insider Trading and Stock Volatility 
Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) suggest that insider dealing allows 
managers to alter their compensation package reflecting their contribution or innovation. 
This increases the managers' incentive to acquire and develop valuable information 
through pursuing valuable investments with reasonable risk for the firm. Later, Bebchuk 
and Fershtman (1994) discuss the effects of insider trading on managers' choice among 
risky investment projects. While shareholders can diversify their risks effectively 
through holding different kinds of securities of different companies, firm managers may 
not be able to diversify the company's risks well when choosing investment projects 
owing to the nature of the business. The managers may be very conservative and choose 
safer projects even if these projects offer lower expected returns since investments with 
huge loss may make the managers lose their jobs. So, the managers are not maximizing 
the shareholders' interests. On the other hand, under contracts that allow insider trading, 
managers look more favorably on risky projects since greater uncertainty and volatility 
enable them to make greater trading profits. However, the desire to increase the gains 
from insider trading may result in choosing unreasonably risky projects by the managers. 
The idea is that riskier projects are usually associated with higher business 
volatility, such as more volatile cash flow streams, and thus greater stock volatility. 
Greater volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation and undervaluation. Since the 
insiders own private information about the direction and extent to which the firm value 
may change, they can accordingly adopt some trading strategies to earn profits when the 
stock market is highly volatile. This suggests that insider trading activities are more 
frequent and more profitable in those firms with higher volatility ex ante. On the other 
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hand, insiders may deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider 
trading by changing the corporate investment policies or by manipulating the contents 
and timing of information disclosure. For long stock position, the insiders may make the 
firm fundamentals more volatile so that when there is overvaluation, they can gain by 
selling their shares; for short position, when there is undervaluation, the insiders can 
gain by buying back shares to cover their short positions. Hence, business volatility such 
as volatility of firm's fundamentals and corporate value, and thus stock volatility may be 
higher before or after insider trading activities. 
Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) also argue, in the view of 
information effect, that insider dealing allows the information possessed by corporate 
insiders to be rapidly reflected in the prices of securities and thus increases the 
efficiency of capital markets. Specifically, a company can convey information, which 
otherwise could not be feasibly announced publicly, through insider trading activities. 
Hence provided that noise trading remains the same before and after insider dealing, 
information revelation may reduce the uncertainly about the firm fundamentals and 
hence decrease stock volatility. 
1.3 Objective of the Thesis Research 
While much theoretical research on insider trading touches upon the issue of 
riskiness and volatility, empirical studies on this topic are rare. In the present study, a 
piece of empirical research is carried out to examine the relationship between insider 
trading and stock volatility. Specifically, the stock dealing of corporate directors and 
chief executives in the listed corporations in Hong Kong in their own companies 
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between 1993 and 1998 is investigated. Event study methodology is adopted to 
investigate the stock volatility changes surrounding insider trading events. Vector 
autoregression (VAR) Granger causality test serves as an analysis from a different 
perspective to study the lag dependence of insider trading and volatility variables. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
literature review. Chapter 3 contains a brief summary of insider dealing regulations in 
Hong Kong which serves as background information to the present research. Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 describe the data and methodology respectively. Chapter 6 provides the 
empirical findings of the event study and Chapter 7 the VAR analysis. Chapter 8 
concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Review of Theoretical Literature 
An early economic theory of insider trading is Manne (1966)，s defense of 
informed trading as a mechanism to provide incentives for managers, an argument later 
enforced by Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Dye (1984)/ Manne (1966) argues that 
stockholders can benefit from insider trading through adjusting the managerial 
compensation contract. With other formats of compensation such as bonuses or stock 
options, the rewards to the managers are limited no matter how great their contribution. 
However, there is no such limitation on the effectiveness of insider trading as 
compensation. Insider trading allows corporate managers to market their contributions -
innovations — to the company. True innovation is marketable because it cannot be 
predicted nor its value known before it has been thought of and made effective. It also 
cannot be planned and budgeted in advance. The situation is actually a sale of 
information about an innovation. The managers' income, thus, come in the form of 
profits from trading in corporate shares to exploit information based on the innovation 
created. Therefore, insider dealing can improve the alignment of interests between 
outside claimants such as shareholders and debtors and management by allowing 
managers to profit from the appreciation in corporate value attributing to their efforts. 
Manne (1966)'s another important argument is that insider trading allows the 
information possessed by corporate insiders to be rapidly reflected in the prices of 
1 To facilitate our discussion, this argument is referred to "Manne (1966)'s compensation argument" 
throughout this thesis. 
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securities and thus increases the efficiency of capital markets.! -phere are fundamentally 
three different ways in which valuable information about stock market prices may be 
exploited. The first one is direct sale of insider information for money. However, it is of 
almost no practical importance since direct sale of insider information is definitely 
illegal and is strictly prohibited. The second method by which the value of information 
may be exploited is by stock purchases. A purchase of stock can have precisely the same 
effect as a direct sale of the information. Suppose the stock is under (over) priced. Those 
with insider information buy (sell) shares until the market price has changed by an 
amount corresponding to the value of the information. After price adjustment, the 
information itself has become valueless because it has already been reflected in the price. 
That means its disclosure will add nothing to the stock market price. The third 
mechanism for marketing valuable private information is information exchange. 
Ultimately, the information will again be exploited by share purchase or sale. 
Carlton and Fischel (1983) give support to Manne (1966)'s arguments by 
proposing the following two explanations — efficiency effect and information effect. The 
efficiency effect is based on the failure of some market forces. Since “competition in 
product and capital markets", "market for corporate control" and "market for managerial 
services" do not work perfectly, they reduce rather than eliminate the divergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders. One possible solution to the problem is 
paying a manager commission based on performance rather than fixed salary. However, 
the shareholders may have difficulty in observing and measuring the manager's actual 
performance directly since other factors may also affect the manager's outputs. It seems 
2 To facilitate our discussion, this argument is referred to "Manne (1966)'s information argument" 
throughout this thesis. 
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that contracts that provide for periodic renegotiations ex post based on observed efforts 
and outputs are alternatives to contracts that ex ante tie compensation to output. But 
renegotiations are costly. Insider trading may present a solution to this 
"cost-of-renegotiation dilemma". It allows a manager to alter his compensation package 
reflecting their innovation. The manager, in effect, "renegotiates" each time he engages 
in insider dealing. This increases the manager's incentive to make innovation and hence 
acquire and develop valuable information. If a manager observes a possible valuable 
investment for the firm, he will be more willing to pursue this opportunity if he is 
rewarded upon success. And abnormal profit from insider trading is one such reward. 
The insider trading alternative reduces the uncertainty and the cost of renegotiation and 
thus increases the incentives of managers to produce valuable information. Moreover, 
the managers can control the frequency of "renegotiations" and thus have their 
compensation scheme tailor made. The advantage of insider trading is that it provides a 
company a way to identify those prospective managers who will work hard and not be 
overly risk averse in their choice of investment projects. Basing compensation in part on 
insider trading is one method for screening out superior from inferior managers. Because 
insider trading rewards those managers who create valuable information and are willing 
to take reasonable risks, managers who most prefer such compensation schemes may be 
those who are the least risk averse and the most capable. Thus, with insider trading, this 
self-selection mechanism minimizes the costs of seeking potential managers, the 
monitoring costs created by risk averse managers, and the opportunity costs resulting 
from sub-optimal investment decisions. The efficiency effect is consistent with Manne 
(1966)'s compensation argument. 
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On the other hand, information effect is another powerful explanation. Though 
disclosure of information is beneficial to the firm itself, complete disclosure is 
impossible. It is argued that communicating information through insider trading might 
be of value to the firm. In the first place, a firm can convey information that could not be 
feasibly announced publicly through insider trading. It is because a public 
announcement may destroy the value of the information, may be too expensive, may not 
be believable, or may subject the firm to massive damage liability if it turns out ex post 
to be incorrect. If insiders trade with their private information, the share price will move 
closer to what it would have been when the information had been disclosed. Since the 
shareholders of a company value the ability of the company to control information that 
flows to the stock markets, they may also value insider trading because it gives the 
company an additional method of communicating and controlling information. On the 
other hand, firms could also use insider trading to limit the amount of information to be 
reflected in price. Controlling the number of traders who have access to information may 
be easier than controlling how much information gets announced over time. Thus, 
insider trading gives firms a tool either to increase or to decrease the amount of 
information that is contained in share prices. As can be seen, the information effect 
conforms to Manne (1966)，s information argument. 
The arguments proposed by Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) gain 
further support by some later studies, such as Dye (1984)，Bebchuk and Fershtman 
(1994)，Hu and Noe (2001) and Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001). 
Dye (1984) analyzes shareholders' incentives to sanction insider trading. It is 
demonstrated that if a firm manager is initially compensated with contracts contingent 
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on earnings, then the welfare of that manager and all shareholders of the company can 
be improved by allowing the manager to trade on his private information. This provides 
further support to Manne (1966)，s compensation argument as well as the efficiency 
effect suggested by Carlton and Fischel (1983). Moreover, the premise of the above 
conclusion depends on the existence of established contracts between the owners of the 
firm and people in a position to affect the firm's earnings. Insider trading by third parties 
who have no contractual relationship with the firm may be harmful to the firm's owners. 
Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) discuss the effects of insider trading on 
managers' choice among risky investment projects. While shareholders can diversify 
their risks effectively through holding different kinds of securities of different 
companies, firm managers may not be able to diversify the company's risks well when 
choosing investment projects owing to nature of the business. The managers may be 
very conservative and choose safer projects even if these projects offer lower expected 
returns since investment with great loss may make the managers lose their jobs. So, the 
managers are not maximizing shareholders' interests. On the other hand, under contracts 
that allow insider trading, managers look more favorably on risky projects since greater 
uncertainty enables them to make greater trading profits. The choice of risky 
investments is in line with the terminology "innovation" in the context of Manne (1966). 
Surely, this argument conforms with the compensation argument of Manne (1966) and 
also the efficiency effect suggested by Carlton and Fischel (1983). However, the desire 
to increase the gains from insider trading may induce the managers to choose 
unreasonably risky projects. In order to enlarge the profits gained from informed trading, 
managers may, on average, invest in projects with unreasonably high risk. So whether 
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the managers can choose projects with appropriate risks that maximize the firm value is 
questionable. 
Hu and Noe (2001) link moral hazard with information effect by assuming that 
managers have private information about their own potential gains from moral hazard. 
Permitting better-informed managers to trade on personal account can sometimes 
increase the level of output and welfare of shareholders. Firstly, insider trading 
impounds information about hidden managerial actions into asset prices. This 
impounding of information allows shareholders to make better personal portfolio 
allocation decisions. Secondly, allowing insider trading induces managers to increase the 
correlation between their personal wealth and firm value beyond the basic employment 
relationship. This can improve managerial incentives. The above conclusions are 
consistent with Carlton and Fischel (1983)’s efficiency and information effects. When 
managerial incentives are high and corporate governance costs are low, managers may 
prefer insider trading prohibitions since with such restrictions, shareholders will offer 
the managers better compensation through greater portion of output. 
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) demonstrate that insider dealing can improve 
outsiders' welfare, even when aggregate investment choices cannot respond to any 
partial revelation of information brought about by such insider trading via prices. 
On the other hand, some later work by Fishman and Hagerty (1989, 1992), 
Manove (1989)，Ausubel (1990), Bagnoli and Khanna (1992)，Fischer (1992)，Khanna et 
al. (1994), Noe (1997), Maug (2002) shows that the above arguments by Manne (1966), 
Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Dye (1984) may not hold. 
Better-informed inside traders and other speculators with private information can 
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extract portion of the gains from corporate investment at the expense of other investors. 
Manove (1989) suggests that this misappropriation tends to discourage corporate 
investment and reduce the efficiency of corporate behavior. In the presence of insider 
dealing, outsiders who lack the information expect adverse selection of their investment. 
So, rational and sophisticated shareholders will take into account adverse selection in 
calculating expected returns and thus their willingness to pay for the shares will be lower 
than that in the case of no insider dealing. As a result, insider trading tends to dampen 
shareholders' support for corporate investment. Put it another way, the expropriation by 
insiders may diminish the investors' confidence. Ausubel (1990) attempts to formalize 
this concept of "confidence" as an efficiency argument. Outsiders' expectation that 
insiders will take advantage at the expense of them at later stages may discourage them 
from investing in the companies. So, the adverse selection costs for outsiders caused by 
insider trading make the raising of external finance more costly. On the other hand, 
effective regulation of insider trading at later stages may improve the anticipated returns 
on investment of outsiders and hence promote investment by outsiders at the beginning. 
Owing to the availability of investment from outsiders, the insiders may also benefit 
from the pre-commitment of insider trading regulation. 
Fischer (1992) questions the arguments of Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel 
(1983). Firstly, neither Manne (1966) nor Carlton and Fischel (1983) formally address 
the common arguments offered as to why insider dealing restrictions are valuable. 
Secondly, neither considers the value of more limited forms of trading restrictions. 
Thirdly, neither deals with the issue of how valuable agent trading restrictions are 
credibly implemented. Bagnoli and Khanna (1992) utilize a financial signaling model to 
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show that managers take inefficient actions to earn trading profit and their conclusion 
opposes to the compensation argument and the efficiency effect. Noe (1997) studies the 
relationship between moral hazard in the manager-shareholder agency problem and 
managerial insider trading. The analysis concludes that while permitting insider trading 
improves managerial effort incentives, allowing shareholders to permit insider trading 
may exacerbate the manager-shareholder agency problem. The costs arising from the 
latter problem outweigh the benefits obtained from the former. 
While Carlton and Fischel (1983), when discussing the information effect, point 
out that complete disclosure of information is impossible or too costly, Fishman and 
Hagerty (1989) argue that firms may actually have the incentive to disclose too much 
information regardless of the costs incurred. Thus mandatory disclosure is a wasteful use 
of corporate resources. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more 
efficient investment decisions because of the unobservability of managers' investment 
decision. In order to increase price efficiency, firms spend resources on disclosure that 
can give a signal containing information on future cash flow. The greater the 
expenditure on disclosure, the more informative the signal is. Since it is too costly for a 
trader to study the disclosure of every firm, firms must compete for the attention of 
traders through signaling. This induces the firms' incentive to increase price efficiency 
by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Though additional disclosure will 
increase the efficiency of prices, the costs still outweigh the benefits. As a result, Carlton 
and Fischel (1983)，s information argument for insider trading has no ground. It is 
because the firms will voluntarily disclose information and conveying information 
through insider trading is not necessary. Fishman and Hagerty (1992), in addition to 
13 
their 1989，s article on the information effect, analyze the effect of insider trading on the 
informational efficiency of stock prices in an imperfectly competitive market. Though 
the amount of information in the market is greater with insider trading, insider trading 
does lead to less efficient stock prices under certain circumstances. This is because 
insider trading has two adverse effects on stock price efficiency. Firstly, public 
disclosure of the insider's information deters non-insiders from acquiring information 
and trading. This is because their relative informational advantage is reduced. Put it 
another way, stock prices may be less informative if insider trading is legal since 
analysts engage less in information acquisition. Thus, insider trading may discourage the 
production of information by outside analysts and thus reduce the net informational 
efficiency of capital markets. Secondly, the information in the market is not evenly 
distributed across investors and is concentrated in the insiders. That means the insider 
has an informational advantage. These two effects result in a less competitive market 
and less efficient stock prices. This provides further opposing arguments to Carlton and 
Fischel (1983)'s information effect. 
Khanna et al. (1994) consider a market with an informed insider (manager) and 
an informed outsider. An informed manager uses his private information as well as 
outside public information conveyed through the secondary market price of the firm's 
shares to improve his resource allocation decisions. When the manager is allowed to 
trade, he competes with informed outsiders. This competition reduces the outsider's 
expected trading profits and leads to a reduction in the quality of the outsider's 
information. 
Maug (2002) focuses on the insider dealing by major shareholders. If legal 
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protection does not give enough control rights to small investors to induce them to invest 
in the company, then perhaps investors can get more effective control rights by being 
large. When control rights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of investors 
with a collectively large cash flow stakes, concerted actions by investors is much easier 
than when control rights are split among many of them. That means, concentration of 
ownership leverages up legal protection. The most direct way to align cash flows and 
control rights of outside investors is to concentrate share holdings. A substantial 
minority shareholder has the incentive to collect information and monitor the 
management, thereby avoiding the traditional free rider problem. He also has enough 
voting control to put pressure on the management. Large shareholders thus address the 
agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and 
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interests respected. However, 
concentrated ownership is not without costs. One of the problems is that the large 
shareholders represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of 
other investors in the firm. They might try to treat themselves preferentially at the 
expense of the others. In a context where large dominant shareholders can monitor 
under-performing companies, Maug (2002) demonstrates that managers have an 
incentive to warn major shareholders early about adverse development, because then 
large shareholders are more likely to sell their stock at overvalued market prices than to 
monitor the company. Large shareholders benefit from these warnings since they can 
make trading profits. Hence, managers can "bribe" large shareholders with information 
to refrain from monitoring in order to protect their rents. In this environment, the value 
of the firm is not maximized. If insider dealing is unregulated, then the incentives of the 
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large shareholders are aligned with those of management. They both collude and 
communicate information privately at the expense of small shareholders. Therefore, the 
company has to disclose all material information to the market in a timely manner. By 
doing so, participation of managers in insider trading can be directly reduced since their 
nonpublic information is limited. Besides, the outside small investors can make right 
decisions and have closer monitoring on the firm. Hence, mandatory disclosure aligns 
the incentives of dominant shareholders with those of small shareholders at the expense 
of management. Maug (2002) concludes that insider trading legislation is necessary as 
part of a well-functioning corporate governance regime since small investors will 
otherwise be unprotected. 
Instead of standing at the for or against side of insider trading, Leland (1992) 
assesses the validity of the arguments about insider trading from previous work. His 
results confirm that many of the arguments both pro and con insider trading are correct 
depending on the characteristics of the markets. The analysis identifies who gains and 
who loses by presuming the characteristics of those markets that are likely to gain from 
insider trading and those that are likely to lose. Generally speaking, liquidity traders are 
major losers when insider trading is permitted as insider trading leads to less liquid 
market. Outside investors are also hurt. Since they are trading against better-informed 
insiders, their expected returns are reduced. Certainly, the insiders themselves should be 
the winners. On the other hand, existing owners of firms issuing shares can also benefit 
from insider trading since the average issuing price is higher. Leland (1992) concludes 
that insider trading is less desirable when investment flexibility decreases; risk aversion 
of investors increases; liquidity trading is more volatile; future price volatility increases. 
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Some conditions for the benefits of insider trading are also discussed. When the 
sensitivity of investment to current price is great, insider trading is likely to be beneficial. 
And insider trading is more tolerated in less developed financial markets. Bernhardt et al. 
(1995) show that when inside information has little predictive power of future payoffs, 
introducing an inside trader to the economy causes welfare losses because insiders 
always seek to profit by concealing their information. Any slight benefits of informative 
prices fail to cover the costs of trading in a market with an insider. Therefore, insider 
trading distorts investment so that the costs of capital are different across otherwise 
identical investment opportunities. On the other hand, when the information of insiders 
has high value in investment decisions, the insiders' presence is socially beneficial. 
In addition to economists' arguments on insider trading, the legal profession has 
developed two streams of reasoning. For example, see Scott (1980); Herzel and Katz 
(1987) and Brudney (1979). Though the arguments from legal perspective may be 
beyond the scope of this thesis, they are also briefly presented below for reference. The 
first is a fairness argument which supports insider dealing legislation in favor of keeping 
a "level playing field". Then regulation attempts to give all investors equal access to 
information. And any trading on nonpublic information should be illegal. The second 
theory is the "business property theory" or "misappropriation theory". It holds that 
insiders abuse information belonging to an organization with which they have a 
fiduciary relationship. Then only insider dealing that uses information that properly 
belongs to the organization should be illegal. 
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2.2 Review of Empirical Literature 
In response to some discussion on the theoretical arguments, Masson and 
Madhavan (1991) study the firm value effects. In particular, the paper examines 
empirically whether insider trading by a firm's top (three to five) executives raises or 
lowers firm value. It distinguishes between executive stock ownership by insiders, which 
provides incentives to maximize firm value, and insider trading, which may lower firm 
value. Manne (1966)'s compensation argument and Carlton and Fischel (1983)'s 
efficient effect suggest that insider trading can benefit stockholders through adjusting the 
managerial compensation contract to provide incentives for managers. Firm value can 
thus be maximized. The fundamental problem for measuring the impact of insider 
trading on firm value is that the level of trading may already have been capitalized, or 
that owners may have designed incentives to achieve an optimal level of insider trading. 
Empirical tests may be unable to detect the impact of insider trading on firm value if 
stockholders have devised executive compensation schemes to minimize the effect of 
insider trading. Masson and Madhavan (1991) analyze a dataset drawn from a period 
when it is unlikely that rational expectations on the part of stockholders could eliminate 
the observed effects of insider trading. The paper examines the structure of executive 
earnings and develops an index of insider trading. The trading index is based on stock 
sales (purchases) prior to stock price decreases (increases). The next step is to construct 
an efficiency test. The results support the hypothesis that active use of insider 
information in stock trading by executives lowers firm value. However, greater stock 
ownership by executives raises firm value. 
Much research on insider trading and stock markets investigates whether insiders 
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can earn abnormal profits by using private information to trade and whether those 
mimicking the insiders' actions can generate abnormal returns. Jaffe (1974), Finnerty 
(1976)，Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986, 1988)，Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin 
and Howe (1990), Chang and Suk (1998), Jeng et al. (2003) find that insiders can gain 
abnormal excess returns at least in some circumstances. On the contrary, Eckbo and 
Smith (1998) show that insider purchases produce zero or even negative excess returns. 
Wong et al. (2000) examine the Hong Kong stock market and conclude that insider 
dealing in small firms can generate abnormal profits while that in medium and large 
firms shows the opposite. Cheuk (2001) also finds that insiders are able to earn abnormal 
profits from both buying and selling activities in the Hong Kong stock market. Seyhun 
(1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Chang and Suk (1998) also discuss the performance 
of imitation by outsiders and the results are ambiguous; Gregory et al. (1994) and Cheuk 
(2001) show some abnormal returns from mimicking. 
Besides, some studies relate the performance of insider trading to corporate 
events such as dividend distributions, share repurchases and mergers and acquisitions. 
Finnerty (1976) studies the relationship between insider trading and announcements of a 
firm's financial and accounting information such as future earnings, dividends and firm 
size. The results show that insider purchases increase with smaller firm size, larger 
future earnings and larger dividends. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) provide evidence that 
insiders in acquired firms can gain abnormal returns by trading insider information prior 
to takeover announcements. Elliott et al. (1984) examine the relationship between 
insider trading and information announcements around some corporate events. It is 
found that only insider transactions in small firms can probably be initiated by 
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information announcements of unexpected changes in earnings. Penman (1985) finds 
that more insider purchases or less insider sales before disclosure of management 
earning forecasts can generate abnormal profits. Seyhun (1988) investigates the seasonal 
pattern of insider trading activities and shows that some insiders in small firms increase 
their buying and decrease their selling of stocks in December, capturing higher returns 
from January effect. Masse et al. (1988) examine insider dealing around announcements 
of mergers and acquisitions. It is found that activity of insider trading and size of 
abnormal returns are positively related to excess trading volume above normal. John and 
Lang (1991) show that insider sales before dividend announcements generate negative 
and smaller excess returns. Otherwise, higher excess returns are resulted. Kaipoff and 
Lee (1991) find that insiders sell more shares prior to the announcements of offerings of 
common stock, straight debt and convertible debt. They can earn positive abnormal 
returns for announcements of common stock and convertible debt but negative for 
announcements of straight debt. Lee et al. (1992) find that managers of repurchasing 
firms increase frequency of buying and decrease frequency of selling stocks before 
announcements of fixed price repurchase offers. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that the 
proportion of buy transactions in insider dealing demonstrates positive relationship with 
cash flow to price ratio and negative relationship with past stock performance. Kahle 
(2000) provides evidence that insider purchases decrease and insider sales increase 
before issues of equity and convertible debt for firms in industrial sector but not utility 
sector. Hauser et al. (2003) investigate the activities of insider dealing around seasoned 
equity offerings and finds that majority insiders buy shares before the offerings. 
Among all, Seyhun (1986) and Seyhun (1988) are two pieces of the most 
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important research. The two papers provide research directions and also references for 
research methodologies for subsequent and future studies. Seyhun (1986) studies insider 
trading over 1975-1981 of the United States market. The data comes from a computer 
tape compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the tape summarizes 
more than 1.5 million insider transactions in all publicly held firms from 1975 to 1981. 
In the study, 769 firms are analyzed. Seyhun (1986) shows that insiders demonstrate 
stock price predictability. They purchase stocks prior to abnormal rise in stock prices 
and sell stocks prior to abnormal decline in stock prices. The quality of information they 
have is different - the predictive power of more senior management is stronger. Insiders 
also trade greater volume of stocks if the information is more valuable. The performance 
of outsiders is also investigated and it is concluded that following the publication of 
insider trading information, the abnormal returns to outsiders, after transaction costs, are 
non-positive. Seyhun (1988) examines the information content of aggregate insider 
trading over 1975-1981. The dataset employed is the same as that used for the 1986 
study. The study is based on the premise that information-related trading by corporate 
insiders is in response to firm specific, industry-wide and economy-wide factors. Seyhun 
(1988) shows that in the aggregate, insiders increase stock purchases prior to rise in 
stock markets and decrease stock purchases prior to decline in stock markets; insiders 
increase stock sales prior to decline in stock markets and decrease stock sales prior to 
rise in stock markets. On the other hand, outsiders, after public dissemination of insider 
trading information, show some predictability. 
Chowdhury et al. (1993) apply Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to examine 
the relationship between aggregate insider transaction and market return. The data 
21 
comes from the computer tape compiled by the SEC and it covers the period from 1975 
to 1986. Further to Seyhun (1988)，s single-equation regression analysis, Chowdhury et 
al. (1993) reconsider the relation between insider transaction and market return in a 
methodological setting that formally models the interaction between insider trading and 
market return variables. The VAR techniques include Granger causality, impulse 
response and variance decomposition. 
Meulbroek (1992) investigates the stock price effects of illegal insider trading in 
securities by individuals or firms possessing important non-public information. Manne 
(1966),s information argument and Carlton and Fischel (1983)，s information effect 
suggest that insider trading leads to quick price discovery. Hence, insider trading can 
enhance efficient capital markets by improving the accuracy of stock prices. Most 
empirical research on insider trading focuses on legal insider dealing, but not on illegal 
transactions by corporate insiders, and tests whether corporate insiders can predict future 
stock price movements. They use self-reported corporate transactions data. In the United 
States, corporate insiders must report their trades to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The SEC disseminates these transactions in its monthly Official 
Summary of Insider Transactions. Most of the studies on legal insider trading in the 
United States are based on this source. The corporate transactions are by definition not 
based on material and non-public information. Because corporate insiders cannot legally 
trade on such information, they would most likely refrain from reporting their illegal 
transactions to the SEC. Hence, when illegal insider trading is being addressed, 
self-reported data is probably not appropriate. In contrast to some prior research, 
Meulbroek (1992)，s study concentrates on how illegal insider trading affects stock prices. 
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It is really a piece of challenging empirical research because isolating trading based on 
private information is difficult. This paper employs illegal insider transactions detected 
by the SEC and subsequently cited in a civil case to examine abnormal returns on the 
days of illegal insider trading. Unlike the executive transactions used in prior work, the 
SEC has asserted that the trades in her data source are based on superior insider 
information. The results reveal that insider dealing is associated with immediate price 
movements and quick price discovery, supporting Manne (1966)'s and Carlton and 
Fischel (1983)，s arguments mentioned above. The extent to which insider trading aids in 
price discovery in the sample is substantial. The cumulative abnormal returns on insider 
trading days are half as large as the price reaction to the public reaction to the public 
revelation of the information on which the insider trades. This ratio suggests that the 
stock markets detect informed trading and impound a large proportion of the information 
into the stock price before it becomes public. 
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Chapter 3 Insider Dealing Regulations in Hong Kong 
The current insider dealing regulations in Hong Kong are presented in this 
Chapter to serve as background information to the present research. 
The new Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) (Cap.571) was enacted in 
March 2002 and became operative on 1 April 2003 after several years of preparatory 
drafting work by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and HKSAR 
Government and a lengthy public consultation process. It consolidates 10 diverse 
ordinances that, together with subsidiary legislations, governed the operations of the 
securities and futures contracts industry and leveraged foreign exchange trading in Hong 
Kong in past years. The SFO is divided into 17 Parts and 64 Divisions. Part XV deals 
with the disclosure of interests while Division 4 of Part III and Division 2 of Part XIV 
are related to the issues of insider dealing. 
Part XV of the SFO replaces the repealed Securities (Disclosure of Interests) 
Ordinance (Cap.396) and seeks to modernize the regime for the disclosure of interests in 
securities. The overriding objective of the new disclosure regime is to provide investors 
in listed corporations with more complete and better quality information on a timely 
basis to enable them to make informed investment decisions. This includes requiring the 
disclosure of information that can affect perceptions of the value of listed corporations. 
The regime is also designed to enable investors to identify the persons who control, or 
are in a position to control, interests in shares in listed corporations and those who may 
benefit from transactions involving associated corporations of listed corporations. It 
brings the disclosure requirements in Hong Kong in line with the international and 
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regional standards while trying to keep the compliance cost low. Part XV of the 
Ordinance requires corporate insiders to give notices to the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited (SEHK) and the listed corporation concerned on the occurrence of the 
following events: (1) substantial shareholders of a listed company (individuals and 
corporations who are interested in 5% or more of the voting shares in the listed 
corporation) must disclose their interests, and short positions, in voting shares of the 
listed corporation; (2) directors and chief executives of a listed corporation must disclose 
their interests, and short positions in any shares in the listed corporation (or any of its 
associated corporations) and their interests in any debentures of the listed corporation (or 
any of its associated corporations). 
A statement of when insider dealing takes place is given in Part III and Part XIV 
of the SFO. Insider dealing may take place in the following circumstances: (1) 
possession of relevant information and its use in dealing or getting others to deal by a 
connected person; or its disclosure to others knowing they would deal or get others to 
deal; (2) in takeover situations, knowledge of the takeover becomes relevant information 
and is used by the person involved with the takeover, otherwise than for the takeover, for 
dealing or procuring others to deal. Some possible defenses against a charge of insider 
dealing include: (1) making a profit or avoiding a loss was not a purpose of the insider 
dealing; (2) the insider dealer acted as an agent and did not select or advise on the 
selection of the listed security or derivatives, and did not know that his principal was a 
connected person or had the relevant information; (3) the dealing was a market contract; 
(4) introduction of a person to trade with a substantial shareholder whom the other 
person knows or should know is a substantial shareholder; (5) trading by a person on the 
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knowledge of his own activities and those facilitating such trading. 
It should be noted that the insider dealing regulations for the study period in this 
research are not governed by the new regulatory regime, but the repealed Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap.395) and the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) 
Ordinance (Cap.396). Nevertheless, the central idea is more or less the same. 
Furthermore, the insider dealing records, i.e. the reported insider transactions, in the 
present study are based on the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Part XV of 
the SFO),s disclosure of interest requirements but not the discovery of illegal insider 
dealing discussed in the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Part III and Part XIV of 
the SFO). 
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Chapter 4 Data 
The data in the present study includes reported insider transactions, company 
data of listed firms, as well as Hong Kong stock market and world indices for the period 
from January 1993 to December 1998. 
4.1 Data Collection 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, corporate insiders such as substantial 
shareholders, directors and chief executives of a listed company have the obligation to 
disclose any interests in the listed company, as well as the acquisitions and disposals of 
such interests by giving notifications to the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
(SEHK). In this study, only insider dealing by directors and chief executives is being 
considered.^ The information on each notification by the directors and chief executives 
of listed companies is released to the general public through The Securities (Disclosure 
of Interests) (SDI) Daily Summaries — Directors ‘ / Chief Executives ‘ Notifications 
Report published by the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). The 
publication contains the following details for each insider transaction: company name, 
name of corporate insider, type of security, transaction date, reporting date and 
publication date. 
The data on insider transactions are obtained from InsideTrade Asia (ITA) of 
PRIMARK-DISCLOSURE. The records on the ITA are based on the The Securities 
(Disclosure of Interests) (SDI) Daily Summaries — Directors ‘ / Chief Executives ‘ 
3 Owing to data availability, insider dealing by large shareholders is not included in the present research. 
Nevertheless, some other studies, for example Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990), show that the 
trades of large shareholders contain less information than those of executives do. 
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Notifications Report published by the HKEx. The ITA includes the following 
information for each insider transaction: company name (and its stock code), name of 
corporate insider (i.e. director' or chief executive's name), transaction type (open market 
purchase, open market sale or other types), balances of security holding before and after 
transaction, transaction date, transaction price, etc.. It is possible that a single insider 
transaction is reported more than once to the SEHK. One possibility is that the 
transaction involves only one director or chief executive but is reported by different 
individuals. The other possibility is that the transaction involves more than one corporate 
insider (director or chief executive) and all of them report the transaction individually 
and separately under the obligation of disclosure of interest. However, exact duplication 
of a particular insider transaction does not occur in the ITA dataset. 
Although the insider dealing records in the present study are based on the 
self-reported insider transactions under the disclosure of interest requirements but not 
the discovery of illegal insider dealing, it is worth carrying out the research analyzing 
the legal insider transactions. First, it is strongly believed that corporate insiders trade 
stocks in response to some private information. At least, the information set they own 
must be better than the outside general public possesses. Second, most other research on 
insider trading is based on legal insider transactions and it is able to obtain some striking 
results. 
Company data of listed firms, Hong Kong stock market and world indices 
between January 1993 and December 1998 are collected from DATASTREAM. During 
the study period, 701 companies existed. A complete trading day calendar is constructed 
based on the availability of Hang Seng Index records from the DATASTREAM. 
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The company data for each individual firm includes stock code, daily stock 
prices, daily market capitalization and industry classification. The DATASTREAM 
classifies each company by industry, that is, its primary activity only. Companies with 
the same industrial classification are grouped into sectors. The DATASTREAM 
industrial classifications exist at six levels, level 1 to level 6, from the broadest to the 
narrowest. At levels 4, 5 and 6，the number of sectors and sub-sectors varies over time. 
In contrast, industry classification levels 1，2 and 3 are more stable during the whole 
period of study. Thus the narrowest categorization among the first three levels, that is 
level 3，is chosen. Level 3 comprises nine sectors, namely, resources, basic industries, 
cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, non-cyclical 
services, utilities, information technology and financials. The industry classification 
from the DATASTREAM is used for the construction of market value weighted industry 
indices. 
For the market indices, Hang Seng Index and S&P Global 1200 index are used to 
represent the Hong Kong stock market and the world market respectively. The reasons 
lie in the large total market capitalization of their constituent stocks. The Hang Seng 
Index is a barometer of the Hong Kong stock market and it currently comprises 33 
constituent stocks which are representative of the market. The aggregate market 
capitalization of these stocks accounts for about 70% of the total market capitalization of 
the Hong Kong stock market. The S&P Global 1200 index is the world's first real-time, 
free-float weighted index and it covers approximately 70% of the global market 
capitalization. 
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4.2 Summary Statistics of Insider Trading Data 
Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics of the insider trading data.^ Under the 
study period, January 1993 through December 1998，541 companies listed on the SEHK 
were involved in directors' and chief executives' dealing. The number of firms involved 
in open market purchases and that of open market sales are 507 and 458 respectively. In 
our sample, 16,221 open market purchases and 7,574 open market sales were recorded. 
Directors and chief executives of hotels are the most intensive buyers and insiders of the 
properties group are the most intensive sellers.^ Insider purchases are more commonly 
found among firms with small size (market capitalization), those with a high 
book-to-market (B/M) ratio and those with a low price-to-eaming (P/E) ratio. Insider 
sales are more prominent in the large size (market capitalization) group, low 
book-to-market (B/M) ratio group and high price-to-eaming (P/E) ratio group. 
4 The information contained in Table 1 is adapted from Cheuk (2001). 
5 The industry classification is different from that described previously since the information contained in 
Table 1 is adapted from the other study. The industry classification in Table 1 is not applied to the 
construction of market value weighted industry index because the classification adopted is not available 
from the DATASTREAM. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
5.1 Hypothesis 
Our main concern is the relationship between insider trading and stock volatility^. 
If stock return volatility increases before insider trading (or stock return volatility 
induces insider trading), it is suggested that insiders are interested in insider dealing 
when firms are more volatile ex ante and thus trade to benefit. It is because greater 
volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation and undervaluation. The informed 
traders know earlier than the outside public about the direction and extent to which the 
firm value may change and thus they can accordingly adopt some trading strategies to 
earn with their private information. On the other hand, if stock return volatility rises 
after insider trading (or insider trading induces stock return volatility), insiders may 
deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider dealing by changing the 
corporate investment policies or by manipulating the contents and timing of information 
disclosure. For long stock position, the informed traders may make the firm 
fundamentals more volatile so that when there is overvaluation, they can gain by selling 
their shares; for short position, when there is undervaluation, the insiders can gain by 
buying back shares to cover their short positions. Another explanation is that insider 
dealing may discourage the production of information by outside analysts and thus 
reduce the net informational efficiency of capital markets. If stock return volatility drops 
after insider trading, a possible reason is that insider trading can reflect information 
efficiently and drive the stock price to the true value quickly. Provided that noise trading 
6 In the financial economics literature, stock volatility usually refers to the volatility of stock return. The 
terms "stock volatility" and "stock return volatility" are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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remains the same before and after insider dealing, information revelation may reduce the 
uncertainly about the firm fundamentals and hence decrease volatility. Surely, the two 
opposing effects may cancel out with each other. It is also hypothesized that when 
insider trading occurs, revealing true information, the stock return would be more 
volatile for a very short period of time during price adjustment to the true fundamental 
value. The volatility then declines as the stock price becomes stable after reflecting 
information. If the information is false or misleading, the volatility may increase after 
insider trading and probably remain at a relatively high level. 
5.2 Event Study 
An event study methodology is adopted to investigate the stock volatility 
changes surrounding insider trading events. Event study has many applications. In 
accounting and finance research, it has been applied to a variety of firm specific and 
economy wide events. Some examples include mergers and acquisitions, earnings 
announcements, issues of new debt or equity, and announcements of macroeconomic 
variables. The impacts of an event on some firm variables such as firm value, abnormal 
return and volatility can be observed over a relatively short period of time. The 
applications in other fields are also abundant. For example, event study is utilized in the 
field of law and economics to measure the impact of a change in the regulatory 
environment on the value of a firm. 
Much empirical research applies event study methodology by simply examining 
the changes of a variable around the occurrence of a single event observation under 
consideration. However, intensive occurrence of an event may distort the results since 
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one observation would interfere with the effects produced by the others. In this research, 
we try to reduce this distortion by two alternative ways. Firstly, we can define a single 
insider transaction as an event if there is no other insider trading of the same type of the 
same stock within 90 days before and after the aforesaid transaction. Secondly, an 
insider trading event can be defined as a group of insider transactions of the same type 
of the same stock if there are no more than n days between two nearest transactions. An 
event can be defined in this way because a group (cluster) of insider transactions would 
probably respond to and thus reflect the same information. For example, consider the 
following pattern of trading of a particular firm. 
/ 7 / 0 / / 0 0 7 / / 7 
where 
I indicates the occurrence of a particular type of insider trading on that 
particular trading day 
0 indicates that there is no insider trading of that particular type on that day 
event 1 event 2 event 3 
I f n 二 0 ， T ~ T ~ i 0 T ~ I 0 0 / / / / 
event 1 event 2 
A. 人 
I f n = 1, / / / 0 / / 0 0 / / / / 
event 1 
入 
I f n = 2, I I I Q I I O Q I I I I 
Some literature suggests that the information contents in insider purchases and 
insider sales are different. Hence, they are usually examined separately in most of the 
studies on insider trading and they very often lead to different results. For the purpose of 
making our study comparable to the existing literature, event study analysis considering 
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purchases and sales separately is also carried out in the present research. 
Once an insider trading event is defined, stock returns around the event 
occurrence are retrieved. In each event observation i, 90 daily stock returns,巧，(where 
t = -90,..., -1，+1，.. ，+90 indicates the day relative to the event occurrence), before and 
• 7 
after the insider trading event are calculated as depicted in the following figure. 
Insider 
�,-90 . . . 化-2 厂.，-1 trading 化+2 ... 巧，+9o 
event 
where 
is the daily stock return for observation i at day t 
As suggested by Seyhun (1986)，information-related trading by corporate 
insiders is in response to economy-wide, industry-wide and firm specific factors. We 
begin with total volatility which reflects all three factors mentioned above, and then 
move on to firm specific volatility. First, for a particular stock j, the daily total stock 




r., is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
p., is the closing price of stock j at day t 
The total volatility of stock j for period T can be measured by standard deviation 
of daily total stock returns in period T. 
〜=沾? 
7 As each observation i is accompanied by a corresponding firm j, the returns of stock j are picked. 
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where 
(j^ j j is the standard deviation of daily total stock returns of stock j for period T 
(total volatility) 
Vj, is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
Fj j is the mean of r^) over t for period T 
D is the set of all trading days of stock j in period T 
• g 
k is the number of trading days of stock j in period T 
On the other hand, the implications from a firm level analysis can provide much 
more insight because the motives of insider dealing most probably come from firm 
specific information. Accordingly abnormal return volatility is computed by removing 
the Hong Kong market factor. First, the daily abnormal return for a particular stock j at 
each day t is obtained by running the following regression decomposition. 
厂"= + +‘，/m，,+〜 
where 
Vj t is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
r^ t is the daily return of market value weighted index at day t 
Uj t is the regression residual and the daily abnormal return of stock j at day t 
dj is the estimated intercept for stock j 
b^ . is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted index 
for stock j 
8 If the number of trading days of stock j in period T is less than two, then the standard deviation of stock 
j for period T is dropped. 
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The abnormal return computation actually follows the Market Model. Generally, 
the abnormal return is the actual ex post return minus the normal return of the stock. 
There are two common choices for modeling the normal return - the constant mean 
return model and the Market Model. The constant mean return model assumes that the 
mean return of a given security is constant through time. The Market Model assumes a 
stable linear relation between the security return and the market return. The two models 
are categorized as the statistical model. The assumption that asset returns are jointly 
multivariate normal and independently and identically distributed through time is 
imposed. This distributional assumption is sufficient for the constant mean return model 
and the Market Model to be correctly specified. While this assumption is strong, in 
practice it generally does not lead to problems because the assumption is empirically 
reasonable. Since the Market Model removes the portion of return that is related to the 
variation in the market return, it leads to increased ability to detect event effects. Hence, 
the Market Model represents a potential improvement over the constant mean return 
model. Though some economic models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APT) are sometimes adopted in other studies, 
imposition of more restrictions is needed and consequently some problems and 
complexity arise. The above reasons justify the fact that the Market Model is widely and 
commonly utilized in various event studies. We thus adopt it in the present research.^ 
The abnormal return volatility of stock j for period T can be measured by 
standard deviation of daily abnormal returns in period T. 
� r = 〜 - 巧 ， J 
9 For detailed discussion on models for measuring normal performance, see Mackinlay (1997). 
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where 
(Ju,j’T is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns of stock j for period T 
(abnormal return volatility) 
Uj, is the daily abnormal return of stock j at day t 
Uj T is the mean of Vj^ over t for period T 
Furthermore, we can obtain firm specific volatility by further controlling for the 
global and industry effects. A world index S&P Global 1200 and a self-constructed 
market value weighted industry index are included in the regression decomposition in 
addition to the Hong Kong market factor. 
rj,t = + Pw,/w,t + P m J m , + Pi,/i,t + 
where 
Vj, is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
r � i s the daily return of S&P Global 1200 at day t 
r似， i s the daily return of market value weighted index at day t 
Vj t is the daily return of market value weighted industry index to which stock j 
belongs at day t 
£., is the regression residual and the daily firm specific return of stock j at day t 
d j is the estimated intercept for stock j 
P^ . is the estimated coefficient of daily return of S&P Global 1200 for stock j 
P^ . is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted index 
for stock j 
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/V 
Pj J is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted 
industry index for stock j 
The firm specific return calculation is based on a statistical model called 
Multifactor Model. The Multifactor Model is an extension of the Market Model by 
introducing more factors into the regression. Industry factor is a common choice and 
Dumev et al. (2003, 2004) give a name for the abnormal component with market factor 
and industry factor removed 〜 ， a s firm specific return. Besides, some research such as 
Morck et al. (2000) includes a global indicator in the Multifactor Model, hence a world 
index S&P Global 1200 is also introduced into our regression decomposition. 
The firm specific return volatility of stock j for period T can be measured by 
standard deviation of daily firm specific returns in period T. 
where 
(T . T is the standard deviation of daily firm specific returns of stock j for period 
T (firm specific volatility) 
£. t is the daily firm specific return of stock j at day t 
S j j is the mean of ~ , over t for period T 
Therefore, for a particular stock j, standard deviation of daily total stock return, 
(j^ J T (total volatility), standard deviation of daily abnormal return, o•�，(abnormal 
return volatility) and standard deviation of daily firm specific return, a^ j j^  (firm 
specific volatility), are used separately for the volatility variable. The abnormal return 
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volatility can be regarded as the case lying between total volatility and firm specific 
volatility. The analysis of this case is also included in the current study because the 
abnormal return based on the Market Model is very often being examined in other 
insider trading literature and hence it is worth investigating the volatility of abnormal 
return. 
We will look at some general trends before going into a detailed analysis. In each 
event observation i, 18 stock return volatility values using 5-day interval without 
overlapping (90 trading days) before and after an insider trading event are calculated as 
illustrated in the following figure. 
Insider 
� - 1 8 . . . � - 1 trading cr,十丄 cr, +2 • . . cr. +is 
event 
where 
cr. J is the standard deviation for observation i for period T (5-day interval) 
We use daily data within each period to construct volatility for that period 
without imposing any parametric models such as ARCH or other stochastic volatility 
models to describe the evolution of volatility over time. These models are notoriously 
complicated and difficult to estimate. Besides, although the choice of parametric model 
may be essential for volatility forecasting, it is less important for describing historical 
movements in volatility. As suggested by Merton (1980), Nelson (1992) and Andersen 
et al. (2001), with sufficiently high frequency data, volatility can be estimated accurately 
over a short time interval. 
The average stock return volatility over all observations surrounding insider 
trading events from T = -18 (t = -90 to t = -85) to T = +18 (t = +85 to t = +90) for 
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various insider trading events and types of volatility are calculated/^ The computation 
is shown as follows. 
Insider 
Obs 1 cri,-i8 ... CTi-i trading cri,+i … 
event 
Obs 2 0"2，-18 ... (^ 2,-1 � 1 ... +18 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Obsi cr._i8 ... �i,+i ... 
• • • • • • • • 、V‘ 、^V‘ ^^V^ ‘^ ^V^^‘ 
Average cr—is cr+i 
Z � 8 l X - 1 Z � + 1 Z �+18 
二 ^^^ , ，o-,, and = ^ 
no. of obs no. of obs no. of obs no. of obs 
where 
(J T is the standard deviation for observation i for period T (5-day interval) 
OV is the average standard deviation for period T (5-day interval) 
S is the set of all volatility observations in period T (5-day interval) 
no. of obs is the number of volatility observations in period T (5-day interval) 
Finally, F-test comparing two stock return volatility values is adopted to confirm 
our observation with bare eyes. The statistical test is performed case by case to compare 
the stock return volatility over two time periods relative to the event occurrence cj^ j^  
and (j.^ where cr. ^ and a, 丁 are the standard deviations for observation i 
The averages are computed only for the purpose of obtaining general trends. 
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calculated over period TJ and period T^  respectively. The proportion of cases that 
volatility for period is significantly greater than that for period T\ and vice versa 
over all observations are then obtained. For our proposition that volatility over period 
is greater than that over period T^，the null hypothesis of F-test is H � = < cr.j^ 
while the alternative hypothesis is H^ = cr.^ y, > . Our research mainly focuses on 
the following four analyses: volatility change immediately before insider trading, 
volatility immediately before and after insider trading, volatility change immediately 
after insider trading, intermediate term volatility before and after insider trading. 
5.3 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis 
A vector autoregression (VAR) model is used to examine the interrelationship 
between insider trading and market return volatility. Granger causality test serves as a 
test to study the lag dependence of insider trading and volatility variables. The 
interdependencies and interactions between the two variables, insider trading and market 
return volatility, are examined. According to some literature, insider purchases and 
insider sales contain different information set. Hence they are commonly investigated 
separately in most of the studies on insider trading and indeed they very often give rise 
to different findings. For instance, Chowdhury et al. (1993) separate purchases and sales 
when applying VAR model to examine the aggregate insider transaction and market 
return and obtain different results for purchases and sales. To make the present study 
comparable to the existing literature, VAR analysis on the interdependencies and 
interactions among the three variables, namely, insider purchase, insider sale and market 
return volatility is also carried out. 
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The insider trading variable is defined as the number of and the dollar amount of 
insider transactions of all stocks available in a weekly interval. Similarly, we define the 
insider purchase variable as the number of and the dollar amount of insider purchases in 
a weekly interval, the insider sale variable as the number of and the dollar amount of 
insider sales in a weekly interval. Different insider trading measures (number and dollar 
amount) are adopted separately in our VAR study. 
Seyhun (1986) points out that insider trading is in response to economy-wide, 
industry-wide and firm specific factors. We start with a macroeconomic level analysis 
and then move on to a firm level analysis. For the macroeconomic level analysis, some 
market indices can be used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The publicly available 
index in Hong Kong, Hang Seng Index, is one choice. Besides, a self-constructed market 
value weighted index and a self-constructed equal weighted index composed of all 
individual stocks under this study are employed. ” The three indices can track the 
general performance of the Hong Kong stock market. The Hang Seng Index is a 
well-known indicator for the Hong Kong stock market and it is observable by all 
investors around the world. Currently, it comprises 33 constituent stocks which account 
for about 70% of the total market capitalization of the Hong Kong stock market. A 
common criticism to the Hang Seng Index as a market indicator is that it represents only 
33 stocks out of more than 600 stocks listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
Hence, a self-constructed market value weighted index including all stocks in the study 
period is also employed. In addition to the 70% of market capitalization that can be 
represented by the Hang Seng Index, the self-constructed market value weighted index 
captures the remaining 30% of the total market capitalization. So, the ability to track the 
11 The details of the constituent stocks of the self-constructed market indices are available upon request. 
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general market movement of Hong Kong is improved. It should be noted that stocks 
with higher market capitalization dominate the index value, and the index price is not 
readily observable by all investors. Equal weighted index is another commonly used 
index in other stock markets and the index value is dominated by stocks with higher 
prices. However, the index is not publicly available in Hong Kong. Therefore, a 
self-constructed equal weighted index including all stocks in the study period is created 
and certainly it is not observable by general investors. 
First, the daily market return at each day t is calculated. 
_ PM,t — Pmj-I 
厂M" - p 
where 
厂 从 ， i s the daily market return at day t 
Pm t is the closing index value at day t (Hang Seng Index, market value 
weighted index or equal weighted index) 
The market return volatility for week T can be measured by standard deviation of 
daily market returns in a weekly interval. 
- j紀一iZ(rM’t -�M’T) 
where 
<Jm t is the standard deviation of daily market returns for week T 
r似， i s the daily market return at day t 
�m，t is the mean of r似，over t for week T 
D is the set of all trading days in week T 
43 
k is the number of trading days in week T and it varies across weeks 
Alternatively, the volatility can be measured by high-low spread. 
H-L spreadm,t =厂M,//，r —尸似，丄，r 
where 
H-L spreadm’t is the high-low spread measure of daily market returns for 
weekT 
r ^ , T is the highest daily market return during week T 
rM,l,t is the lowest daily market return during week T 
On the other hand, a market indicator can be constructed from a different angle 
and the concepts of total return, abnormal return and firm specific return in event study 
are employed. In VAR analysis, some aggregate return measures are computed and they 
are dominated by stocks with higher returns. It is worthwhile to study aggregate return 
measures as percentage return is sometimes more important than absolute price change 
in financial economics. Analogous to other market indices, average is applied. We first 
consider aggregate total volatility which reflects economy-wide, industry-wide and firm 
specific factors. For each stock j, the daily total stock return at each day t is calculated. 
厂"一 p 
where 
Vj, is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
Pj t is the closing price of stock j at day t 
Then the daily average total stock return over all stocks (aggregate total return) at 
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f] is the daily average total stock return over all stocks (aggregate total return) at 
day t 
r " is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
J is the set of all trading stocks at day t 
N is the number of trading stocks at day t 
The aggregate total volatility for week T can be measured by standard deviation 
of daily aggregate total returns in a weekly interval. 
where 
(j^ T is the standard deviation of daily aggregate total returns for week T 
f] is the daily aggregate total return at day t 
Fj. is the mean of r^  over t for week T 
Alternatively, the volatility can be measured by high-low spread. 
H-L spread^j = r^j _ 
where 
H-L spreadr 丁 is the high-low spread measure of daily aggregate total returns 
for week T 
45 
r ^ j is the highest daily aggregate total return during week T 
r^ j is the lowest daily aggregate total return during week T 
Since insider dealing is more likely driven by firm specific information, the 
implications from the firm level analysis can provide much more insight. Analogous to 
the aggregate total volatility, aggregate abnormal return volatility is computed by 
removing the Hong Kong market factor. First, the daily abnormal return for each stock j 
1 ， 
at each day t is obtained by running the following regression decomposition, 
where 
rj,t is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
r似 t is the daily return of market value weighted index at day t 
Dj, is the regression residual and the daily abnormal return of stock j at day t 
dj is the estimated intercept for stock j 
A 
b^ J is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted index 
for stock j 
Then the daily average abnormal return over all stocks (aggregate abnormal 
return) at each day t is computed. 
t N 
where 
v^  is the daily average abnormal return over all stocks (aggregate abnormal 
12 The method is the same as that utilized in event study. 
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return) at day t 
Oj ^ is the daily abnormal return of stock j at day t 
The aggregate abnormal return volatility for week T can be measured by 
standard deviation of daily aggregate abnormal returns in a weekly interval. 
where 
(j^ ^ j is the standard deviation of daily aggregate abnormal returns for week T 
v^  is the daily aggregate abnormal return at day t 
Uj is the mean of u^  over t for week T 
Alternatively, the volatility can be measured by high-low spread. 
H-L spread^j = v^j -u以 
where 
H - L spread�丁 is the high-low spread measure of daily aggregate abnormal 
returns for week T 
Uh t is the highest daily aggregate abnormal return during week T 
t is the lowest daily aggregate abnormal return during week T 
We then obtain aggregate firm specific volatility by further eliminating the 
global and industry effects. A world index S&P Global 1200 and a self-constructed 
market value weighted industry index are included in the regression decomposition in 
addition to the Hong Kong market factor/^ 
13 The method is the same as that utilized in event study. 
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= + Pwjw, + PmJM, + A , / / ， , + 已 
where 
r " is the daily total stock return of stock j at day t 
r � i s the daily return of S&P Global 1200 at day t 
r似， i s the daily return of market value weighted index at day t 
r " is the daily return of market value weighted industry index to which stock j 
belongs at day t 
£j t is the regression residual and the daily firm specific return of stock j at day t 
d j is the estimated intercept for stock j 
fK 
P^ J is the estimated coefficient of daily return of S&P Global 1200 for stock j 
Pm j is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted index 
for stock j 
/V 
Pj J is the estimated coefficient of daily return of market value weighted 
industry index for stock j 
Next the daily average firm specific return over all stocks (aggregate firm 
specific return) at each day t is computed. 
St 二 ^ ^ 
t N 
where 
St is the daily average firm specific return over all stocks (aggregate firm 
specific return) at day t 
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is the daily firm specific return of stock j at day t 
The aggregate firm specific volatility for week T can be measured by standard 
deviation of daily aggregate firm specific returns in a weekly interval. 
where 
(j^ j is the standard deviation of daily aggregate firm specific returns for week T 
E^  is the daily aggregate firm specific return at day t 
Sj is the mean of e^  over t for week T 
Alternatively, the volatility can be measured by high-low spread. 
H - L spread�T = — 
where 
H - L spreads 丁 is the high-low spread measure of daily aggregate firm specific 
returns for week T 
Sh t is the highest daily aggregate firm specific return during week T 
Sl t is the lowest daily aggregate firm specific return during week T 
After obtaining the time series variables required, augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
is conducted to test the presence of unit roots for each series. Since a misspecification 
concerning the deterministic part of the regression may cause a failure of the test to 
reject the null of a unit root, the procedure suggested by Doldado et al. (1990) to test for 
a unit root when the form of the data-generating process is unknown is applied. Next, 
multivariate Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) is used to determine the inclusion of 
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intercept and the appropriate lag length of the VAR model. 
Finally, VAR Granger causality test is performed for different insider trading 
measures (number and dollar amount), types of volatility (volatility of Hang Seng Index 
return, volatility of market value weighted index return, volatility of equal weighted 
index return, aggregate total volatility, aggregate abnormal return volatility and 
aggregate firm specific volatility) and volatility measures (standard deviation and 
high-low spread) in the two-variable (insider trading and volatility) system and the 
three-variable (insider purchase, insider sale and volatility) system. It seems that solely 
considering the aggregate firm specific volatility is sufficient for the firm level analysis. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the aggregate abnormal return volatility is included in this 
study since the abnormal return based on the Market Model is very often being 
examined in other insider trading literature and so it is worth investigating the volatility 
of abnormal return. Investigation by dividing the whole sample period into pre-Asian 
Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) and Asian Financial Crisis period (from 
July 97 to 98) is also conducted. It should be noted that the VAR methodology for the 
aggregate abnormal return volatility and the aggregate firm specific volatility are 
interpreted in an aggregate sense though the market effects have been removed. It is 
because the return measures are just averages over all stocks. A thorough firm level 
investigation should rely on event study methodology. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Event Study 
The empirical findings of event study are discussed in this Chapter. First, a 
general description of results is presented. F-test is then adopted to confirm our 
observation with bare eyes and to perform further analyses; the findings are reported 
next. 
6.1 General Description of Results 
In the event study methodology for the present research, there are several event 
definitions which result in different numbers of event observations. Table 2 shows the 
summary. Table 3 reports some preliminary findings and general trends of the event 
study. In each event observation i, 18 stock return volatility values using 5-day interval 
without overlapping (90 trading days) before and after an insider trading event are 
calculated. The average stock return volatility over all observations surrounding insider 
trading events from T = —18 (t = —90 to t = -85) to T - +18 (t = +85 to t = +90) for 
various insider trading events and types of volatility is reported in Table 3.14 p^^ better 
visualization, the Table is also accompanied by several graphs which are shown in 
Figure 1. 
6.1.1 Insider Purchase Event 
As exhibited in Table 2, there are 498 observations (events) for event defined as 
14 The computation of average stock return volatility is illustrated in the previous Chapter. The 
presentation of average volatility in the Table is the transpose of that previously shown owing to the 
limitation of paper size. The timeline in the figure shown previously is horizontal while that in the Table is 
vertical. 
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a single insider purchase with no other insider purchases of the same stock within 90 
days (90 clean days) before and after the purchase. For event defined as a cluster of 
insider purchases, there are 9225 observations (events) for n = 0, 7772 observations 
(events) for n = 1 and 6626 observations (events) for n = 2. 
Panels A to C of Table 3 and Figures lA to IC display the average stock return 
volatility over all observations around insider purchase events from T = —18toT = +18. 
The findings from the analysis using the three different types of volatility (total volatility, 
abnormal return volatility and firm specific volatility) are reported in separate Panels. In 
general, insider purchases are found to occur after a short period of a stock return 
volatility rise. After insider purchase events, volatility stays relatively high for a short 
period, and then drops abruptly and returns to the original level. 
6.1.2 Insider Sale Event 
From Table 2, there are 488 observations (events) for event defined as a single 
insider sale with no other insider sales of the same stock within 90 days (90 clean days) 
before and after the sale. For event defined as a cluster of insider sales, there are 4745 
observations (events) for n = 0, 4204 observations (events) for n = 1 and 3815 
observations (events) for n = 2. 
Panels D to F of Table 3 and Figures ID to IF display the average stock return 
volatility over all observations around insider sale events from T = -18 to T = +18. The 
findings from the analysis using the three different types of volatility are reported in 
separate Panels. In general, insider sales are found to occur after a short period of a stock 
return volatility rise. After insider sale events, volatility stays relatively high for a short 
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period, and then drops abruptly and returns to the original level. 
6.1.3 Total Insider Trading Event 
From Table 2, there are 499 observations (events) for event defined as a single 
insider transaction (either purchase or sale) with no other insider transactions of the 
same stock within 90 days (90 clean days) before and after the transaction. For event 
defined as a cluster of insider transactions, there are 13136 observations (events) for n = 
0, 11026 observations (events) for n = 1 and 9459 observations (events) for n = 2. 
Panels G to I of Table 3 and Figures IG to II present the average stock return 
volatility over all observations surrounding total insider trading events (either purchases 
or sales) from T = —18toT = +18. The results from the analysis employing the three 
different types of volatility are reported in separate Panels. Generally, insider 
transactions are found to occur after a short period of a stock return volatility rise. After 
total insider trading events, volatility stays relatively high for a short period, and then 
drops abruptly and returns to the original level. 
6.2 Volatility Change Immediately before Insider Trading 
As described above, insider purchase events, insider sale events and total insider 
trading events (either purchases or sales) occur after a short period of a stock return 
volatility increase. The stock volatility calculated over day —10 to day -6 and that 
calculated over day -5 to day -1 are compared case by case. The computation of 




Obs i ^ -90 ... 厂，-6 化-5 ... 巧，-1 event ... 化+90 
� J ^ J 
V V 
r. t is the daily stock return for observation i at day t 
C/’f叫to/2 is the standard deviation for observation i calculated over d a y � t o 
day 
Besides, the volatility over day -20 to day -11 and that over day —10 to day —1, 
and the volatility over day -40 to day -21 and that over day -20 to day —1 are compared. 
F-test comparing two sample standard deviations is employed and the proportion of 
cases that volatility significantly rises and drops at 10% level of significance is 
obtained. 15 Table 4 summarizes the results. 
The cases that volatility neither significantly increases nor decreases dominate, 
accounting for around 55% to 80% of successful comparisons^^. That means there is no 
strong and clear-cut relation detected. Nevertheless, by restricting ourselves to the 
statistically significant portion, interesting results can still be found by comparing the 
numbers of rises and declines. 
6.2.1 Insider Purchase Event 
The Analysis of total volatility, as displayed in Panel A, reveals that for single 
15 Throughout this Chapter, wherever a comparison of volatility, such as an increase or a decrease, is 
made, it is referred to "significant at 10% level of significance using F-test". 
16 The number of successful comparisons may be less than the number of event observations owing to 
insufficient data in calculating sample standard deviations in some circumstances. 
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insider purchase with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 13.40% of 388 
successful comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day -10 to day - 6 to 
period over day - 5 to day - 1 before an insider purchase event while 7.47% show a 
decrease. The number of increases is nearly double that of decreases. Comparing 
volatility over day -20 to day —11 and volatility over day -10 to day —1, we find that the 
cases of rises (16.59% of 410 comparisons) are more than those of declines (13.66%). 
When period over day -40 to day -21 and period over day -20 to day - 1 are compared, 
22.95% of 427 cases show an increase in volatility while 18.03% show a decrease. In 
addition, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also confirm our 
observation by demonstrating that the cases of increases are more than those of 
decreases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel B illustrates that for single insider purchase 
with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 13.08% of 390 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from period over day -10 to day —6 to period over day -5 to 
day —1 before an insider purchase event while 7.18% show a decrease. The number of 
increases is nearly double that of decreases. Comparing volatility over day -20 to 
day —11 and volatility over day —10 to day —1, we observe that the cases of rises (16.83% 
of 416 comparisons) are more than those of declines (12.02%) by 40%. When period 
over day —40 to day —21 and period over day -20 to day - 1 are compared, 21.03% of 
428 cases show an increase in volatility while 17.06% show a decrease. The results from 
event defined as a cluster of insider purchases when comparing volatility over day -10 
to day - 6 to that over day -5 to day —1 and volatility over day -20 to day -11 to that 
over day -10 to day - 1 also support our hypothesis by demonstrating that the cases of 
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increases are more than those of decreases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel C reports that for single insider purchase with 
90 clean days before and after the purchase, 12.05% of 390 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from period over day -10 to day - 6 to period over day - 5 to 
day - 1 before an insider purchase event while 7.44% show a decrease. The number of 
increases is more than the number of decreases by 60%. Comparing volatility over 
day -20 to day -11 and volatility over day —10 to day -1, we observe that the cases of 
rises (18.03% of 416 comparisons) are more than those of declines (12.50%). The 
former is more than the latter by 40%. When period over day —40 to day -21 and period 
over day -20 to day - 1 are compared, 20.56% of 428 cases show an increase in volatility 
while 15.89% show a decrease. The results from event defined as a cluster of insider 
purchases also confirm our observation by demonstrating that the number of increases is 
more than that of decreases. 
The results suggest that the cases of rises in stock return volatility before insider 
purchases are more frequent than the cases of declines. Hence it is more likely that 
volatility increases rather than decreases before insider purchases. This supports our 
hypothesis that stock return volatility induces insider purchases. Insiders are interested 
in insider purchases when firms are more volatile ex ante and trade to benefit. It is 
because greater volatility implies higher chances of undervaluation. The informed 
traders know earlier than the outside public about the direction and extent to which the 
firm value may change and thus they can purchase stocks accordingly to earn with their 
private information. 
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6.2.2 Insider Sale Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as exhibited in Panel D, reveals that for 
single insider sale with 90 clean days before and after the sale, 12.83% of 413 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day -10 to day - 6 to period 
over day - 5 to day - 1 before an insider sale event while 5.81% show a decrease. The 
number of increases is more than double that of decreases. When period over day -20 to 
day -11 and period over day -10 to day - 1 are compared, 18.64% of 440 cases show an 
increase in volatility while 11.59% show a decrease. The former is more than the latter 
by 60%. A Comparison between volatility over day -40 to day -21 and volatility over 
day -20 to day —1 also shows similar findings. Besides, the results from event defined as 
a cluster of insider sales demonstrate that the cases of rises are more than those of 
declines by about 30% to 40%, supporting our hypothesis. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel E illustrates that for single insider sale with 
90 clean days before and after the sale, 12.08% of 414 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day -10 to day - 6 to period over day -5 to day - 1 
before an insider sale event while 7.00% show a decrease. The number of increases is 
more than the number of decreases by 70%. When period over day -20 to day -11 and 
period over day -10 to day - 1 are compared, 17.65% of 442 cases show an increase in 
volatility while 11.76% show a decrease. The former is more than the latter by half. A 
comparison between volatility over day —40 to day -21 and volatility over day —20 to 
day - 1 also shows similar results. Besides, the results from event defined as a cluster of 
insider sales demonstrate that the cases of rises are more than those of declines by about 
30%, confirming our observation. The results are more pronounced when comparing 
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volatility over day -20 to day -11 to that over day -10 to day - 1 and volatility over 
day -40 to day -21 to that over day -20 to day -1. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel F reports that for single insider sale with 90 
clean days before and after the sale, 12.32% of 414 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day —10 to day - 6 to period over day - 5 to day - 1 
before an insider sale event while 7.25% show a decrease. The number of increases is 
more than the number of decreases by 70%. When period over day —20 to day —11 and 
period over day -10 to day - 1 are compared, 17.87% of 442 cases show an increase in 
volatility while 11.54% show a decrease. The former is more than the latter by half. A 
comparison between volatility over day —40 to day —21 and volatility over day -20 to 
day —1 also shows similar findings. Besides, the results from event defined as a cluster 
of insider sales demonstrate that the number of rises is more than that of declines by 
about 30% to 40%, confirming our observation. 
The findings suggest that, like insider purchases, the cases of rises in stock return 
volatility before insider sales are more frequent than the cases of declines. Hence it is 
more probably that volatility increases rather than decreases before insider sales. This 
supports our hypothesis that stock return volatility induces insider sales. Insiders are 
interested in insider sales when firms are more volatile ex ante and trade to benefit. It is 
because greater volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation. The informed traders 
know earlier than the outside public about the direction and extent to which the firm 
value may change and thus they can sell stocks accordingly to earn with their private 
information. 
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6.2.3 Total Insider Trading Event 
The results from the analysis employing total volatility, as reported in Panel G, 
reveal that for single insider transaction with 90 clean days before and after the 
transaction, 10.82% of 379 successful comparisons show a volatility increase from 
period over day -10 to day - 6 to period over day - 5 to day —1 before a total insider 
trading event while 6.86% show a decrease. The number of increases is more than the 
number of decreases by 60%. Comparing volatility over day —20 to day —11 and 
volatility over day —10 to day -1, we find that the cases of rises (17.56% of 410 
comparisons) are more than those of declines (13.17%). When period over day -40 to 
day -21 and period over day -20 to day —1 are compared, 22.38% of 429 cases show an 
increase in volatility while 17.25% show a decrease. In addition, the results from event 
defined as a cluster of insider transactions also confirm our observation by 
demonstrating that the cases of increases are more than those of decreases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel H illustrates that for single insider 
transaction with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 10.47% of 382 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day —10 to day —6 to period 
over day - 5 to day - 1 before a total insider trading event while 6.28% show a decrease. 
The number of increases is more than the number of decreases by 70%. Comparing 
volatility over day -20 to day-11 and volatility over day -10 to day —1, we observe that 
the cases of rises (18.47% of 417 comparisons) are more than those of declines (11.27%). 
The former is more than the latter by 60%. When period over day -40 to day -21 and 
period over day -20 to day - 1 are compared, 21.40% of 430 cases show an increase in 
volatility while 17.67% show a decrease. The results from event defined as a cluster of 
59 
insider transactions also demonstrate that the cases of increases are more than those of 
decreases, supporting our hypothesis. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel I illustrates that for single insider transaction 
with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 9.95% of 382 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day -10 to day - 6 to period 
over day - 5 to day - 1 before a total insider trading event while 6.28% show a decrease. 
The number of increases is more than the number of decreases by 60%. Comparing 
volatility over day -20 to day -11 and volatility over day -10 to day -1, we observe that 
the cases of rises (18.71% of 417 comparisons) are more than those of declines (11.51% 
by 60%). When period over day -40 to day -21 and period over day -20 to day - 1 are 
compared, 21.86% of 430 cases show an increase in volatility while 15.81% show a 
decrease. The former is more than the latter by 40%. The results from event defined as a 
cluster of insider transactions also demonstrate that the number of rises is more than that 
of declines, confirming our observation. 
In conclusion, the cases of rises in stock return volatility before insider 
transactions are more than the cases of declines. Hence it is more probably that volatility 
increases instead of decreases before insider transactions. It is not surprising because 
both purchases and sales give the same conclusion. This supports our hypothesis that 
stock return volatility induces insider transactions. Insiders are interested in insider 
trading when firms are more volatile ex ante and trade to benefit. It is because greater 
volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation and undervaluation. The informed 
traders know earlier than the outside public about the direction and extent to which the 
firm value may change and thus they can trade stocks accordingly to earn with their 
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private information. 
6.3 Volatility Immediately before and after Insider Trading 
According to our previous discussion, stock return volatility stays relatively high 
for a short period after insider purchase events, insider sale events and total insider 
trading events (either purchases or sales). The stock volatility calculated over day - 5 to 
day - 1 and that over day +1 to day +5 are compared observation by observation. The 
volatility over day-10 to day - 1 and that over day +1 to day +10, and the volatility over 
day -20 to day —1 and that over day +1 to day +20 are also compared. F-test comparing 
two sample standard deviations is adopted and the fraction of cases that volatility 
significantly rises and drops at 10% level of significance is obtained. The findings are 
presented in Table 5. 
Interesting results are found by restricting ourselves to the statistically significant 
portion and comparing the numbers of rises and declines, though the proportion that 
volatility neither significantly increases nor decreases dominates and occupies about 
55% to 80% of successful comparisons. 
6.3.1 Insider Purchase Event 
The analysis of total volatility, as displayed in Panel A，reveals that for single 
insider purchase with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 8.82% of 397 
successful comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day —1 to 
period over day +1 to day +5 around an insider purchase event while 13.60% show a 
decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number of decreases by half. When 
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period over day —10 to day-1 and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 15.40% 
of 435 cases show an increase in volatility while 17.47% show a decrease. Comparing 
volatility over day —20 to day —1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20，we find that the 
cases of declines (22.72% of 449 comparisons) are more than those of rises (19.82%). 
Furthermore, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also show 
that the number of decreases is more than that of increases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel B illustrates that for single insider purchase 
with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 8.23% of 401 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day - 1 to period over day +1 to 
day +5 around an insider purchase event while 13.22% show a decrease. The number of 
decreases is more than the number of increases by 60%. When period over day -10 to 
day - 1 and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 14.58% of 439 cases show an 
increase in volatility while 16.86% show a decrease. Comparing volatility over day -20 
to day - 1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we observe that the cases of declines 
(23.33% of 450 comparisons) are more than those of rises (18.89%). The results from 
event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also show that the number of decreases is 
more than that of increases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel C reports that for single insider purchase with 
90 clean days before and after the purchase, 9.98% of 401 successful comparisons show 
a volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day —1 to period over day +1 to day +5 
around an insider purchase event while 13.47% show a decrease. The number of 
decreases is more than the number of increases by nearly 40%. When period over 
day —10 to day - 1 and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 15.03% of 439 
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cases show an increase in volatility while 17.54% show a decrease. Comparing volatility 
over day -20 to day - 1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we observe that the cases 
of declines (24.00% of 450 comparisons) are more than those of rises (18.00%). The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also show that the number of 
decreases is more than that of increases. 
To conclude, stock return volatility generally is more likely lower instead of 
higher after insider purchases. It is suggested that insider purchases can reveal true 
information quite efficiently and the stock price is driven to the true fundamental value 
very quickly. 
6.3.2 Insider Sale Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as exhibited in Panel D, reveals that for 
single insider sale with 90 clean days before and after the sale, 5.26% of 418 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day -5 to day - 1 to period over 
day +1 to day +5 around an insider sale event while 10.29% show a decrease. The 
number of decreases is double that of increases. When period over day -10 to day - 1 
and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 9.60% of 448 cases show an increase 
in volatility while 16.74% show a decrease. The latter is more than the former by 70%. 
Comparing volatility over day —20 to day - 1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20，we 
find that the cases of declines (23.16% of 462 comparisons) are more than those of rises 
(13.42%) by 70%. Furthermore, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider 
sales also show that the number of decreases is more than that of increases. The findings 
are more pronounced when comparing volatility over day -10 to day —1 and that over 
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day +1 to day +10 and the cases of decreases are more than the cases of increases by 
about 30%. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel E illustrates that for single insider sale with 
90 clean days before and after the sale, 5.97% of 419 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day —1 to period over day +1 to day +5 
around an insider sale event while 11.93% show a decrease. The number of decreases is 
double that of increases. When period over day —10 to day —1 and period over day +1 to 
day +10 are compared, 8.87% of 451 cases show an increase in volatility while 16.63% 
show a decrease. The latter is nearly double the former. Comparing volatility over 
day -20 to day —1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we observe that the cases of 
declines (23.76% of 463 comparisons) are more than those of rises (12.53%) by nearly 
double. The results from event defined as a cluster of insider sales also show that the 
number of decreases is more than that of increases. The findings are more pronounced 
when comparing volatility over day -10 to day —1 and that over day +1 to day +10 and 
the cases of decreases are more than the cases of increases by about 30%. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel F reports that for single insider sale with 90 
clean days before and after the sale, 5.25% of 419 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day -5 to day -1 to period over day +1 to day +5 
around an insider sale event while 11.46% show a decrease. The number of decreases is 
more than double that of increases. When period over day —10 to day —1 and period over 
day +1 to day +10 are compared, 7.98% of 451 cases show an increase in volatility 
while 17.29% show a decrease. The latter is more than double the former. Comparing 
volatility over day -20 to day —1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we observe that 
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the cases of declines (23.54% of 463 comparisons) are more than those of rises (12.96%) 
by nearly double. The results from event defined as a cluster of insider sales also show 
that the number of decreases is more than that of increases. The findings are more 
pronounced when comparing volatility over day —10 to day - 1 and that over day +1 to 
day +10 and the cases of decreases are more than the cases of increases by about 30%. 
Stock return volatility generally is more probably lower instead of higher after 
insider sales. It is suggested that insider sales can reveal true information quite 
efficiently and the stock price is driven to the true fundamental value very quickly. 
6.3.3 Total Insider Trading Event 
The results from the analysis employing total volatility, as reported in Panel G, 
reveal that for single insider transaction with 90 clean days before and after the 
transaction, 8.25% of 388 successful comparisons show a volatility increase from period 
over day - 5 to day —1 to period over day +1 to day +5 around a total insider trading 
event while 12.63% show a decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number 
of increases by half. When period over day -10 to day - 1 and period over day +1 to day 
+10 are compared, 11.45% of 428 cases show an increase in volatility while 15.42% 
show a decrease. The latter is more than the former by nearly 40%. Comparing volatility 
over day -20 to day —1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we find that the cases of 
declines (22.15% of 447 comparisons) are more than those of rises (16.55%). 
Furthermore, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also 
demonstrate that the number of decreases is more than that of increases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel H illustrates that for single insider 
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transaction with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 7.42% of 391 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day - 1 to period over 
day +1 to day +5 around a total insider trading event while 11.76% show a decrease. The 
number of decreases is more than the number of increases by 60%. When period over 
day —10 to day —1 and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 13.16% of 433 
cases show an increase in volatility while 15.47% show a decrease. Comparing volatility 
over day -20 to day - 1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20，we observe that the cases 
of declines (22.77% of 448 comparisons) are more than those of rises (17.41%). The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also demonstrate that the 
number of decreases is more than that of increases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel I illustrates that for single insider transaction 
with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 8.18% of 391 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day - 5 to day - 1 to period over 
day +1 to day +5 around a total insider trading event while 12.02% show a decrease. The 
number of decreases is more than the number of increases by half. When period over 
day -10 to day —1 and period over day +1 to day +10 are compared, 13.39% of 433 
cases show an increase in volatility while 17.32% show a decrease. Comparing volatility 
over day -20 to day —1 and volatility over day +1 to day +20, we observe that the cases 
of declines (22.54% of 448 comparisons) are more than those of rises (17.41%). The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also demonstrate that the 
number of decreases is more than that of increases. 
In conclusion, stock return volatility generally is more probably lower rather than 
higher after insider transactions. It is suggested that insider transactions can reveal true 
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information quite efficiently and the stock price is driven to the true fundamental value 
very quickly. 
6.4 Volatility Change Immediately after Insider Trading 
As mentioned earlier, stock return volatility decreases a short period after insider 
purchase events, insider sale events and total insider trading events (either purchases or 
sales). The stock volatility calculated over day +1 to day +5 and that over day +6 to day 
+10 are compared case by case. Besides, the volatility over day +1 to day +10 and that 
over day +11 to day +20，and the volatility over day +1 to day +20 and that over day 
+21 to day +40 are compared. F-test comparing two sample standard deviations is 
employed and the proportion of cases that volatility significantly rises and drops at 10% 
level of significance is obtained. Table 6 reports the findings. 
Interesting results are found by restricting ourselves to the statistically significant 
portion and comparing the numbers of rises and declines, though the fraction that 
volatility neither significantly increases nor decreases dominates and accounts for 
around 55% to 80% of successful comparisons. 
6.4.1 Insider Purchase Event 
The findings from the analysis using total volatility, as displayed in Panel A, 
reveal that for single insider purchase with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 
12.07% of 439 successful comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day 
+1 to day +10 to period over day +11 to day +20 after an insider purchase event while 
20.05% show a decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number of increases 
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by nearly 70%. When period over day +1 to day +20 and period over day +21 to day 
+40 are compared, 17.51% of 457 cases show an increase in volatility while 23.85% 
show a decrease. The latter is more the former by nearly 40%. A comparison between 
period over day +1 to day +5 to period over day +6 to day +10 shows similar results and 
the findings from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also demonstrate that 
the cases of declines are more than those of rises, supporting our hypothesis. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel B illustrates that for single insider purchase 
with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 13.12% of 442 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +10 to period over day +11 to 
day +20 after an insider purchase event while 20.36% show a decrease. The number of 
decreases is more than the number of increases by half. When period over day +1 to day 
+20 and period over day +21 to day +40 are compared, 15.97% of 457 cases show an 
increase in volatility while 22.98% show a decrease. The latter is more than the former 
by 40%. The results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also 
demonstrate that the number of declines is more than that of rises, confirming our 
observation. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel C reports that for single insider purchase with 
90 clean days before and after the purchase, 12.67% of 442 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +10 to period over day +11 to 
day +20 after an insider purchase event while 19.91% show a decrease. The number of 
decreases is more than the number of increases by 60%. When period over day +1 to day 
+20 and period over day +21 to day +40 are compared, 16.41% of 457 comparisons 
show an increase in volatility while 22.10% show a decrease. The latter is more than the 
68 
former by nearly 40%. A comparison between period over day +1 to day +5 to period 
over day +6 to day +10 shows similar results and the findings from event defined as a 
cluster of insider purchases also demonstrate that the number of declines is more than 
that of rises, confirming our observation. 
The results suggest that the cases of declines after insider purchases are more 
frequent than the cases of rises. This supports our hypothesis that on average stock 
return volatility is more likely to decrease than increase after insider purchases. A 
possible reason is that insider purchases reveal the private information owned by the 
insiders and drive the stock price to the true value. The volatility decreases as the stock 
price becomes stable after reflecting the information. 
6.4.2 Insider Sale Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as exhibited in Panel D, reveals that for 
single insider sale with 90 clean days before and after the sale, 8.31% of 421 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +5 to period over 
day +6 to day +10 after an insider sale event while 10.69% show a decrease. When 
period over day +1 to day +10 and period over day +11 to day +20 are compared, 
14.70% of 449 cases show an increase in volatility while 17.15% show a decrease. In 
addition, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider sales also confirm our 
observation by demonstrating that the cases of declines are more than those of rises. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel E illustrates that for single insider sale with 
90 clean days before and after the sale, 8.86% of 429 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +5 to period over day +6 to day +10 
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after an insider sale event while 11.66% show a decrease. When period over day +1 to 
day +10 and period over day +11 to day +20 are compared, 12.47% of 449 cases show 
an increase in volatility while 18.04% show a decrease. The number of decreases is 
more than the number of increases by 40%. The results from event defined as a cluster 
of insider sales also demonstrate that the number of declines is more than that of rises, 
supporting our hypothesis. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel F reports that for single insider sale with 90 
clean days before and after the sale, 7.93% of 429 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +5 to period over day +6 to day +10 
after an insider sale event while 11.42% show a decrease. The number of decreases is 
more than the number of increases by 40%. When period over day +1 to day +10 and 
period over day +11 to day +20 are compared, 12.25% of 449 cases show an increase in 
volatility while 18.49% show a decrease. The latter is more than the former by half. A 
comparison between period over day +1 to day +20 to period over day +21 to day +40 
shows similar results and the findings from event defined as a cluster of insider sales 
also demonstrate that the number of declines is more than that of rises, confirming our 
observation. 
Similar to purchases, the findings suggest that the cases of declines after insider 
sales are more frequent than the cases of rises. This supports our hypothesis that on 
average stock return volatility is more likely to decrease than increase after insider sales. 
A possible reason is that insider sales reveal the private information owned by the 
insiders and drive the stock price to the true value. The volatility decreases as the stock 
price becomes stable after reflecting the information. 
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6.4.3 Total Insider Trading Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as reported in Panel G, reveals that for single 
insider transaction with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 12.70% of 433 
successful comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +10 to 
period over day +11 to day +20 after a total insider trading event while 18.94% show a 
decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number of increases by half. When 
period over day +1 to day +20 and period over day +21 to day +40 are compared, 
17.92% of 452 cases show an increase in volatility while 21.68% show a decrease. In 
addition, the results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also support 
our hypothesis by demonstrating that the cases of declines are more than those of rises. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel H illustrates that for single insider 
transaction with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 12.90% of 434 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +10 to period 
over day +11 to day +20 after a total insider trading event while 20.51% show a 
decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number of increases by 60%. When 
period over day +1 to day +20 and period over day +21 to day +40 are compared, 
16.56% of 453 cases show an increase in volatility while 21.41% show a decrease. The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also demonstrate that the 
number of declines is more than that of rises, confirming our observation. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel I illustrates that for single insider transaction 
with 90 clean days before and after the transaction, 12.90% of 434 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from period over day +1 to day +10 to period 
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over day +11 to day +20 after a total insider trading event while 19.82% show a 
decrease. The number of decreases is more than the number of increases by half. When 
period over day +1 to day +20 and period over day +21 to day +40 are compared, 
16.11% of 453 cases show an increase in volatility while 20.31% show a decrease. The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider transactions also demonstrate that the 
number of declines is more than that of rises, confirming our observation. 
In conclusion, the cases of declines after insider transactions are more than the 
cases of rises. This supports our hypothesis that on average stock return volatility is 
more likely to decrease than increase after insider transactions. Again, that insider 
transactions reveal the private information owned by the insiders and drive the stock 
price to the true value is one of the possible explanations. The volatility decreases as the 
stock price becomes stable after reflecting the information. 
6.5 Intermediate Term Volatility before and after Insider Trading 
It is worth comparing the intermediate term volatility between pre-event and 
post-event periods of insider purchase events, insider sale events and total insider trading 
events (either purchases or sales). To remove the dramatic effects near the event 
occurrence, the stock volatility calculated over day -90 to day -21 and that over day +21 
to day +90 are compared observation by observation. The volatility over day -90 to 
day -41 and that over +41 to day +90, and the volatility over day —90 to day -60 and 
that over day +60 to day +90 are also compared. F-test comparing two sample standard 
deviations is adopted and the fraction of cases that volatility significantly rises and drops 
at 10% level of significance is obtained. The findings are summarized in Table 7. 
72 
Interesting results are found by restricting ourselves to the statistically significant 
portion and comparing the numbers of rises and declines, though the cases that volatility 
neither significantly increases nor decreases dominate, occupying about 30% to 50% of 
successful comparisons. 
6.5.1 Insider Purchase Event 
The findings from the analysis using total volatility, as displayed in Panel A, 
reveal that for single insider purchase with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 
31.96% of 438 successful comparisons show a volatility increase from pre-event period 
over day -90 to day -21 to post-event period over day +21 to day +90 while 26.26% 
show a decrease. Comparing volatility over day —90 to day -41 and volatility over day 
+41 to day +90，we find that the cases of rises (33.74% of 412 comparisons) are more 
than those of declines (26.94%). When period over day —90 to day -61 and period over 
day +61 to day +90 are compared, 30.33% of 389 cases show an increase in volatility 
while 23.65% show a decrease. The results from event defined as a cluster of insider 
purchases when comparing volatility over day -90 to day -41 to that over day +41 to 
day +90 and volatility over day -90 to day -61 to that over day +60 to day +90 also 
show that the cases of increases are more than those of decreases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel B illustrates that for single insider purchase 
with 90 clean days before and after the purchase, 30.30% of 439 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from pre-event period over day —90 to day —21 to post-event 
period over day +21 to day +90 while 25.06% show a decrease. Comparing volatility 
over day -90 to day —41 and volatility over day +41 to day +90, we observe that the 
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cases of rises (33.33% of 414 comparisons) are more than those of declines (25.85%). 
When period over day -90 to day —61 and period over day +61 to day +90 are compared, 
28.90% of 391 cases show an increase in volatility while 23.02% show a decrease. The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases when comparing volatility 
over day -90 to day -41 to that over day +41 to day +90 and volatility over day -90 to 
day -61 to that over day +60 to day +90 also show that the cases of increases are more 
than those of decreases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel C reports that for single insider purchase with 
90 clean days before and after the purchase, 28.93% of 439 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to post-event 
period over day +21 to day +90 while 25.74% show a decrease. Comparing volatility 
over day -90 to day —41 and volatility over day +41 to day +90, we observe that the 
cases of rises (31.88% of 414 comparisons) are more than those of declines (25.85%). 
When period over day -90 to day —61 and period over day +61 to day +90 are compared, 
28.13% of 391 cases show an increase in volatility while 21.74% show a decrease. The 
results from event defined as a cluster of insider purchases also show that the cases of 
increases are more than those of decreases. 
To conclude, the intermediate term volatility more probably increases than 
decreases after insider purchases. The findings suggest that though most of the private 
information is reflected during the price adjustment period as concluded in the previous 
section, insiders may deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider 
purchases by changing the corporate investment policies in the intermediate term. The 
informed traders may make the firm fundamentals more volatile so that when there is 
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overvaluation, they can gain by selling their shares. Another explanation is that insider 
purchases may discourage the production of information by outside analysts and thus 
reduce the net informational efficiency of capital markets. 
6.5.2 Insider Sale Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as exhibited in Panel D，reveals that for event 
defined as a cluster of insider sales with n = 0, 36.51% of 4612 successful comparisons 
show a volatility increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to post-event 
period over day +21 to day +90 while 27.23% show a decrease. When period over 
day —90 to day -41 and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 36.59% of 4433 
cases show an increase in volatility while 26.55% show a decrease. The number of 
increases is more than the number of decreases by 40%. Comparing volatility over 
day -90 to day —61 and volatility over day +61 to day +90，we find that the cases of rises 
(33.84% of 4273 comparisons) are more than those of declines (23.71%) by 40%. 
Similar results are obtained for n = 1 and n = 2 and the number of increases is more than 
the number of decreases by about 30% to 40%. The results for single insider sale with 90 
clean days before and after the sale also show that the number of increases is more than 
that of decreases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel E illustrates that for event defined as a 
cluster of insider sales with n = 0, 35.20% of 4614 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from pre-event period over day —90 to day -21 to post-event period 
over day +21 to day +90 while 26.85% show a decrease. When period over day -90 to 
day -41 and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 34.64% of 4437 cases show 
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an increase in volatility while 25.22% show a decrease. The number of increases is more 
than the number of decreases by 40%. Comparing volatility over day -90 to day —61 and 
volatility over day +61 to day +90, we observe that the cases of rises (32.50% of 4280 
comparisons) are more than those of declines (22.83%) by 40%. Similar results are 
obtained for n = 1 and n = 2 and the number of increases is more than the number of 
decreases by about 30% to 40%. The results for single insider sale with 90 clean days 
before and after the sale also show that the number of increases is more than that of 
decreases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel F reports that for event defined as a cluster of 
insider sales with n = 0，35.00% of 4614 successful comparisons show a volatility 
increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to post-event period over day 
+21 to day +90 while 26.46% show a decrease. When period over day —90 to day -41 
and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 34.26% of 4437 cases show an 
increase in volatility while 25.58% show a decrease. Comparing volatility over day —90 
to day —61 and volatility over day +61 to day +90, we observe that the cases of rises 
(32.57% of 4280 comparisons) are more than those of declines (23.04%) by 40%. 
Similar results are obtained for n = 1 and n = 2 and the number of increases is more than 
the number of decreases by about 30% to 40%. The results for single insider sale with 90 
clean days before and after the sale also show that the number of increases is more than 
that of decreases. The findings are more pronounced when comparing volatility over 
day -61 to day -90 and that over day +61 to day +90 and the cases of increases are more 
than the cases of decreases by about half. 
The intermediate term volatility more probably increases than decreases after 
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insider sales. The findings suggest that though most of the private information is 
reflected during the price adjustment period as concluded in the previous section, 
insiders may deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider sales by 
changing the corporate investment policies in the intermediate term. The informed 
traders may make the firm fundamentals more volatile so that when there is 
undervaluation, they can gain by buying back shares to cover their short positions. 
Another explanation is that insider sales may discourage the production of information 
by outside analysts and thus reduce the net informational efficiency of capital markets. 
6.5.3 Total Insider Trading Event 
The investigation of total volatility, as reported in Panel G, reveals that for event 
defined as a cluster of insider transactions with n = 0, 33.37% of 12696 successful 
comparisons show a volatility increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to 
post-event period over day +21 to day +90 while 29.55% show a decrease. When period 
over day —90 to day —41 and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 32.96% of 
12316 cases show an increase in volatility while 28.23% show a decrease. Comparing 
volatility over day —90 to day —61 and volatility over day +61 to day +90, we find that 
the cases of rises (30.81% of 11851 comparisons) are more than those of declines 
(25.01%). Similar results are obtained for n = 1 and n = 2. The results for single insider 
transaction with 90 clean days before and after the transaction also demonstrate that the 
cases of increases are more than those of decreases. 
For abnormal return volatility, Panel H illustrates that for event defined as a 
cluster of insider transactions with n = 0, 32.72% of 12704 successful comparisons show 
77 
a volatility increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to post-event period 
over day +21 to day +90 while 29.05% show a decrease. When period over day —90 to 
day -41 and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 31.98% of 12331 cases show 
an increase in volatility while 26.95% show a decrease. Comparing volatility over 
day —90 to day -61 and volatility over day +61 to day +90, we observe that the cases of 
rises (29.86% of 11871 comparisons) are more than those of declines (23.93%). Similar 
results are obtained for n = 1 and n = 2. The results for single insider transaction with 90 
clean days before and after the transaction also demonstrate that the cases of increases 
are more than those of decreases. 
For firm specific volatility, Panel I illustrates that for event defined as a cluster of 
insider transactions with n = 0, 32.46% of 12704 successful comparisons show a 
volatility increase from pre-event period over day -90 to day -21 to post-event period 
over day +21 to day +90 while 28.56% show a decrease. When period over day -90 to 
day —41 and period over day +41 to day +90 are compared, 31.87% of 12331 cases show 
an increase in volatility while 26.76% show a decrease. Comparing volatility over 
day -90 to day -61 and volatility over day +61 to day +90, we observe that the cases of 
increases (29.74% of 11871 comparisons) are more than those of decreases (23.75%). 
Similar results are obtained for n = 1 and n = 2. The results for single insider transaction 
with 90 clean days before and after the transaction also demonstrate that the cases of 
rises are more than those of declines. 
In conclusion, the intermediate term volatility more probably increases than 
decreases after insider transactions. The findings suggest that though most of the private 
information is reflected during the price adjustment period as concluded in the previous 
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section, insiders may deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider 
dealing by changing the corporate investment policies in the intermediate term. For long 
stock position, the informed traders may make the firm fundamentals more volatile so 
that when there is overvaluation, they can gain by selling their shares; for short position, 
when there is undervaluation, the insiders can gain by buying back shares to cover their 
short positions. Another explanation is that insider dealing may discourage the 
production of information by outside analysts and thus reduce the net informational 
efficiency of capital markets. 
6.6 Chapter Summary and Discussion 
An event study methodology is adopted to investigate the stock volatility 
changes surrounding insider trading events. Generally, the cases that volatility neither 
significantly increases nor decreases dominate. Nevertheless, interesting results can still 
be found by restricting ourselves to the statistically significant portion and comparing 
the numbers of rises and declines. The study provides some evidence that insider 
transactions (and insider purchases and insider sales separately) are more likely to take 
place after a rise in stock volatility than after a decline. In addition, volatility is lower 
immediately after insider transactions (and insider purchases and insider sales separately) 
and then drops further. However, in the intermediate term, insider transactions (and 
insider purchases and insider sales separately) more probably raise stock volatility rather 
than reduce it. 
Insiders are interested in insider dealing when firms are more volatile ex ante and 
trade to benefit. It is because greater volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation 
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and undervaluation. The informed traders know earlier than the outside public about the 
direction and extent to which the firm value may change and thus they can trade stocks 
accordingly to earn with their private information. The findings support the arguments 
proposed by Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) and some other researchers that insiders try 
to realize their rewards through trading during time of high stock volatility which is 
probably induced by the riskiness in investment projects. The informed traders do, 
indeed, earn abnormal profits. The empirical studies on the profitability from insider 
dealing are documented by other researchers and some of them are discussed in an 
earlier Chapter of this thesis. Specifically, Wong et al. (2000) and Cheuk (2001) find 
that insiders in the Hong Kong stock market can gain abnormal excess returns in some 
circumstances. Insiders gain with their private information at the expense of other 
shareholders. This demonstrates a principal-agent problem in the context of corporate 
governance. Hence, good governance should include monitoring executives' trading 
during time of exceptionally high stock volatility. 
Insider dealing can reveal some, but not all, of the private information owned by 
the corporate insiders. Volatility is lower immediately after insider trading and then 
drops further. This suggests that insider trading demonstrates some efficiency-enhancing 
effects by revealing information, so generally our results support the information effect 
suggested by Manne (1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983) and some other literature. 
However, the intermediate term volatility is more likely to increase than decrease after 
insider trading. The findings suggest that though part of the private information is 
reflected during the price adjustment period, insiders may deliberately create more 
volatility ex post to benefit from insider dealing by changing the corporate investment 
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policies in the intermediate term. For long stock position, the informed traders may 
make the firm fundamentals more volatile so that when there is overvaluation, they can 
gain by selling their shares; for short position, when there is undervaluation, the insiders 
can gain by buying back shares to cover their short positions. Another explanation for 
the higher level of volatility in the post event period is that insider dealing may 
discourage the production of information by outside analysts and thus reduce the net 
informational efficiency of capital markets. 
The relatively high proportion of insignificant results does not affect our main 
conclusion. Though theories suggest that insiders may realize their rewards through 
trading during time of high stock volatility which is probably induced by the riskiness in 
investment projects, other factors leading to insider dealing are possible. In those 
circumstances, corporate insiders trade based on some information which does not relate 
to volatility. This gives an explanation for the large fraction of insignificant results. 
Besides, it is commonly known that derivative securities such as options, futures and 
warrants are more volatile. If the theory proposed by Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) 
and some other researchers holds, corporate insiders may prefer derivative securities to 
company stock when they try to benefit from high volatility. This explains why we 
cannot obtain strong and clear-cut results when analyzing stock trading. The relatively 
weak results we get may also be due to the fact that the study does not cover all types of 
insider trading but only self-reported (legal) insider trading is investigated. If we also 
look at illegal insider trading, then the results may be stronger. 
Nonetheless, comparisons between the cases of rises and declines can provide 
some insight. In addition, the findings of intermediate term volatility are more 
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convincing as the insignificant portion is relatively smaller compared with other 
hypotheses. Although high volatility is not the only driving force for insider dealing, it 
does rise in the intermediate term after trading. 
The findings from using total volatility, abnormal return volatility and firm 
specific volatility are sometimes a little bit different. It is because the information sets 
they contain are different. The results for total volatility reflect the global, local market, 
industry and firm specific factors. The industry information, the firm specific 
information and some global effect are left for abnormal return volatility; firm specific 
volatility contains only the firm specific information. Generally, the three types of 
volatility lead us to the same conclusion. Hence we can infer that the effect of the firm 
specific component is persistent. 
82 
Chapter 7 Empirical Results: Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis 
In this Chapter, the empirical results of vector autoregression (VAR) analysis are 
discussed. The findings for different types of market return volatility are presented in 
each of the following sections. They include volatility of Hang Seng Index return, 
volatility of market value weighted index return, volatility of equal weighted index 
return, aggregate total volatility, aggregate abnormal return volatility and aggregate firm 
specific volatility. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test concludes that all time series variables under our 
analysis including insider trading variables and volatility variables do not contain any 
unit root. So, no differencing is required and level data is examined directly. 
7.1 Volatility of Hang Seng Index Return 
Hang Seng Index is a well-known indicator for the Hong Kong stock market and 
it is observable by all investors around the world. Currently, it comprises 33 constituent 
stocks which account for about 70% of the total market capitalization of the Hong Kong 
stock market. So, it tracks the general market movement of Hong Kong. Table 8 
summarizes the results of VAR Granger causality test using volatility of Hang Seng 
Index return. 
Panel A shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by standard 
deviation, insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces 
transaction. Analyzing the pre-Asian Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) and 
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Asian Financial Crisis period (from July 97 to 98) separately, the results for the 
pre-Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility. Those for the Crisis 
period are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces 
transaction. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a different volatility 
measure, the findings from employing high-low spread volatility are that insider 
transaction induces volatility and in turn transaction also induces volatility. 
Panel B reports the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system 
for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. The results from the analysis 
employing either volatility measures are insignificant for the whole sample period. 
Analyzing the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately using standard deviation volatility 
measure, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that volatility induces insider 
transaction. Those for the Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility and 
in turn volatility also induces transaction. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as number of transactions are shown in Panel C. For volatility 
measured by standard deviation, insider purchase induces volatility and in turn volatility 
also induces purchase. Analyzing the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results 
for the pre-Crisis period are that both insider purchase and sale induce volatility. Those 
for the Crisis period are that insider purchase induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces purchase. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a different 
volatility measure, the findings from employing high-low spread volatility are that 
insider purchase induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces purchase. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
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purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions are reported in Panel D. For 
volatility measured by standard deviation, volatility induces insider purchase. Analyzing 
the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that 
volatility induces insider purchase. Those for the Crisis period are that insider purchase 
induces volatility and insider sale induces insider purchase. As a robust test for the entire 
sample period by using a different volatility measure, the findings from employing 
high-low spread volatility are that volatility induces insider purchase. 
Generally, the results support that a larger number of insider transactions induces 
higher volatility of Hang Seng Index return and in turn higher volatility also induces a 
larger number of transactions. When insider purchases and sales are distinguished, the 
findings show us that a greater number of purchases induces higher volatility and vice 
versa. On the other hand, though weakly, higher volatility induces a greater dollar value 
of insider purchases. 
7.2 Volatility of Market Value Weighted Index Return 
A common criticism to the Hang Seng Index as a market indicator is that it 
represents only 33 stocks out of more than 600 stocks listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong. Hence, a self-constructed market value weighted index including all stocks 
in the study period is also employed. In addition to the 70% of market capitalization that 
can be represented by the Hang Seng Index, the self-constructed market value weighted 
index captures the remaining 30% of the total market capitalization. So, the ability to 
track the general market movement of Hong Kong is improved. It should be noted that 
stocks with higher market capitalization dominate the index value, and the index price is 
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not readily observable by all investors. Table 9 presents the results of VAR Granger 
causality test using volatility of market value weighted index return. 
Panel A shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by standard 
deviation, volatility induces insider transaction. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis 
periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are insignificant. Those for the 
Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a different 
volatility measure, the findings from employing high-low spread volatility are that 
volatility induces insider transaction. 
Panel B reports the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system 
for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. The results from the analysis 
employing either volatility measures are insignificant for the whole sample period. 
Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately using standard deviation 
volatility measure, the results for the pre-Crisis period are again insignificant. Those for 
the Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as number of transactions are shown Panel C. For volatility 
measured by standard deviation, volatility induces insider purchase while insider sale 
induces volatility. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results 
for the pre-Crisis period are that insider sale induces volatility. Those for the Crisis 
period are that insider purchase induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces 
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purchase. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a different volatility 
measure, the findings from employing high-low spread volatility are that insider sale 
induces volatility and insider purchase; and volatility induces insider purchase. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions are reported Panel D. The 
results from the analysis employing either volatility measures are insignificant for the 
whole sample period. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately using 
standard deviation volatility measure, the results for the pre-Crisis period are 
insignificant. Those for the Crisis period are that insider sale induces volatility and in 
turn volatility also induces sale; insider purchase induces insider sale and vice versa. 
The findings generally support that higher volatility of market value weighted 
index return induces a larger number of insider transactions. When insider purchases and 
sales are distinguished, we observe that a greater number of sales induces higher 
volatility while higher volatility induces a greater number of purchases. 
7.3 Volatility of Equal Weighted Index Return 
Equal weighted index is a commonly used index in stock markets and the index 
value is dominated by stocks with higher prices. However, the index is not publicly 
available in Hong Kong. Therefore, a self-constructed equal weighted index including 
all stocks in the study period is created and certainly it is not observable by general 
investors. It shows us the general performance of the Hong Kong stock market. Table 10 
presents the results of VAR Granger causality test using volatility of equal weighted 
index return. 
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Panel A shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by standard 
deviation, insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces 
transaction. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for both 
the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods are insignificant. As a robust test for the entire sample 
period by using a different volatility measure, the findings from employing high-low 
spread volatility are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn transaction also 
induces volatility. 
Panel B reports the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system 
for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. The results from the analysis 
employing either volatility measures are insignificant for the whole sample period. 
Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately using standard deviation 
volatility measure, the results for the pre-Crisis period are again insignificant while those 
for the Crisis period are that volatility induces insider transaction. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as number of transactions are shown Panel C. The results from 
the analysis employing standard deviation volatility measure are insignificant for the 
whole sample period. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the 
results for the pre-Crisis period are again insignificant while those for the Crisis period 
are that insider purchase induces volatility. As a robust test for the entire sample period 
by using a different volatility measure, the findings from employing high-low spread 
volatility are that volatility induces insider purchase. 
The results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system for insider 
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purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions are reported in Panel D. The 
results from the analysis employing either volatility measures are insignificant for the 
whole sample period. Investigating the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately using 
standard deviation volatility measure, the results for the pre-Crisis period are 
insignificant while those for the Crisis period are that insider sale induces insider 
purchase. 
The findings generally support that a larger number of insider transactions 
induces higher volatility of equal weighted index return and in turn higher volatility also 
induces a larger number of transactions. 
7.4 Aggregate Total Volatility 
The aggregate total return measure is computed by taking average of individual 
stocks' returns. The findings of VAR Granger causality test using volatility of aggregate 
(average) total return (aggregate total volatility) are exhibited in Table 11. 
Panel A summarizes the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable 
system for insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. In considering the analysis of the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods 
separately, the results for both the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods are that insider 
transaction induces volatility. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a 
different volatility measure, the results from using high-low spread volatility are that 
insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces transaction. 
Panel B shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
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insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the pre-Crisis and Crisis 
periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that volatility induces insider 
transaction while those for the Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility. 
As a robust test for the whole sample period by using a different volatility measure, the 
results from using high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
Panel C reports the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system 
for insider purchase and sale defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured 
by standard deviation, insider purchase induces volatility. Considering the pre-Crisis and 
Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that insider sale induces 
volatility. Those for the Crisis period are that both insider purchase and sale induce 
volatility; insider sale induces insider purchase. As a robust test for the entire sample 
period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using high-low spread 
volatility are that insider purchase induces volatility and in turn volatility also induces 
purchase. 
Panel D summarizes the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable 
system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. For 
volatility measured by standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the 
pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that 
volatility induces insider purchase. Those for the Crisis period are that both insider 
purchase and sale induce volatility; insider sale induces insider purchase. As a robust 
test for the whole sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from 
using high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
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To conclude, a larger number of insider transactions induces higher aggregate 
total volatility and in turn higher volatility also induces a larger number of transactions. 
When insider purchases and sales are distinguished, we find that a greater number of 
purchases induces higher volatility. 
7.5 Aggregate Abnormal Return Volatility 
Since insider dealing is more likely driven by firm specific information, the 
implications from the firm level analysis can provide much more insight. It seems that 
solely considering the aggregate firm specific volatility (in the next section) is sufficient 
for the firm level analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis of the aggregate abnormal return 
volatility is included in this study since the abnormal return based on the Market Model 
is very often being examined in other insider trading literature and so it is worth 
investigating the volatility of abnormal return. The abnormal return is obtained by 
removing the Hong Kong market factor from the total return. The aggregate abnormal 
return is calculated by taking average of individual stocks' abnormal returns. Table 12 
exhibits the findings of VAR Granger causality test using volatility of aggregate (average) 
abnormal return (aggregate abnormal return volatility). 
Panel A summarizes the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable 
system for insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. In considering the analysis of the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods 
separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are insignificant while those for the Crisis 
period are that insider transaction induces volatility. As a robust test for the entire 
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sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using high-low 
spread volatility are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. 
Panel B shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the pre-Crisis and Crisis 
periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are insignificant while those for 
the Crisis period are that insider transaction induces volatility. As a robust test for the 
whole sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using 
high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
Panel C reports the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system 
for insider purchase and sale defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured 
by standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the pre-Crisis and Crisis 
periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that insider sale induces 
volatility and those for the Crisis period are that both insider purchase and sale induce 
volatility. As a robust test for the entire sample period by using a different volatility 
measure, the results from using high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
Panel D summarizes the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable 
system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. For 
volatility measured by standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the 
pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are 
insignificant. Those for the Crisis period are that both insider purchase and sale induce 
volatility; insider sale induces insider purchase. As a robust test for the whole sample 
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period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using high-low spread 
volatility are again insignificant. 
In conclusion, the results support that a greater number of insider transactions 
induces higher aggregate abnormal return volatility and in turn higher volatility also 
induces a greater number of transactions. 
7.6 Aggregate Firm Specific Volatility 
As mentioned in the previous section, the implications from the firm level 
analysis can provide much more insight. In addition to the Hong Kong market factor, the 
global and industry effects are also removed from the total return in order to obtain the 
firm specific return. The aggregate firm specific return is calculated by taking average of 
individual stocks’ firm specific returns. The findings of VAR Granger causality test 
using volatility of aggregate (average) firm specific return (aggregate firm specific 
volatility) are exhibited in Table 13. 
Panel A summarizes the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable 
system for insider trading defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. In considering the analysis of the pre-Crisis and Crisis periods 
separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are insignificant while those for the Crisis 
period are that insider transaction induces volatility. As a robust test for the entire 
sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using high-low 
spread volatility are that insider transaction induces volatility and in turn volatility also 
induces transaction. 
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Panel B shows the results of Granger causality test in the two-variable system for 
insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions. For volatility measured by 
standard deviation, the results are insignificant. In considering the analysis of the 
pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are 
insignificant while those for the Crisis period are that insider transaction induces 
volatility. As a robust test for the whole sample period by using a different volatility 
measure, the results from using high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
Panel C reports the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable system 
for insider purchase and sale defined as number of transactions. For volatility measured 
by standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the pre-Crisis and Crisis 
periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that insider sale induces 
volatility. Those for the Crisis period are that insider sale induces volatility and in turn 
volatility also induces sale; insider purchase induces volatility. As a robust test for the 
entire sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from using 
high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
Panel D summaries the results of Granger causality test in the three-variable 
system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. For 
volatility measured by standard deviation, the results are insignificant. Considering the 
pre-Crisis and Crisis periods separately, the results for the pre-Crisis period are that 
volatility induces insider purchase. Those for the Crisis period are that both insider 
purchase and sale induce volatility; insider sale induces insider purchase. As a robust 
test for the whole sample period by using a different volatility measure, the results from 
using high-low spread volatility are again insignificant. 
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Similar to the case of aggregate abnormal return volatility, the findings generally 
support that a greater number of insider transactions induces higher aggregate firm 
specific volatility and in turn higher volatility also induces a greater number of 
transactions. 
7.7 Chapter Summary and Discussion 
A vector autoregression (VAR) model is used to examine the interrelationship 
between insider trading and market return volatility. Granger causality test serves as a 
test to study the lag dependence of insider trading and volatility variables. While 
volatility of Hang Seng Index return, volatility of equal weighted index return, volatility 
of market value weighted index return and aggregate total volatility capture the 
economy-wide, industry-wide and firm specific factors, aggregate abnormal return 
volatility reflects only the industry and firm specific effects and aggregate firm specific 
volatility reflects only the latter. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test concludes that all time series variables under our 
analysis including insider trading variables and volatility variables do not contain any 
unit root. So, no differencing is required and level data is examined directly. Overall 
speaking, the study concludes that a larger number of insider transactions induces higher 
market return volatility and in turn higher volatility also induces a larger number of 
transactions. The findings suggest that insider transactions are more frequent when 
market and firm fundamentals are more volatile ex ante and insiders try to extract profits 
during time of high volatility. On the other hand, insider dealing does induce volatility. 
Insiders may deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider dealing by 
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changing the corporate investment policies. Another explanation is that the production 
of information by outside analysts is discouraged by insider dealing and thus the net 
informational efficiency of capital markets is reduced. While volatility of Hang Seng 
Index return, volatility of market value weighted index return and aggregate total 
volatility provide some more inferences when insider purchases and sales are 
distinguished, the results are not persistent in aggregate abnormal return volatility and 
aggregate firm specific volatility. 
The results from the analysis using dollar amount of transactions are weak and 
unclear. One possible reason is that although corporate insiders own better information 
than the outside public and may adopt trading strategies to earn with their private 
information, their trading patterns are limited by their portfolio composition and wealth. 
The findings of the Crisis period are pronouncedly stronger. During the Asian 
Financial Crisis, many companies encountered difficulties in running their business and 
some of them even closed down. Under that situation, stockholders of a firm looked 
more closely on the actions concerted by the insiders because they expected insiders had 
private knowledge about the latest situation of the firm. Some outside shareholders 
might follow the insiders' strategies irrationally, inducing higher stock volatility. 
Generally, for the Crisis period, number of insider transactions, in particular insider 
purchases, induces market return volatility. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the relationship between insider trading and stock volatility 
by investigating the insider dealing of corporate directors and chief executives in the 
listed corporations in Hong Kong between 1993 and 1998. We conduct event study to 
investigate the stock volatility changes surrounding insider trading events and use vector 
autoregression (VAR) Granger causality test to study the lag dependence of insider 
trading and volatility variables. 
In event study, the cases that volatility neither significantly increases nor 
decreases are dominant; we can infer that high volatility is not the main driving force for 
insider dealing. Besides, interesting results are found by restricting ourselves to the 
statistically significant portion and comparing the numbers of rises and declines. The 
study provides some evidence that insider trading is more likely to take place after a rise 
in stock volatility than after a decline. In addition, volatility is lower immediately after 
insider trading and then drops further. However, in the intermediate term, insider trading 
more probably raises stock volatility rather than reduces it. 
Insiders are interested in insider dealing when firms are more volatile ex ante and 
trade to benefit. It is because greater volatility implies higher chances of overvaluation 
and undervaluation. The informed traders know earlier than the outside public about the 
direction and extent to which the firm value may change and thus they can trade stocks 
accordingly to earn with their private information. The findings support the arguments 
proposed by Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) and some other researchers that insiders try 
to realize their rewards through trading during time of high stock volatility which is 
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probably induced by the riskiness in investment projects. The fact that insiders gain with 
their private information at the expense of other shareholders demonstrates a 
principal-agent problem in the context of corporate governance. Hence, good 
governance should include monitoring executives' trading during time of exceptionally 
high stock volatility. 
Insider dealing can reveal some, but not all, of the private information owned by 
the corporate insiders. Volatility is lower immediately after insider trading and then 
drops further. This suggests that insider trading demonstrates some efficiency-enhancing 
effects by revealing information, so generally our results support the information effect 
suggested by Manne (1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983) and some other literature. 
However, the intermediate term volatility is more likely to increase than decrease after 
insider trading. The findings suggest that though part of the private information is 
reflected during the price adjustment period, insiders may deliberately create more 
volatility ex post to benefit from insider dealing by changing the corporate investment 
policies in the intermediate term. For long stock position, the informed traders may 
make the firm fundamentals more volatile so that when there is overvaluation, they can 
gain by selling their shares; for short position, when there is undervaluation, the insiders 
can gain by buying back shares to cover their short positions. Another explanation for 
the higher level of volatility in the post event period is that insider dealing may 
discourage the production of information by outside analysts and thus reduce the net 
informational efficiency of capital markets. 
In vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, while volatility of Hang Seng Index 
return, volatility of equal weighted index return, volatility of market value weighted 
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index return and aggregate total volatility capture the economy-wide, industry-wide and 
firm specific factors, aggregate abnormal return volatility reflects only the industry and 
firm specific effects and aggregate firm specific volatility reflects only the latter. VAR 
analysis concludes that a larger number of insider transactions induces higher market 
return volatility and in turn higher volatility also induces a larger number of transactions. 
The findings suggest that insider transactions are more frequent when market and firm 
fundamentals are more volatile ex ante and insiders try to extract profits during time of 
high volatility. On the other hand, insider dealing does induce volatility. Insiders may 
deliberately create more volatility ex post to benefit from insider dealing by changing the 
corporate investment policies. Another explanation is that the production of information 
by outside analysts is discouraged by insider dealing and thus the net informational 
efficiency of capital markets is reduced. On the other hand, more pronounced results are 
observed for the sample period covering only the Asian Financial Crisis. During that 
period, number of insider transactions, in particular insider purchases, induces market 
return volatility. 
The interpretations of the results from event study and those from VAR Granger 
causality test are somewhat different. In event study, we are looking at the stock 
volatility surrounding an event for a particular event definition. On the other hand, VAR 
analysis serves as a study from a different perspective to investigate the lag dependence 
of insider trading and volatility variables. It examines the relationship between insider 
trading and stock volatility in a time series framework where the time interval for the 
insider trading measures corresponds to that for the volatility measures. While a greater 
number of insider transactions in a particular time interval in VAR analysis has some 
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correspondence to the occurrence of an event defined as a cluster of transactions, VAR 
analysis using dollar value can provide some insight which cannot be captured in event 
study. 
The results from our research contain some policy implications for corporate 
governance, particularly in the area of executives' dealing. In Hong Kong, the current 
regulatory framework of corporate governance regarding this issue includes both 
statutory and non-statutory requirements. Statutory requirements consist of the 
Companies Ordinance and the Securities and Futures Ordinance which we have 
discussed in Chapter 3. Non-statutory requirements refer to those specified under the 
Listing Rules covering the number of independent non-executive directors, disclosures 
of connected transactions, and disclosures of the different components of directors' 
remuneration. The regulatory framework is also accompanied by some market codes 
which serve as a guide for self-regulation rather than setting rigid rules so as to provide 
some flexibility to the whole framework. Examples include the SEHK's Code of Best 
Practice which serves as a guide for directors of listed companies and the Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers which among its provisions is the concept of perfect secrecy up 
to the time a takeover or merger is completed. Although compliance with those codes is 
very often voluntary, most of the market participants try their every effort to meet the 
standards showing their commitment to the industry as it is expected by the same. 
Accordingly, modifying those market codes may be an effective way to improve 
corporate governance while amending legal requirements is complicated, inflexible and 
time consuming. 
Based on our discussion in this thesis, we would suggest the following rules, 
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which can either be incorporated in industry's codes or adopted by a particular company 
as its guidelines. A director / executive should not deal in any of the securities of his 
company during periods of exceptionally high volatility, the level of which can be 
determined by the past records of the company and the market. Similar to other rules, the 
restriction on dealing by a director / executive should be regarded as equally applicable 
to any dealing by the director / executive's spouse or by or on behalf of any infant child. 
It is the duty of the director / executive to seek to avoid any such dealing at a time when 
he himself is not free to deal. Alternatively, if insider dealing is not strictly prohibited 
during time of high volatility, notification must be required. A director / executive 
should not deal in any securities of his own company without first notifying the 
chairman or other director(s) and receiving a written acknowledgement. 
Though the above-mentioned policies may improve corporate governance by 
reducing informed trading during sensitive periods, the fact that the ultimate and direct 
motive of insider dealing is to possess private and price-sensitive information suggests 
that the traditional principles of corporate governance are also helpful. Transparency in 
corporate information disclosure is one of the most important elements. If information 
disclosure is transparent, quick and unimpeded, insiders' monopoly power over 
corporate information will be mitigated so that they cannot take advantage of their 
private information to benefit from insider trading. Then high volatility offers no 
unfairly profitable trading opportunities to them. 
The relationship between stock volatility and insider dealing detected in this 
research may show different patterns of persistence and intensity in companies with 
different ownership structures and thus different corporate governance qualities. One 
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striking feature of corporate ownership in Hong Kong's listed companies is the 
prevalence of concentrated ownership and the separation of cash flow rights and control 
rights of block shareholders. 
Some executives of Hong Kong companies, especially small and medium- sized 
firms, hold significant shares of the companies or they are the sole or dominant owners 
of the same companies. This pattern of ownership concentration is widely expected to 
strengthen corporate governance. Usually shareholders / owners with substantial 
interests in the company prefer to take on investment projects with fair risk rather than 
extremely high risk because they will bear a large loss if the project does not go well. 
With a large stake in the company, block shareholders have the incentive to intensively 
monitor corporate management, preventing the latter from taking too much risk. This 
will reduce the possibility of insiders choosing risky business strategy before or after 
insider trading, which in turn implies that the component of stock volatility driven by 
insiders' risky business strategy diminishes. As a larger proportion of the company stock 
volatility is beyond the control and knowledge of corporate insiders under concentrated 
ownership, insiders will have less advantage than otherwise in predicting undervaluation 
or overvaluation from volatile stock price movement and thus less capable of making 
profits from insider trading following a surge in stock price volatility. This may reduce 
the frequency of insider dealing in the wake of a rise in stock volatility. Similarly, 
intensive monitoring under concentrated ownership may also deter corporate insiders 
from choosing risky business strategy and thus raising stock volatility after insider 
dealing. This will weaken the correlation between insider trading and ex post stock 
volatility. 
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In addition, recent studies show that there exists pyramidal ownership structure 
in Hong Kong firms. For example, there is a sizable number of Hong Kong listed firms 
that are controlled by Cheung Kong and ultimately by Li Ka Shing. From the 
perspective of the parent company or the ultimate owner, the control right is usually 
larger than the cash flow right in subsidiaries. This separation of cash flow rights and 
control rights may cast profound impact on the relationship between insider trading and 
stock volatility. 
On the one hand, the correlation between insider dealing and stock volatility may 
be enhanced both ex ante and ex post. A large divergence of control rights from cash 
flow rights in the hands of large shareholders implies that the ultimate owner may have a 
stronger tendency to taking risk. Ultimate owner incurs a relatively small cash flow loss 
when the investment is unsuccessful, but reaps tremendous benefits when the investment 
goes well by wielding his control rights. The controlling ultimate owner may siphon off 
corporate profits from the subsidiary to other companies under his control. This kind of 
tunneling implies an asymmetric payoff pattern for the ultimate owner and a strong 
risk-taking incentive. Hence, the parent company, who is usually the major shareholder 
of the subsidiaries, does not mind taking risky projects. Under these circumstances, the 
directors / executives in subsidiary firms can raise the risk profile after insider trading 
without many objections from the major shareholder / parent company. Also, as a large 
portion of the company stock's volatility most probably comes from the fundamental 
risk of the firm's investment projects while the executives have better information about 
these projects, the insiders would probably engage in stock trading after a rise in stock 
volatility. Therefore, it is expected that the relationship between insider trading and 
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volatility is stronger in both ways in pyramidal ownership structure. 
On the other hand, the existence of pyramid ownership may also provide a 
scheme of smoothing subsidiaries' cash flow in different states of nature. The ultimate 
owner may transfer funds from other subsidiaries under his control to a subsidiary that is 
in financial distress. Similarly, the ultimate owner may also transfer funds out of a 
profit-making subsidiary. This kind of funds transfer may smooth subsidiaries' cash flow 
so as to diminish their stock volatility. Then corporate insiders of subsidiaries will less 
likely take advantage of their private information to conduct insider trading in times of 
high stock volatility. Also, they are less capable of raising stock volatility after insider 
trading. As a result, the correlation between insider trading and stock volatility will be 
weakened. 
In conclusion, further empirical research can be carried out to study the linkage 
between ownership structure and causal relationship between insider trading and 
volatility. Besides, according to our previous discussion, derivative securities such as 
options, futures and warrants are more volatile and illegal insider trading reflects more 
private information. Hence future research may include analyzing derivatives securities 
and illegal insider trading which is expected to give more striking results. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics on Insider Trading Data 
Summary statistics of the insider trading data is reported in this Table. Panel A displays 
the number of insider transactions (directors' and chief executives' dealing) and the 
number of firms involved for the entire sample. Panel B shows the distribution of insider 
transactions by industry classification and the number of companies under each industry 
category at the end of January 1998 is also shown for reference. Panels C，D and E show 
the distribution of insider transactions by firm size (market capitalization), 
book-to-market (B/M) ratio and price-to-eaming (P/E) ratio respectively. While 
Purchase and Sale refer to the open market purchase and open market sale respectively, 
Total represents the insider transaction in whole which includes both purchase and sale. 
Panel A: Entire sample 
Purchase Sale Total 
Number of transactions 16221 7574 23675 
Number of firms involved 507 458 541 
Panel B: Distribution of insider transactions by industry of the firm 
Industry Purchase Sale Total No. of Firms 
Finance 701 433 1134 60 
Utilities 123 87 210 15 
Properties 5276 1666 6942 108 
Consolidated Enterprises 4299 2772 7071 207 
Industrials 4838 2196 7034 259 
Hotels 921 158 1079 15 
Miscellaneous 63 132 195 10 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel C: Distribution of insider transactions by size (market capitalization) of the firm 
Market capitalization Purchase Sale Total 
Small <HK$618 million 6141 1900 8041 
Medium > HK$618 million and < HK$1991 million 5291 2571 7862 
Large > HK$1991 million 4784 2981 7765 
Panel D: Distribution of insider transactions by book-to-market (B/M) ratio of the firm 
B/M ratio Purchase Sale Total 
Low < 0.580 3387 3191 6578 
Medium > 0.580 and < 1.282 4425 2030 6455 
High > 1.282 5203 1284 6487 
Panel E: Distribution of insider transactions by price-to-eaming (P/E) ratio of the firm 
P/E ratio Purchase Sale Total 
Low <7 .88 4712 1836 6548 
Medium > 7.88 and < 15.11 4607 1842 6449 
High > 15.11 3691 2825 6516 
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Table 2 
Event Study 一 Number of Observations for Various Event Definitions 
In the event study methodology for the present research, an event can be defined as a 
single insider transaction if there is no other insider trading of the same type of the same 
stock within 90 days before and after the aforesaid transaction. It can also be defined as 
a group (cluster) of insider transactions of the same type of the same stock if there are no 
more than n days between two nearest transactions. For example, consider the following 
pattern of trading of a particular firm. 
I I I Q I I O Q I I I I 
where 
/ indicates the occurrence of a particular type of insider trading on that 
particular trading day 
0 indicates that there is no insider trading of that particular type on that day 
event 1 event 2 event 3 
, 人 、 『八 1 , 人 、 
l f n = 0, I I I Q I I O Q I I I I 
event 1 event 2 
入 A 
I f n = 1, I I I Q I I O Q I I I I 
event 1 
I f n = 2， I I I O I I O O I I I I 
Different event definitions result in different numbers of event observations. This Table 
shows the summary. The first column indicates the type of insider trading. The second 
specifies the event definition. The last column displays the number of observations for 
the particular type of insider trading event. 
Type of insider trading Event definition Number of observations 
Insider purchase event Single 498 
Insider purchase event Cluster n=0 9225 
Insider purchase event Cluster n=1 7772 
Insider purchase event Cluster n=2 6626 
Insider sale event Single 488 
Insider sale event Cluster n=0 4745 
Insider sale event Cluster n=1 4204 
Insider sale event Cluster n=2 3815 
Total insider trading event Single 499 
Total insider trading event Cluster n=0 13136 
Total insider trading event Cluster n=1 11026 
Total insider trading event Cluster n=2 9459 
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Table 3 
Event Study 一 Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
In each event observation i, 18 stock return volatility values using 5-day interval without 
overlapping (90 trading days) before and after an insider trading event are calculated as 
illustrated in the following figure. 
Insider 
� - 1 8 • . . trading cr, cj, . . . �i，+i8 
event 
where 0\丁 is the standard deviation for observation i for period T (5-day interval) 
The average stock return volatility over all observations surrounding insider trading 
events from T = —18 (t = —90 to t = -85) to T = +18 (t = +85 to t = +90) for various 
insider trading events and types of volatility is obtained. Panel A exhibits the total 
volatility surrounding insider purchase events; Panel B reports the abnormal return 
volatility around insider purchase events; Panel C displays the firm specific volatility 
around insider purchase events; Panel D exhibits the total volatility surrounding insider 
sale events; Panel E shows the abnormal return volatility around insider sale events; 
Panel F displays the firm specific volatility around insider sale events; Panel G exhibits 
the total volatility surrounding total insider trading events; Panel H reports the abnormal 
return volatility around total insider trading events; Panel I displays firm specific 
volatility around total insider trading events. In each Panel, the first column is the time 
period relative to the event occurrence under consideration and the other columns show 
the average stock volatility for various event definitions. This Table is also accompanied 
by several graphs, which are shown in Figure 1, with each corresponding to each Panel. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel A: Insider purchase event, total volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0271 0.0269 0.0270 0.0267 
-17 0.0266 0.0263 0.0263 0.0262 
-16 0.0264 0.0264 0.0264 0.0264 
-15 0.0256 0.0261 0.0260 0.0261 
-14 0.0260 0.0268 0.0266 0.0267 
-13 0.0267 0.0270 0.0268 0.0267 
-12 0.0266 0.0277 0.0276 0.0276 
-11 0.0270 0.0277 0.0275 0.0274 
-10 0.0275 0.0271 0.0270 0.0268 
-9 0.0277 0.0269 0.0265 0.0264 
-8 0.0280 0.0272 0.0270 0.0267 
-7 0.0284 0.0272 0.0272 0.0272 
-6 0.0286 0.0268 0.0267 0.0268 
-5 0.0274 0.0266 0.0265 0.0267 
-4 0.0281 0.0265 0.0265 0.0265 
-3 0.0274 0.0266 0.0266 0.0266 
-2 0.0282 0.0270 0.0269 0.0268 
-1 0.0331 0.0288 0.0284 0.0283 
Insider purchase 
event 
+1 0.0320 0.0289 0.0285 0.0285 
+2 0.0301 0.0280 0.0278 0.0278 
+3 0.0285 0.0276 0.0274 0.0271 
+4 0.0284 0.0269 0.0268 0.0267 
+5 0.0277 0.0267 0.0266 0.0266 
+6 0.0284 0.0267 0.0265 0.0266 
+7 0.0270 0.0264 0.0263 0.0261 
+8 0.0270 0.0264 0.0264 0.0264 
+9 0.0280 0.0267 0.0265 0.0266 
+10 0.0288 0.0272 0.0271 0.0270 
+11 0.0285 0.0272 0.0269 0.0268 
+12 0.0285 0.0271 0.0268 0.0271 
+13 0.0290 0.0274 0.0274 0.0275 
+14 0.0292 0.0274 0.0274 0.0273 
+15 0.0279 0.0275 0.0275 0.0274 
+16 0.0270 0.0271 0.0271 0.0271 
+17 0.0282 0.0267 0.0266 0.0266 
+18 0.0275 0.0270 0.0271 0.0270 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Insider purchase event, abnormal return volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0278 0.0264 0.0265 0.0262 
-17 0.0269 0.0258 0.0258 0.0258 
-16 0.0249 0.0259 0.0260 0.0259 
-15 0.0245 0.0256 0.0256 0.0257 
-14 0.0274 0.0262 0.0260 0.0261 
-13 0.0273 0.0263 0.0262 0.0261 
-12 0.0267 0.0270 0.0268 0.0268 
-11 0.0256 0.0270 0.0268 0.0268 
-10 0.0253 0.0263 0.0263 0.0261 
-9 0.0273 0.0262 0.0259 0.0258 
-8 0.0283 0.0267 0.0264 0.0261 
-7 0.0276 0.0265 0.0265 0.0266 
-6 0.0272 0.0262 0.0261 0.0262 
-5 0.0253 0.0260 0.0260 0.0261 
-4 0.0265 0.0259 0.0259 0.0259 
-3 0.0268 0.0259 0.0259 0.0260 
-2 0.0279 0.0263 0.0262 0.0262 
-1 0.0318 0.0280 0.0276 0.0277 
Insider purchase 
event 
+1 0.0301 0.0278 0.0276 0.0276 
+2 0.0283 0.0272 0.0270 0.0271 
+3 0.0253 0.0267 0.0265 0.0262 
+4 0.0270 0.0262 0.0261 0.0261 
+5 0.0253 0.0260 0.0258 0.0258 
+6 0.0276 0.0260 0.0258 0.0259 
+7 0.0262 0.0257 0.0256 0.0254 
+8 0.0260 0.0255 0.0256 0.0256 
+9 0.0269 0.0259 0.0258 0.0259 
+10 0.0275 0.0264 0.0264 0.0263 
+11 0.0265 0.0264 0.0262 0.0261 
+12 0.0285 0.0263 0.0262 0.0265 
+13 0.0292 0.0266 0.0266 0.0267 
+14 0.0282 0.0267 0.0267 0.0266 
+15 0.0273 0.0267 0.0268 0.0267 
+16 0.0272 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263 
+17 0.0274 0.0260 0.0259 0.0260 
+18 0.0273 0.0263 0.0264 0.0264 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0271 0.0260 0.0260 0.0257 
-17 0.0270 0.0255 0.0255 0.0255 
-16 0.0248 0.0256 0.0257 0.0256 
-15 0.0243 0.0253 0.0253 0.0254 
-14 0.0271 0.0258 0.0256 0.0258 
-13 0.0269 0.0259 0.0258 0.0257 
-12 0.0265 0.0266 0.0264 0.0264 
-11 0.0252 0.0265 0.0264 0.0263 
-10 0.0253 0.0259 0.0258 0.0256 
-9 0.0270 0.0258 0.0254 0.0253 
-8 0.0279 0.0263 0.0260 0.0257 
-7 0.0272 0.0261 0.0261 0.0262 
-6 0.0271 0.0259 0.0258 0.0258 
-5 0.0249 0.0257 0.0257 0.0258 
-4 0.0262 0.0255 0.0255 0.0256 
-3 0.0265 0.0256 0.0257 0.0257 
-2 0.0276 0.0260 0.0259 0.0258 
-1 0.0315 0.0276 0.0273 0.0273 
Insider purchase 
event 
+1 0.0298 0.0275 0.0273 0.0273 
+2 0.0277 0.0268 0.0266 0.0267 
+3 0.0248 0.0264 0.0261 0.0258 
+4 0.0263 0.0258 0.0257 0.0257 
+5 0.0244 0.0257 0.0255 0.0255 
+6 0.0264 0.0256 0.0255 0.0255 
+7 0.0255 0.0253 0.0252 0.0250 
+8 0.0258 0.0252 0.0252 0.0253 
+9 0.0266 0.0255 0.0254 0.0255 
+10 0.0275 0.0261 0.0260 0.0259 
+11 0.0262 0.0261 0.0258 0.0258 
+12 0.0285 0.0260 0.0258 0.0261 
+13 0.0285 0.0263 0.0263 0.0264 
+14 0.0279 0.0264 0.0264 0.0263 
+15 0.0273 0.0264 0.0265 0.0264 
+16 0.0272 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 
+17 0.0270 0.0257 0.0256 0.0256 
+18 0.0269 0.0260 0.0261 0.0260 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0256 0.0265 0.0265 0.0264 
-17 0.0253 0.0263 0.0262 0.0261 
-16 0.0254 0.0261 0.0261 0.0261 
-15 0.0263 0.0262 0.0261 0.0263 
-14 0.0266 0.0261 0.0261 0.0261 
-13 0.0267 0.0275 0.0272 0.0273 
-12 0.0259 0.0270 0.0270 0.0270 
-11 0.0275 0.0273 0.0273 0.0275 
-10 0.0276 0.0276 0.0275 0.0274 
-9 0.0286 0.0278 0.0275 0.0275 
-8 0.0288 0.0288 0.0284 0.0284 
-7 0.0295 0.0284 0.0285 0.0284 
-6 0.0276 0.0279 0.0280 0.0279 
-5 0.0287 0.0283 0.0284 0.0282 
-4 0.0271 0.0285 0.0285 0.0283 
-3 0.0282 0.0291 0.0290 0.0289 
-2 0.0285 0.0303 0.0302 0.0300 
-1 0.0327 0.0336 0.0333 0.0334 
Insider sale event 
+1 0.0306 0.0311 0.0306 0.0305 
+2 0.0274 0.0296 0.0295 0.0293 
+3 0.0261 0.0292 0.0289 0.0288 
+4 0.0272 0.0298 0.0297 0.0294 
+5 0.0260 0.0292 0.0291 0.0287 
+6 0.0275 0.0293 0.0291 0.0288 
+7 0.0280 0.0296 0.0296 0.0294 
+8 0.0270 0.0296 0.0294 0.0293 
+9 0.0272 0.0299 0.0295 0.0296 
+10 0.0277 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300 
+11 0.0259 0.0293 0.0293 0.0291 
+12 0.0267 0.0289 0.0290 0.0288 
+13 0.0277 0.0296 0.0297 0.0294 
+14 0.0270 0.0292 0.0289 0.0287 
+15 0.0269 0.0294 0.0293 0.0291 
+16 0.0259 0.0298 0.0300 0.0298 
+17 0.0269 0.0294 0.0294 0.0292 
+18 0.0282 0.0296 0.0295 0.0296 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0254 0.0264 0.0264 0.0263 
-17 0.0247 0.0261 0.0261 0.0260 
-16 0.0250 0.0259 0.0259 0.0259 
-15 0.0264 0.0262 0.0261 0.0263 
-14 0.0259 0.0260 0.0259 0.0259 
-13 0.0262 0.0272 0.0269 0.0269 
-12 0.0254 0.0267 0.0267 0.0267 
-11 0.0266 0.0270 0.0270 0.0271 
-10 0.0272 0.0274 0.0273 0.0271 
-9 0.0284 0.0277 0.0275 0.0275 
-8 0.0284 0.0287 0.0282 0.0281 
-7 0.0292 0.0284 0.0284 0.0284 
-6 0.0275 0.0278 0.0279 0.0278 
-5 0.0281 0.0283 0.0283 0.0281 
-4 0.0268 0.0285 0.0284 0.0282 
-3 0.0283 0.0289 0.0288 0.0287 
-2 0.0285 0.0302 0.0300 0.0299 
-1 0.0328 0.0333 0.0330 0.0330 
Insider sale event 
+1 0.0299 0.0309 0.0304 0.0303 
+2 0.0270 0.0294 0.0293 0.0291 
+3 0.0256 0.0290 0.0287 0.0285 
+4 0.0268 0.0294 0.0293 0.0290 
+5 0.0256 0.0289 0.0288 0.0285 
+6 0.0271 0.0291 0.0289 0.0286 
+7 0.0273 0.0293 0.0293 0.0291 
+8 0.0263 0.0292 0.0290 0.0289 
+9 0.0270 0.0295 0.0291 0.0292 
+10 0.0273 0.0295 0.0295 0.0295 
+11 0.0255 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 
+12 0.0258 0.0285 0.0286 0.0283 
+13 0.0269 0.0292 0.0293 0.0291 
+14 0.0268 0.0289 0.0286 0.0284 
+15 0.0262 0.0289 0.0288 0.0286 
+16 0.0254 0.0293 0.0295 0.0292 
+17 0.0259 0.0287 0.0286 0.0284 
+18 0.0277 0.0290 0.0289 0.0289 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0252 0.0259 0.0259 0.0258 
-17 0.0242 0.0256 0.0256 0.0255 
-16 0.0246 0.0253 0.0254 0.0253 
-15 0.0262 0.0257 0.0255 0.0257 
-14 0.0259 0.0256 0.0255 0.0254 
-13 0.0258 0.0268 0.0265 0.0265 
-12 0.0251 0.0264 0.0264 0.0263 
-11 0.0263 0.0265 0.0266 0.0266 
-10 0.0269 0.0269 0.0267 0.0266 
-9 0.0282 0.0272 0.0271 0.0270 
-8 0.0282 0.0281 0.0277 0.0276 
-7 0.0291 0.0279 0.0279 0.0278 
-6 0.0272 0.0274 0.0274 0.0273 
-5 0.0278 0.0278 0.0278 0.0276 
-4 0.0268 0.0279 0.0279 0.0276 
-3 0.0281 0.0285 0.0284 0.0283 
-2 0.0280 0.0297 0.0295 0.0294 
-1 0.0325 0.0328 0.0325 0.0325 
Insider sale event 
+1 0.0298 0.0304 0.0299 0.0298 
+2 0.0266 0.0288 0.0287 0.0285 
+3 0.0253 0.0285 0.0282 0.0280 
+4 0.0267 0.0289 0.0288 0.0285 
+5 0.0254 0.0284 0.0283 0.0280 
+6 0.0266 0.0286 0.0283 0.0281 
+7 0.0267 0.0288 0.0288 0.0286 
+8 0.0260 0.0286 0.0284 0.0283 
+9 0.0265 0.0289 0.0286 0.0286 
+10 0.0271 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 
+11 0.0251 0.0282 0.0282 0.0281 
+12 0.0257 0.0279 0.0280 0.0278 
+13 0.0267 0.0286 0.0287 0.0285 
+14 0.0266 0.0283 0.0280 0.0279 
+15 0.0259 0.0284 0.0282 0.0280 
+16 0.0252 0.0288 0.0289 0.0287 
+17 0.0255 0.0282 0.0280 0.0279 
+18 0.0272 0.0284 0.0283 0.0283 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0276 0.0267 0.0268 0.0266 
-17 0.0286 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263 
-16 0.0266 0.0262 0.0263 0.0262 
-15 0.0264 0.0261 0.0261 0.0263 
-14 0.0280 0.0265 0.0264 0.0264 
-13 0.0285 0.0271 0.0269 0.0269 
-12 0.0276 0.0274 0.0273 0.0273 
-11 0.0266 0.0275 0.0273 0.0273 
-10 0.0279 0.0271 0.0270 0.0268 
-9 0.0304 0.0271 0.0268 0.0267 
-8 0.0280 0.0276 0.0274 0.0272 
-7 0.0296 0.0276 0.0276 0.0277 
-6 0.0268 0.0272 0.0272 0.0273 
-5 0.0266 0.0272 0.0273 0.0274 
-4 0.0270 0.0271 0.0271 0.0271 
-3 0.0291 0.0275 0.0275 0.0275 
-2 0.0294 0.0282 0.0281 0.0280 
-1 0.0342 0.0304 0.0301 0.0302 
Total insider 
trading event 
+1 0.0313 0.0295 0.0292 0.0291 
+2 0.0298 0.0286 0.0285 0.0284 
+3 0.0266 0.0282 0.0280 0.0276 
+4 0.0278 0.0280 0.0278 0.0277 
+5 0.0266 0.0276 0.0275 0.0274 
+6 0.0294 0.0277 0.0276 0.0275 
+7 0.0276 0.0277 0.0277 0.0276 
+8 0.0268 0.0276 0.0276 0.0277 
+9 0.0281 0.0279 0.0277 0.0278 
+10 0.0288 0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 
+11 0.0263 0.0280 0.0279 0.0278 
+12 0.0285 0.0278 0.0277 0.0280 
+13 0.0300 0.0283 0.0284 0.0284 
+14 0.0287 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 
+15 0.0259 0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 
+16 0.0280 0.0282 0.0283 0.0283 
+17 0.0287 0.0279 0.0278 0.0277 
+18 0.0290 0.0280 0.0279 0.0280 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0274 0.0263 0.0264 0.0262 
-17 0.0281 0.0259 0.0260 0.0259 
-16 0.0259 0.0258 0.0259 0.0259 
-15 0.0263 0.0258 0.0258 0.0260 
-14 0.0275 0.0260 0.0259 0.0260 
-13 0.0282 0.0266 0.0264 0.0264 
-12 0.0271 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268 
-11 0.0264 0.0269 0.0268 0.0268 
-10 0.0274 0.0266 0.0265 0.0263 
-9 0.0297 0.0266 0.0264 0.0263 
-8 0.0276 0.0272 0.0270 0.0268 
-7 0.0288 0.0271 0.0272 0.0273 
-6 0.0262 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268 
-5 0.0262 0.0268 0.0269 0.0270 
-4 0.0264 0.0267 0.0267 0.0268 
-3 0.0281 0.0270 0.0270 0.0270 
-2 0.0292 0.0277 0.0276 0.0276 
-1 0.0338 0.0297 0.0295 0.0296 
Total insider 
trading event 
+1 0.0304 0.0288 0.0285 0.0285 
+2 0.0292 0.0280 0.0279 0.0279 
+3 0.0263 0.0275 0.0273 0.0270 
+4 0.0276 0.0274 0.0272 0.0271 
+5 0.0263 0.0270 0.0269 0.0268 
+6 0.0289 0.0271 0.0270 0.0270 
+7 0.0269 0.0271 0.0271 0.0270 
+8 0.0263 0.0269 0.0269 0.0270 
+9 0.0279 0.0272 0.0271 0.0272 
+10 0.0283 0.0276 0.0276 0.0276 
+11 0.0260 0.0273 0.0272 0.0272 
+12 0.0280 0.0272 0.0272 0.0274 
+13 0.0287 0.0277 0.0277 0.0278 
+14 0.0279 0.0275 0.0275 0.0275 
+15 0.0256 0.0275 0.0275 0.0275 
+16 0.0274 0.0275 0.0276 0.0276 
+17 0.0280 0.0271 0.0271 0.0270 
+18 0.0285 0.0273 0.0273 0.0274 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Time period Single Cluster n=0 Cluster n=1 Cluster n=2 
-18 0.0271 0.0259 0.0260 0.0257 
-17 0.0276 0.0256 0.0256 0.0256 
-16 0.0259 0.0255 0.0255 0.0255 
-15 0.0261 0.0254 0.0254 0.0256 
-14 0.0276 0.0257 0.0256 0.0256 
-13 0.0278 0.0261 0.0260 0.0260 
-12 0.0266 0.0265 0.0264 0.0264 
-11 0.0262 0.0265 0.0264 0.0264 
-10 0.0274 0.0261 0.0260 0.0258 
-9 0.0298 0.0262 0.0259 0.0259 
-8 0.0275 0.0267 0.0265 0.0263 
-7 0.0286 0.0267 0.0268 0.0268 
-6 0.0262 0.0264 0.0264 0.0264 
-5 0.0259 0.0265 0.0266 0.0266 
-4 0.0264 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263 
-3 0.0279 0.0266 0.0266 0.0267 
-2 0.0288 0.0273 0.0272 0.0272 
-1 0.0337 0.0293 0.0291 0.0292 
Total insider 
trading event 
+1 0.0304 0.0284 0.0281 0.0281 
+2 0.0286 0.0275 0.0274 0.0274 
+3 0.0257 0.0271 0.0269 0.0266 
+4 0.0277 0.0269 0.0267 0.0267 
+5 0.0259 0.0266 0.0265 0.0264 
+6 0.0280 0.0267 0.0266 0.0265 
+7 0.0262 0.0267 0.0267 0.0266 
+8 0.0261 0.0265 0.0265 0.0266 
+9 0.0274 0.0268 0.0266 0.0268 
+10 0.0280 0.0271 0.0271 0.0272 
+11 0.0259 0.0269 0.0268 0.0268 
+12 0.0276 0.0268 0.0268 0.0270 
+13 0.0287 0.0273 0.0273 0.0274 
+14 0.0277 0.0271 0.0271 0.0270 
+15 0.0257 0.0272 0.0272 0.0272 
+16 0.0271 0.0271 0.0272 0.0272 
+17 0.0277 0.0267 0.0266 0.0266 
+18 0.0280 0.0269 0.0269 0.0269 
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Table 4 
Event Study 一 Volatility Change Immediately before Insider Trading 
The analysis of volatility change immediately before insider trading in event study is 
shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results for insider purchase events from the 
analysis using total volatility; Panel B reports those for insider purchase events 
employing abnormal return volatility; Panel C displays those for insider purchase events 
employing firm specific volatility; Panel D exhibits those for insider sale events 
adopting total volatility; Panel E shows those for insider sale events adopting abnormal 
return volatility; Panel F displays those for insider sale events employing firm specific 
volatility; Panel G exhibits those for total insider trading events employing total 
volatility; Panel H reports those for total insider trading events adopting abnormal return 
volatility; Panel I displays those for total insider trading events adopting firm specific 
volatility. 
In each Panel, the first two columns are the two time periods relative to the event 
occurrence under consideration and they are represented by period range A and period 
range B respectively. The third column specifies the event definition. The fourth 
(Number A < B) displays the number and proportion of cases that volatility over period 
range A is significantly less than volatility over period range B at 10% level of 
significance using F-test; the fifth (Number A > B) exhibits those for the reverse 
direction. The sixth column (Number A <> B) shows the number of cases for neither of 
the above two situations. For each entry, the upper number is the number of cases while 
the lower number (in %) is the proportion out of the number of successful comparisons 
which is provided in the seventh column. 
Panel A: Insider purchase event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^^；；^；^^^ Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B ^ " . " J j p ^ ^ g ^ g " ' 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 52 29 307 388 
13.40% 7.47% 79.12% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 833 749 6167 7749 
10.75% 9.67% 79.58% 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 690 630 5165 6485 
10.64% 9.71% 79.65% 
Day- IO today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 591 533 4359 5483 
10.78% 9.72% 79.50% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 68 56 286 410 
16.59% 13.66% 69.76% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1368 1214 5764 8346 
16.39% 14.55% 69.06% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1116 1010 4872 6998 
15.95% 14.43% 69.62% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 937 860 4137 5934 
15.79% 14.49% 69.72% 
Day-40 to day-21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 98 77 252 427 
22.95% 18.03% 59.02% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1828 1794 5087 8709 
20.99% 20.60% 58.41% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 1505 1486 4324 7315 
20.57% 20.31% 59.11% 
Day-40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1273 1262 3679 6214 
20.49% 20.31% 59.21% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B ？“?：^®!?^' 
definition comparisons 
Day -10 today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 51 28 311 390 
13.08% 7.18% 79.74% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 858 748 6221 7827 
10.96% 9.56% 79.48% 
Day-10 today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 702 617 5226 6545 
10.73% 9.43% 79.85% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 593 518 4420 5531 
10.72% 9.37% 79.91% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 70 50 296 416 
16.83% 12.02% 71.15% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1350 1197 5852 8399 
16.07% 14.25% 69.67% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1108 1006 4927 7041 
15.74% 14.29% 69.98% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 944 855 4173 5972 
15.81% 14.32% 69.88% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 90 73 265 428 
21.03% 17.06% 61.92% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1739 1748 5242 8729 
19.92% 20.03% 60.05% 
Day-40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1448 1451 4434 7333 
19.75% 19.79% 60.47% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1218 1229 3784 6231 
19.55% 19.72% 60.73% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
® definition comparisons 
Day -10 today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 47 29 314 390 
12.05% 7.44% 80.51% 
Day -10 today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 878 752 6197 7827 
11.22% 9.61% 79.17% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 729 614 5202 6545 
11.14% 9.38% 79.48% 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 621 515 4395 5531 
11.23% 9.31% 79.46% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 75 52 289 416 
18.03% 12.50% 69.47% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1364 1215 5820 8399 
16.24% 14.47% 69.29% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1123 1019 4899 7041 
15.95% 14.47% 69.58% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 950 867 4155 5972 
15.91% 14.52% 69.57% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 88 68 272 428 
20.56% 15.89% 63.55% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1734 1719 5276 8729 
19.86% 19.69% 60.44% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 1442 1427 4464 7333 
19.66% 19.46% 60.88% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1208 1206 3817 6231 
19.39% 19.35% 61.26% 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B ^ o . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f u l 
definition comparisons 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 53 24 336 413 
12.83% 5.81% 81.36% 
Day -10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 545 409 3442 4396 
12.40% 9.30% 78.30% 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 476 360 3047 3883 
12.26% 9.27% 78.47% 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 431 326 2755 3512 
12.27% 9.28% 78.45% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 82 51 307 440 
18.64% 11.59% 69.77% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 846 604 3077 4527 
18.69% 13.34% 67.97% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 741 539 2725 4005 
18.50% 13.46% 68.04% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 670 485 2470 3625 
18.48% 13.38% 68.14% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 108 92 258 458 
23.58% 20.09% 56.33% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=0 1139 839 2620 4598 
24.77% 18.25% 56.98% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=1 995 754 2319 4068 
24.46% 18.53% 57.01% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=2 885 684 2115 3684 
24.02% 18.57% 57.41% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
® definition comparisons 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 50 29 335 414 
12.08% 7.00% 80.92% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 555 437 3420 4412 
12.58% 9.90% 77.52% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 481 388 3025 3894 
12.35% 9.96% 77.68% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 440 349 2733 3522 
12.49% 9.91% 77.60% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 78 52 312 442 
17.65% 11.76% 70.59% 
Day-20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 815 612 3108 4535 
17.97% 13.50% 68.53% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 709 548 2755 4012 
17.67% 13.66% 68.67% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 648 493 2490 3631 
17.85% 13.58% 68.58% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Single 105 86 268 459 
22.88% 18.74% 58.39% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1108 831 2663 4602 
24.08% 18.06% 57.87% 
Day-40 to day -21 Day-20 to day-1 Cluster n=1 973 742 2357 4072 
23.89% 18.22% 57.88% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=2 866 671 2151 3688 
23.48% 18.19% 58.32% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparisoS^^' 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 51 30 333 414 
12.32% 7.25% 80.43% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 548 418 3446 4412 
12.42% 9.47% 78.11% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 481 371 3042 3894 
12.35% 9.53% 78.12% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day-5 to day-1 Cluster n=2 444 332 2746 3522 
12.61% 9.43% 77.97% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 79 51 312 442 
17.87% 11.54% 70.59% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 840 609 3086 4535 
18.52% 13.43% 68.05% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 731 541 2740 4012 
18.22% 13.48% 68.30% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 669 489 2473 3631 
18.42% 13.47% 68.11% 
Day-40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 107 84 268 459 
23.31% 18.30% 58.39% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1100 822 2680 4602 
23.90% 17.86% 58.24% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 964 734 2374 4072 
23.67% 18.03% 58.30% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=2 858 662 2168 3688 
23.26% 17.95% 58.79% 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B d ^ f l S n dumber A < B Number A > B Number A <> B " " ^ Q ^ j i ^ a S r n f ' 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 41 26 312 379 
10.82% 6.86% 82.32% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1269 1091 9009 11369 
11.16% 9.60% 79.24% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 1041 917 7531 9489 
10.97% 9.66% 79.37% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 891 783 6414 8088 
11.02% 9.68% 79.30% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 72 54 284 410 
17.56% 13.17% 69.27% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 2062 1722 8299 12083 
17.07% 14.25% 68.68% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1699 1433 6971 10103 
16.82% 14.18% 69.00% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1435 1223 5972 8630 
16.63% 14.17% 69.20% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Single 96 74 259 429 
22.38% 17.25% 60.37% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 2775 2465 7263 12503 
22.19% 19.72% 58.09% 
Day-40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 2268 2057 6140 10465 
21.67% 19.66% 58.67% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1914 1758 5284 8956 
21.37% 19.63% 59.00% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B . E/ent Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
definition compa 门 sons 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 40 24 318 382 
10.47% 6.28% 83.25% 
Day-10 to day-6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1302 1112 9048 11462 
11.36% 9.70% 78.94% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 1061 929 7569 9559 
11.10% 9.72% 79.18% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 904 793 6448 8145 
11.10% 9.74% 79.17% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 77 47 293 417 
18.47% 11.27% 70.26% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 2027 1718 8398 12143 
16.69% 14.15% 69.16% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1670 1443 7039 10152 
16.45% 14.21% 69.34% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1434 1228 6011 8673 
16.53% 14.16% 69.31% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Single 92 76 262 430 
21.40% 17.67% 60.93% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 2673 2417 7436 12526 
21.34% 19.30% 59.36% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 2210 2021 6255 10486 
21.08% 19.27% 59.65% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=2 1861 1724 5391 8976 
20.73% 19.21% 60.06% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B . E/ent Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B ul 
® definition comparisons 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Single 38 24 320 382 
9.95% 6.28% 83.77% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=0 1315 1100 9047 11462 
11.47% 9.60% 78.93% 
Day-10 today -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=1 1085 911 7563 9559 
11.35% 9.53% 79.12% 
Day-10 to day -6 Day -5 to day -1 Cluster n=2 936 774 6435 8145 
11.49% 9.50% 79.01% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Single 78 48 291 417 
18.71% 11.51% 69.78% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=0 2065 1721 8357 12143 
17.01% 14.17% 68.82% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=1 1706 1441 7005 10152 
16.80% 14.19% 69.00% 
Day -20 to day-11 Day-10 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1459 1232 5982 8673 
16.82% 14.21% 68.97% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Single 94 68 268 430 
21.86% 15.81% 62.33% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=0 2658 2380 7488 12526 
21.22% 19.00% 59.78% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day -1 Cluster n=1 2195 1986 6305 10486 
20.93% 18.94% 60.13% 
Day -40 to day -21 Day -20 to day-1 Cluster n=2 1845 1688 5443 8976 
20.55% 18.81% 60.64% 
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Table 5 
Event Study 一 Volatility Immediately before and after Insider Trading 
The analysis of volatility immediately before and after insider trading is shown in this 
Table. Panel A exhibits the results for insider purchase events from the analysis using 
total volatility; Panel B reports those for insider purchase events employing abnormal 
return volatility; Panel C displays those for insider purchase events employing firm 
specific volatility; Panel D exhibits those for insider sale events adopting total volatility; 
Panel E shows those for insider sale events adopting abnormal return volatility; Panel F 
displays those for insider sale events employing firm specific volatility; Panel G exhibits 
those for total insider trading events employing total volatility; Panel H reports those for 
total insider trading events adopting abnormal return volatility; Panel I displays those for 
total insider trading events adopting firm specific volatility. 
In each Panel, the first two columns are the two time periods relative to the event 
occurrence under consideration and they are represented by period range A and period 
range B respectively. The third column specifies the event definition. The fourth 
(Number A < B) displays the number and proportion of cases that volatility over period 
range A is significantly less than volatility over period range B at 10% level of 
significance using F-test; the fifth (Number A > B) exhibits those for the reverse 
direction. The sixth column (Number A <> B) shows the number of cases for neither of 
the above two situations. For each entry, the upper number is the number of cases while 
the lower number (in %) is the proportion out of the number of successful comparisons 
which is provided in the seventh column. 
Panel A: Insider purchase event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B dgEf二门 dumber A < B Number A > B Number A <> B N。二二：二 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 35 54 308 397 
8.82% 13.60% 77.58% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 830 838 6138 7806 
10.63% 10.74% 78.63% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 661 702 5153 6516 
10.14% 10.77% 79.08% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 584 583 4339 5506 
10.61% 10.59% 78.80% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 67 76 292 435 
15.40% 17.47% 67.13% 
Day-10 today-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1351 1397 5693 8441 
16.01% 16.55% 67.44% 
Day-10 today-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 1095 1160 4813 7068 
15.49% 16.41% 68.10% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 931 953 4106 5990 
15.54% 15.91% 68.55% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 89 102 258 449 
19.82% 22.72% 57.46% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1816 1858 5129 8803 
20.63% 21.11% 58.26% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1511 1557 4317 7385 
20.46% 21.08% 58.46% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1283 1306 3684 6273 
20.45% 20.82% 58.73% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B 
^ definition comparisons 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 33 53 315 401 
8.23% 13.22% 78.55% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 854 861 6167 7882 
10.83% 10.92% 78.24% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 677 710 5189 6576 
10.30% 10.80% 78.91% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 583 582 4393 5558 
10.49% 10.47% 79.04% 
Day-10toc lay-1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 64 74 301 439 
14.58% 16.86% 68.56% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1308 1383 5796 8487 
15.41% 16.30% 68.29% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 1053 1148 4905 7106 
14.82% 16.16% 69.03% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=2 896 941 4187 6024 
14.87% 15.62% 69.51% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 85 105 260 450 
18.89% 23.33% 57.78% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1764 1817 5257 8838 
19.96% 20.56% 59.48% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1459 1546 4411 7416 
19.67% 20.85% 59.48% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1222 1314 3763 6299 
19.40% 20.86% 59.74% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^^,；®；；^  Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 40 54 307 401 
9.98% 13.47% 76.56% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 872 866 6144 7882 
11.06% 10.99% 77.95% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 693 715 5168 6576 
10.54% 10.87% 78.59% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 607 583 4368 5558 
10.92% 10.49% 78.59% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 today+10 Single 66 77 296 439 
15.03% 17.54% 67.43% 
Day -10 to day -1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=0 1339 1366 5782 8487 
15.78% 16.10% 68.13% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 1084 1149 4873 7106 
15.25% 16.17% 68.58% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=2 922 957 4145 6024 
15.31% 15.89% 68.81% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 81 108 261 450 
18.00% 24.00% 58.00% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1734 1799 5305 8838 
19.62% 20.36% 60.02% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1438 1532 4446 7416 
19.39% 20.66% 59.95% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1200 1307 3792 6299 
19.05% 20.75% 60.20% 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
^ definition comparisons 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 22 43 353 418 
5.26% 10.29% 84.45% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 409 498 3515 4422 
9.25% 11.26% 79.49% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 365 447 3089 3901 
9.36% 11.46% 79.18% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 334 427 2760 3521 
9.49% 12.13% 78.39% 
Day-10toc lay-1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 43 75 330 448 
9.60% 16.74% 73.66% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 651 844 3072 4567 
14.25% 18.48% 67.27% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 577 754 2700 4031 
14.31% 18.71% 66.98% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=2 520 695 2428 3643 
14.27% 19.08% 66.65% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 62 107 293 462 
13.42% 23.16% 63.42% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 932 1068 2653 4653 
20.03% 22.95% 57.02% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 823 948 2344 4115 
20.00% 23.04% 56.96% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 739 864 2123 3726 
19.83% 23.19% 56.98% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^ Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B l^ J^； ®^®^ "' " ^ definition compa 门 sons 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 25 50 344 419 
5.97% 11.93% 82.10% 
Day-5 to day-1 Day+1 to day+5 Cluster n=0 437 513 3490 4440 
9.84% 11.55% 78.60% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 383 461 3074 3918 
9.78% 11.77% 78.46% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 345 420 2772 3537 
9.75% 11.87% 78.37% 
Day-10toc lay-1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 40 75 336 451 
8.87% 16.63% 74.50% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 619 817 3144 4580 
13.52% 17.84% 68.65% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=1 541 724 2779 4044 
13.38% 17.90% 68.72% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 495 665 2496 3656 
13.54% 18.19% 68.27% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 58 110 295 463 
12.53% 23.76% 63.71% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 876 1066 2715 4657 
18.81% 22.89% 58.30% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 763 952 2404 4119 
18.52% 23.11% 58.36% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 688 866 2176 3730 
18.45% 23.22% 58.34% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^ Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
^ definition comparisons 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 22 48 349 419 
5.25% 11.46% 83.29% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 432 509 3499 4440 
9.73% 11.46% 78.81% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 375 449 3094 3918 
9.57% 11.46% 78.97% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 339 417 2781 3537 
9.58% 11.79% 78.63% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 today+10 Single 36 78 337 451 
7.98% 17.29% 74.72% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 612 815 3153 4580 
13.36% 17.79% 68.84% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 540 713 2791 4044 
13.35% 17.63% 69.02% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 490 655 2511 3656 
13.40% 17.92% 68.68% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 60 109 294 463 
12.96% 23.54% 63.50% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 865 1062 2730 4657 
18.57% 22.80% 58.62% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 760 939 2420 4119 
18.45% 22.80% 58.75% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 682 849 2199 3730 
18.28% 22.76% 58.95% 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B dS l i l t ^n Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B ^compar ison?" ' 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 32 49 307 388 
8.25% 12.63% 79.12% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 1163 1247 9040 11450 
10.16% 10.89% 78.95% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 937 1039 7554 9530 
9.83% 10.90% 79.27% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 828 909 6377 8114 
10.20% 11.20% 78.59% 
Day-10toc lay-1 Day+1 today+10 Single 49 66 313 428 
11.45% 15.42% 73.13% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1893 2092 8215 12200 
15.52% 17.15% 67.34% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 1538 1744 6899 10181 
15.11% 17.13% 67.76% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 1320 1473 5893 8686 
15.20% 16.96% 67.84% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 74 99 274 447 
16.55% 22.15% 61.30% 
Day-20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 2597 2733 7306 12636 
20.55% 21.63% 57.82% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 2154 2287 6125 10566 
20.39% 21.64% 57.97% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day+1 to day+20 Cluster n=2 1833 1945 5257 9035 
20.29% 21.53% 58.18% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B d ^ f l i l l L Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B "^comparisoS^"' 
Day-5 to day-1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 29 46 316 391 
7.42% 11.76% 80.82% 
Day-5 to day-1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 1207 1283 9052 11542 
10.46% 11.12% 78.43% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 970 1055 7580 9605 
10.10% 10.98% 78.92% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 840 896 6444 8180 
10.27% 10.95% 78.78% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 57 67 309 433 
13.16% 15.47% 71.36% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1823 2052 8381 12256 
14.87% 16.74% 68.38% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=1 1475 1700 7054 10229 
14.42% 16.62% 68.96% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 1269 1430 6031 8730 
14.54% 16.38% 69.08% 
Day-20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 78 102 268 448 
17.41% 22.77% 59.82% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 2498 2686 7490 12674 
19.71% 21.19% 59.10% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 2051 2275 6274 10600 
19.35% 21.46% 59.19% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1731 1952 5381 9064 
19.10% 21.54% 59.37% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B 
^ definition comparisons 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Single 32 47 312 391 
8.18% 12.02% 79.80% 
Day-5 to day-1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=0 1226 1281 9035 11542 
10.62% 11.10% 78.28% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=1 985 1051 7569 9605 
10.26% 10.94% 78.80% 
Day -5 to day -1 Day +1 to day +5 Cluster n=2 867 906 6407 8180 
10.60% 11.08% 78.33% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Single 58 75 300 433 
13.39% 17.32% 69.28% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=0 1843 2033 8380 12256 
15.04% 16.59% 68.37% 
Day-10 to day-1 Day +1 to day +10 Cluster n=1 1502 1703 7024 10229 
14.68% 16.65% 68.67% 
Day -10 today -1 Day+1 to day+10 Cluster n=2 1286 1453 5991 8730 
14.73% 16.64% 68.63% 
Day-20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Single 78 101 269 448 
17.41% 22.54% 60.04% 
Day -20 to day -1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=0 2457 2665 7552 12674 
19.39% 21.03% 59.59% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=1 2029 2253 6318 10600 
19.14% 21.25% 59.60% 
Day -20 to day-1 Day +1 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1706 1933 5425 9064 
18.82% 21.33% 59.85% 
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Table 6 
Event Study 一 Volatility Change Immediately after Insider Trading 
The analysis of volatility change immediately after insider trading is shown in this Table. 
Panel A exhibits the results for insider purchase events from the analysis using total 
volatility; Panel B reports those for insider purchase events employing abnormal return 
volatility; Panel C displays those for insider purchase events employing firm specific 
volatility; Panel D exhibits those for insider sale events adopting total volatility; Panel E 
shows those for insider sale events adopting abnormal return volatility; Panel F displays 
those for insider sale events employing firm specific volatility; Panel G exhibits those 
for total insider trading events employing total volatility; Panel H reports those for total 
insider trading events adopting abnormal return volatility; Panel I displays those for total 
insider trading events adopting firm specific volatility. 
In each Panel, the first two columns are the two time periods relative to the event 
occurrence under consideration and they are represented by period range A and period 
range B respectively. The third column specifies the event definition. The fourth 
(Number A < B) displays the number and proportion of cases that volatility over period 
range A is significantly less than volatility over period range B at 10% level of 
significance using F-test; the fifth (Number A > B) exhibits those for the reverse 
direction. The sixth column (Number A <> B) shows the number of cases for neither of 
the above two situations. For each entry, the upper number is the number of cases while 
the lower number (in %) is the proportion out of the number of successful comparisons 
which is provided in the seventh column. 
Panel A: Insider purchase event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^^；；^^^^ Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 44 47 325 416 
10.58% 11.30% 78.13% 
Day+1 to day+5 Day+6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 723 839 6266 7828 
9.24% 10.72% 80.05% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day +10 Cluster n=1 616 694 5247 6557 
9.39% 10.58% 80.02% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 524 586 4442 5552 
9.44% 10.55% 80.01% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 53 88 298 439 
12.07% 20.05% 67.88% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today+20 Cluster n=0 1216 1381 5787 8384 
14.50% 16.47% 69.02% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1026 1160 4847 7033 
14.59% 16.49% 68.92% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 849 982 4142 5973 
14.21% 16.44% 69.35% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 80 109 268 457 
17.51% 23.85% 58.64% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 1697 1974 4998 8669 
19.58% 22.77% 57.65% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 1425 1642 4221 7288 
19.55% 22.53% 57.92% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1197 1395 3609 6201 
19.30% 22.50% 58.20% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B d l l l i l t ^ in Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparisonf" ' 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 54 48 319 421 
12.83% 11.40% 75.77% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 783 837 6289 7909 
9.90% 10.58% 79.52% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 651 696 5278 6625 
9.83% 10.51% 79.67% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 547 582 4479 5608 
9.75% 10.38% 79.87% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 58 90 294 442 
13.12% 20.36% 66.52% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1219 1373 5838 8430 
14.46% 16.29% 69.25% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1023 1155 4892 7070 
14.47% 16.34% 69.19% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 838 973 4195 6006 
13.95% 16.20% 69.85% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 73 105 279 457 
15.97% 22.98% 61.05% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 1653 1876 5175 8704 
18.99% 21.55% 59.46% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 1380 1554 4383 7317 
18.86% 21.24% 59.90% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1159 1331 3735 6225 
18.62% 21.38% 60.00% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B d ^ f l i l l L Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B compar isoS^' 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 50 51 320 421 
11.88% 12.11% 76.01% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day+6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 785 867 6257 7909 
9.93% 10.96% 79.11% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 663 716 5246 6625 
10.01% 10.81% 79.18% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 566 597 4445 5608 
10.09% 10.65% 79.26% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Single 56 88 298 442 
12.67% 19.91% 67.42% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1251 1359 5820 8430 
14.84% 16.12% 69.04% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1058 1147 4865 7070 
14.96% 16.22% 68.81% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 870 967 4169 6006 
14.49% 16.10% 69.41% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 75 101 281 457 
16.41% 22.10% 61.49% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 1679 1857 5168 8704 
19.29% 21.34% 59.38% ‘ 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 1412 1551 4354 7317 
19.30% 21.20% 59.51% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1194 1324 3707 6225 
19.18% 21.27% 59.55% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparison?"' 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 35 45 341 421 
8.31% 10.69% 81.00% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day +10 Cluster n=0 447 467 3514 4428 
10.09% 10.55% 79.36% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 402 415 3096 3913 
10.27% 10.61% 79.12% 
Day+1 to day+5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 366 379 2795 3540 
10.34% 10.71% 78.95% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 to day +20 Single 66 77 306 449 
14.70% 17.15% 68.15% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today+20 Clustern=0 666 751 3144 4561 
14.60% 16.47% 68.93% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 603 654 2778 4035 
14.94% 16.21% 68.85% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 to day+20 Cluster n=2 541 588 2525 3654 
14.81% 16.09% 69.10% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 96 90 275 461 
20.82% 19.52% 59.65% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 948 985 2687 4620 
20.52% 21.32% 58.16% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 853 858 2379 4090 
20.86% 20.98% 58.17% 
Day+1 to day+20 Day+21 to day+40 Cluster n=2 779 783 2144 3706 
21.02% 21.13% 57.85% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel E: Insider sale event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B d S l i I l L Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B "^comparisonf^' 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 38 50 341 429 
8.86% 11.66% 79.49% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 446 486 3519 4451 
10.02% 10.92% 79.06% 
Day+1 to day+5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 397 429 3108 3934 
10.09% 10.90% 79.00% 
Day+1 to day+5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 362 390 2809 3561 
10.17% 10.95% 78.88% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 56 81 312 449 
12.47% 18.04% 69.49% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 637 740 3188 4565 
13.95% 16.21% 69.84% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 572 645 2820 4037 
14.17% 15.98% 69.85% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 517 582 2557 3656 
14.14% 15.92% 69.94% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 90 87 286 463 
19.44% 18.79% 61.77% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 934 962 2730 4626 
20.19% 20.80% 59.01% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 842 846 2408 4096 
20.56% 20.65% 58.79% 
Day+1 today+20 Day+21 today+40 Cluster n=2 763 772 2177 3712 
20.55% 20.80% 58.65% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
^ ^ definition compansons 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 34 49 346 429 
7.93% 11.42% 80.65% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 428 480 3543 4451 
9.62% 10.78% 79.60% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 384 425 3125 3934 
9.76% 10.80% 79.44% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 351 388 2822 3561 
9.86% 10.90% 79.25% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Single 55 83 311 449 
12.25% 18.49% 69.27% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today+20 Cluster n=0 651 726 3188 4565 
14.26% 15.90% 69.84% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 581 634 2822 4037 
14.39% 15.70% 69.90% 
Day +1 to day+10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 519 579 2558 3656 
14.20% 15.84% 69.97% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 90 92 281 463 
19.44% 19.87% 60.69% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 923 943 2760 4626 
19.95% 20.38% 59.66% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 825 828 2443 4096 
20.14% 20.21% 59.64% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 751 755 2206 3712 
20.23% 20.34% 59.43% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B . Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B 
® ^ definition comparisons 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 47 46 309 402 
11.69% 11.44% 76.87% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1103 1217 9154 11474 
9.61% 10.61% 79.78% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 935 1009 7637 9581 
9.76% 10.53% 79.71% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 801 869 6503 8173 
9.80% 10.63% 79.57% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 55 82 296 433 
12.70% 18.94% 68.36% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1768 1988 8381 12137 
14.57% 16.38% 69.05% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1485 1652 7011 10148 
14.63% 16.28% 69.09% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1247 1400 6029 8676 
14.37% 16.14% 69.49% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 81 98 273 452 
17.92% 21.68% 60.40% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 2508 2766 7195 12469 
20.11% 22.18% 57.70% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 2119 2282 6046 10447 
20.28% 21.84% 57.87% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1804 1950 5192 8946 
20.17% 21.80% 58.04% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^ Event Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B ^。‘ 
^ ^ definition comparisons 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 58 49 303 410 
14.15% 11.95% 73.90% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=0 1159 1225 9189 11573 
10.01% 10.58% 79.40% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day+6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 961 1022 7681 9664 
9.94% 10.58% 79.48% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=2 815 875 6554 8244 
9.89% 10.61% 79.50% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 56 89 289 434 
12.90% 20.51% 66.59% 
Day +1 today+10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1746 1967 8473 12186 
14.33% 16.14% 69.53% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1454 1638 7095 10187 
14.27% 16.08% 69.65% 
Day+1 to day+10 Day+11 today+20 Cluster n=2 1212 1388 6111 8711 
13.91% 15.93% 70.15% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 75 97 281 453 
16.56% 21.41% 62.03% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=0 2443 2651 7414 12508 
19.53% 21.19% 59.27% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 2058 2185 6237 10480 
19.64% 20.85% 59.51% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1753 1878 5343 8974 
19.53% 20.93% 59.54% 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B d ^ f l i i l l L Number A < B Number A > B Number A • B ^compar ison?" ' 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Single 53 47 310 410 
12.93% 11.46% 75.61% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day +10 Cluster n=0 1143 1253 9177 11573 
9.88% 10.83% 79.30% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day+10 Cluster n=1 962 1037 7665 9664 
9.95% 10.73% 79.31% 
Day +1 to day +5 Day +6 to day +10 Cluster n=2 826 885 6533 8244 
10.02% 10.74% 79.25% 
Day+1 today+10 Day+11 today +20 Single 56 86 292 434 
12.90% 19.82% 67.28% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=0 1787 1941 8458 12186 
14.66% 15.93% 69.41% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=1 1494 1623 7070 10187 
14.67% 15.93% 69.40% 
Day +1 to day +10 Day +11 to day +20 Cluster n=2 1242 1379 6090 8711 
14.26% 15.83% 69.91% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Single 73 92 288 453 
16.11% 20.31% 63.58% 
Day+1 to day+20 Day+21 to day+40 Cluster n=0 2466 2617 7425 12508 
19.72% 20.92% 59.36% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=1 2074 2170 6236 10480 
19.79% 20.71% 59.50% 
Day +1 to day +20 Day +21 to day +40 Cluster n=2 1773 1862 5339 8974 
19.76% 20.75% 59.49% 
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Table 7 
Event Study 一 Intermediate Term Volatility before and after Insider 
Trading 
The analysis of intermediate term volatility before and after insider trading is shown in 
this Table. Panel A exhibits the results for insider purchase events from the analysis 
using total volatility; Panel B reports those for insider purchase events employing 
abnormal return volatility; Panel C displays those for insider purchase events employing 
firm specific volatility; Panel D exhibits those for insider sale events adopting total 
volatility; Panel E shows those for insider sale events adopting abnormal return volatility; 
Panel F displays those for insider sale events employing firm specific volatility; Panel G 
exhibits those for total insider trading events employing total volatility; Panel H reports 
those for total insider trading events adopting abnormal return volatility; Panel I displays 
those for total insider trading events adopting firm specific volatility. 
In each Panel, the first two columns are the two time periods relative to the event 
occurrence under consideration and they are represented by period range A and period 
range B respectively. The third column specifies the event definition. The fourth 
(Number A < B) displays the number and proportion of cases that volatility over period 
range A is significantly less than volatility over period range B at 10% level of 
significance using F-test; the fifth (Number A > B) exhibits those for the reverse 
direction. The sixth column (Number A <> B) shows the number of cases for neither of 
the above two situations. For each entry, the upper number is the number of cases while 
the lower number (in %) is the proportion out of the number of successful comparisons 
which is provided in the seventh column. 
Panel A: Insider purchase event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 问。。。。二丨 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 140 115 183 438 
31.96% 26.26% 41.78% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2779 2782 3333 8894 
31.25% 31.28% 37.47% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2318 2331 2837 7486 
30.96% 31.14% 37.90% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1970 1979 2416 6365 
30.95% 31.09% 37.96% 
Day-90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 139 111 162 412 
33.74% 26.94% 39.32% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2664 2574 3431 8669 
30.73% 29.69% 39.58% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2247 2143 2898 7288 
30.83% 29.40% 39.76% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1893 1814 2488 6195 
30.56% 29.28% 40.16% 
Day-90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 118 92 179 389 
30.33% 23.65% 46.02% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2405 2195 3746 8346 
28.82% 26.30% 44.88% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2046 1845 3131 7022 
29.14% 26.27% 44.59% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1741 1567 2659 5967 
29.18% 26.26% 44.56% 150 
Table 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Insider purchase event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B dS l i l l l i n Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B "^comparisonf^' 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 133 110 196 439 
30.30% 25.06% 44.65% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2747 2739 3414 8900 
30.87% 30.78% 38.36% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2304 2301 2887 7492 
30.75% 30.71% 38.53% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1945 1956 2468 6369 
30.54% 30.71% 38.75% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 138 107 169 414 
33.33% 25.85% 40.82% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2623 2471 3587 8681 
30.22% 28.46% 41.32% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2223 2062 3013 7298 
30.46% 28.25% 41.29% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1872 1751 2580 6203 
30.18% 28.23% 41.59% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 113 90 188 391 
28.90% 23.02% 48.08% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2353 2100 3907 8360 
28.15% 25.12% 46.73% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1995 1763 3275 7033 
28.37% 25.07% 46.57% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1691 1504 2780 5975 
28.30% 25.17% 46.53% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B dS l i l t ^n Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparisoS^"' 
Day-90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 127 113 199 439 
28.93% 25.74% 45.33% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2727 2690 3483 8900 
30.64% 30.22% 39.13% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2279 2256 2957 7492 
30.42% 30.11% 39.47% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1930 1916 2523 6369 
30.30% 30.08% 39.61% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 132 107 175 414 
31.88% 25.85% 42.27% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2620 2429 3632 8681 
30.18% 27.98% 41.84% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2214 2021 3063 7298 
30.34% 27.69% 41.97% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1858 1720 2625 6203 
29.95% 27.73% 42.32% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 110 85 196 391 
28.13% 21.74% 50.13% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 2334 2061 3965 8360 
27.92% 24.65% 47.43% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1976 1732 3325 7033 
28.10% 24.63% 47.28% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1672 1469 2834 5975 
27.98% 24.59% 47.43% 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B dS i i l t ^n Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparisons^^' 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 149 140 172 461 
32.32% 30.37% 37.31% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1684 1256 1672 4612 
36.51% 27.23% 36.25% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1481 1117 1487 4085 
36.25% 27.34% 36.40% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1323 1028 1348 3699 
35.77% 27.79% 36.44% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 153 132 145 430 
35.58% 30.70% 33.72% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1622 1177 1634 4433 
36.59% 26.55% 36.86% 
Day-90 to day-41 Day+41 to day+90 Cluster n=1 1431 1038 1459 3928 
36.43% 26.43% 37.14% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1279 957 1317 3553 
36.00% 26.93% 37.07% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 139 99 164 402 
34.58% 24.63% 40.80% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1446 1013 1814 4273 
33.84% 23.71% 42.45% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1289 900 1608 3797 
33.95% 23.70% 42.35% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1155 827 1455 3437 
33.60% 24.06% 42.33% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^^；®；；^  Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B •^。。。。^；^^。I 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 145 141 176 462 
31.39% 30.52% 38.10% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1624 1239 1751 4614 
35.20% 26.85% 37.95% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1426 1094 1567 4087 
34.89% 26.77% 38.34% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1276 1003 1422 3701 
34.48% 27.10% 38.42% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 149 132 151 432 
34.49% 30.56% 34.95% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1537 1119 1781 4437 
34.64% 25.22% 40.14% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1356 989 1587 3932 
34.49% 25.15% 40.36% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1216 910 1431 3557 
34.19% 25.58% 40.23% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 141 105 158 404 
34.90% 25.99% 39.11% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1391 977 1912 4280 
32.50% 22.83% 44.67% 
Day-90 to day-61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1233 868 1702 3803 
32.42% 22.82% 44.75% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1110 796 1537 3443 
32.24% 23.12% 44.64% 
154 
Table 6 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B ^^；®；；^  Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 145 145 172 462 
31.39% 31.39% 37.23% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1615 1221 1778 4614 
35.00% 26.46% 38.53% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1428 1087 1572 4087 
34.94% 26.60% 38.46% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1278 1002 1421 3701 
34.53% 27.07% 38.40% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 150 126 156 432 
34.72% 29.17% 36.11% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1520 1135 1782 4437 
34.26% 25.58% 40.16% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1340 1004 1588 3932 
34.08% 25.53% 40.39% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1205 911 1441 3557 
33.88% 25.61% 40.51% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 147 102 155 404 
36.39% 25.25% 38.37% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 1394 986 1900 4280 
32.57% 23.04% 44.39% 
Day-90 to day-61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 1241 879 1683 3803 
32.63% 23.11% 44.25% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 1124 800 1519 3443 
32.65% 23.24% 44.12% 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
Period range A Period range B dSnltion Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B comparisonf^' 
Day-90 to day-21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 135 119 184 438 
30.82% 27.17% 42.01% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 4237 3752 4707 12696 
33.37% 29.55% 37.07% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3525 3135 3989 10649 
33.10% 29.44% 37.46% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 3012 2688 3419 9119 
33.03% 29.48% 37.49% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 130 114 157 401 
32.42% 28.43% 39.15% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 4059 3477 4780 12316 
32.96% 28.23% 38.81% 
Day-90 to day-41 Day+41 to day+90 Cluster n=1 3406 2890 4031 10327 
32.98% 27.98% 39.03% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2891 2482 3464 8837 
32.71% 28.09% 39.20% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 110 94 168 372 
29.57% 25.27% 45.16% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 3651 2964 5236 11851 
30.81% 25.01% 44.18% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3096 2495 4359 9950 
31.12% 25.08% 43.81% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2658 2138 3715 8511 
31.23% 25.12% 43.65% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
Period range A Period range B definition Number A < B Number A > B Number A < > B ^ comparisonf" ' 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 133 118 188 439 
30.30% 26.88% 42.82% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 4157 3690 4857 12704 
32.72% 29.05% 38.23% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3468 3079 4110 10657 
32.54% 28.89% 38.57% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2951 2642 3532 9125 
32.34% 28.95% 38.71% 
Day-90 to day-41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 129 113 161 403 
32.01% 28.04% 39.95% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 3944 3323 5064 12331 
31.98% 26.95% 41.07% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3323 2766 4251 10340 
32.14% 26.75% 41.11% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2829 2373 3646 8848 
31.97% 26.82% 41.21% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 107 93 173 373 
28.69% 24.93% 46.38% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 3545 2841 5485 11871 
29.86% 23.93% 46.21% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2995 2392 4579 9966 
30.05% 24.00% 45.95% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2569 2051 3904 8524 
30.14% 24.06% 45.80% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel I: Total insider trading event, firm specific volatility 
Period range A Period range B Number A < B Number A > B Number A <> B "^comparison?"' 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Single 136 122 181 439 
30.98% 27.79% 41.23% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=0 4124 3628 4952 12704 
32.46% 28.56% 38.98% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3445 3031 4181 10657 
32.33% 28.44% 39.23% 
Day -90 to day -21 Day +21 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2936 2603 3586 9125 
32.18% 28.53% 39.30% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Single 128 114 161 403 
31.76% 28.29% 39.95% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=0 3930 3300 5101 12331 
31.87% 26.76% 41.37% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=1 3303 2740 4297 10340 
31.94% 26.50% 41.56% 
Day -90 to day -41 Day +41 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2811 2342 3695 8848 
31.77% 26.47% 41.76% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Single 106 90 177 373 
28.42% 24.13% 47.45% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=0 3531 2819 5521 11871 
29.74% 23.75% 46.51% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=1 2982 2376 4608 9966 
29.92% 23.84% 46.24% 
Day -90 to day -61 Day +61 to day +90 Cluster n=2 2565 2031 3928 8524 
30.09% 23.83% 46.08% 
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Table 8 
VAR Granger Causality Test - Volatility of Hang Seng Index Return 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of Hang Seng Index return are 
shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results of the two-variable system for insider 
trading defined as number of transactions; Panel B reports those of the two-variable 
system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions; Panel C displays 
those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions; Panel D shows those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and 
sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. In each Panel, the first column indicates 
the volatility measure (standard deviation or high-low spread). The second is the sample 
period of time series (entire sample period (from 93 to 97), pre-Asian Financial Crisis 
period (from 93 to June 97) or Asian Financial Crisis period (from July 97 to 98)). The 
remaining are the results of Granger causality test. The third column states the null 
hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and sixth display the unrestricted sum of squares (SSEu), 
restricted sum of squares (SSEr) and p-value of the Granger causality test (F-test) on the 
null hypothesis. (XE+Y means XxlO^). 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0333 0.0347 0.0005 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.5053E+05 3.5367E+05 0 . 0 9 7 4 。 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0093 0.0101 0.0000 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3548E+05 2.3689E+05 0.2415 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0195 0.0215 0.0064 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 9.7560E+04 1.0683E+05 0.0093 ® 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.2071 0.2141 0.0014 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4754E+05 3.5367E+05 0.0202 
a: significant at 1% level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0345 0.0347 0.3071 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4475E+09 3.4640E+09 0.2251 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0101 0.0101 0.4225 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.1983E+09 3.4043E+09 0.0002 ^ 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0121 0.0182 0 .0734。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.2534E+06 3.5525E+06 0.0409 ^ 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.2132 0.2141 0.2619 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4507E+09 3.4640E+09 0.2765 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure ’ 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0330 0.0346 0.0001 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0330 0.0330 0.9586 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1036E+05 2.1294E+05 0 .0530。 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1036E+05 2.1103E+05 0.3244 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8481 E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.6482 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8481 E+04 8.8560E+04 0.6003 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0093 0.0097 0.0017 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0093 0.0095 0.0179 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1083E+05 1.1149E+05 0.2429 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1083E+05 1.1154E+05 0.2261 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2671 E+04 7.2780E+04 0.5584 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2671 E+04 7.2793E+04 0.5352 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0184 0.0214 0.0008 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0184 0.0184 0.7672 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 8.7478E+04 9.4908E+04 0.0144 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 8.7478E+04 8.7571 E+04 0.7800 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.4380E+04 1.4548E+04 0.3552 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.4380E+04 1.4380E+04 0.9694 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.2052 0.2137 0.0004 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.2052 0.2053 0.9418 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0764E+05 2.1294E+05 0.0054 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0764E+05 2.0827E+05 0.3357 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8463E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.6019 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8463E+04 8.8532E+04 0.6226 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0345 0.0346 0.5494 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0345 0.0346 0.3711 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2977E+09 2.3289E+09 0.0417 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2977E+09 2.3061 E+09 0.2875 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9244E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4567 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9244E+08 9.9251 E+08 0.8989 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0101 0.0101 0.6438 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0101 0.0101 0.4697 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1134E+09 2.3121 E+09 0.0000 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1134E+09 2.1180E+09 0.4829 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.7203E+08 9.7225E+08 0.8203 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.7203E+08 9.7205E+08 0.9535 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0052 0.0104 0.0223 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0052 0.0076 0.3778 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 3.0963E+05 3.8290E+05 0.8315 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 3.0963E+05 9.4466E+05 0.0001 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.8501 E+05 1.6552E+06 0.1167 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.8501 E+05 1.5379E+06 0.2185 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.2131 0.2135 0.4549 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.2131 0.2136 0.3944 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3008E+09 2.3289E+09 0 . 0 5 3 4 。 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3008E+09 2.3090E+09 0.2968 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9197E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4024 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9197E+08 9.9202E+08 0.9012 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 9 
VAR Granger Causality Test - Volatility of Market Value Weighted 
Index Return 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of market value weighted index 
return are shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results of the two-variable system 
for insider trading defined as number of transactions; Panel B reports those of the 
two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions; Panel C 
displays those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as 
number of transactions; Panel D shows those of the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. In each Panel, the first 
column indicates the volatility measure (standard deviation or high-low spread). The 
second is the sample period of time series (entire sample period (from 93 to 97), 
pre-Asian Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) or Asian Financial Crisis period 
(from July 97 to 98)). The remaining are the results of Granger causality test. The third 
column states the null hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and sixth display the unrestricted sum 
of squares (SSEu)，restricted sum of squares (SSEr) and p-value of the Granger causality 
test (F-test) on the null hypothesis. (XE+Y means XxlO^). 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0961 0.0965 0.2329 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4844E+05 3.5367E+05 0.0321 ^ 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0688 0.0689 0.6982 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3663E+05 2.3689E+05 0.6141 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0251 0.0263 0 . 0 6 7 7 。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 9.3275E+04 1.0683E+05 0.0015 ® 
High-low spread 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.6004 0.6027 0.2820 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4511E+05 3.5367E+05 0.0060 ^ 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0962 0.0965 0.3567 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4625E+09 3.4640E+09 0.7150 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0686 0.0689 0.3113 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4042E+09 3.4043E+09 0.9344 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0137 0.0214 0.0491 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.4055E+06 3.5524E+06 0.0986 e 
High-low spread 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.6005 0.6027 0.2877 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4627E+09 3.4640E+09 0.7323 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure ‘ 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0951 0.0951 0.9594 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0951 0.0965 0.0347 b 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0808E+05 2.1294E+05 0.0077 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0808E+05 2.0974E+05 0.1179 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8532E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.8591 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8532E+04 8.8737E+04 0.3990 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0669 0.0675 0.1473 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0669 0.0687 0.0123 " 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1141E+05 1.1149E+05 0.6896 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1141E+05 1.1231E+05 0.1757 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2756E+04 7.2780E+04 0.7863 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2756E+04 7.2822E+04 0.6497 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0251 0.0262 0 .0869。 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0251 0.0255 0.3322 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 8.1046E+04 9.4908E+04 0.0007 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 8.1046E+04 8.1301 E+04 0.6308 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.4547E+04 1.4548E+04 0.9457 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.4547E+04 1.4649E+04 0.4750 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.5947 0.5947 0.9171 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.5947 0.6026 0.0446 匕 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0600E+05 2.1294E+05 0.0014 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0600E+05 2.0802E+05 0 .0832。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8441 E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.5554 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8441 E+04 8.8631 E+04 0.4162 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value measure 
standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0961 0.0962 0.6979 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0961 0.0964 0.3018 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3279E+09 2.3289E+09 0.7177 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3279E+09 2.3355E+09 0.3174 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9025E+08 9.9423E+08 0.2665 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9025E+08 9.9032E+08 0.8996 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0684 0.0685 0.6860 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0684 0.0688 0.2386 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3089E+09 2.3121 E+09 0.5752 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3089E+09 2.3153E+09 0.4281 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.6875E+08 9.7225E+08 0.3640 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.6875E+08 9.6875E+08 0.9802 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0088 0.0147 0.1073 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0088 0.0156 0 . 0 6 3 1 。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.7011E+05 3.8339E+05 0.4064 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.7011E+05 9.5401 E+05 0.0000 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9951 E+05 1.6991E+06 0 . 0 9 1 0 。 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9951 E+05 1.6902E+06 0 . 0 9 5 7 。 
High-low spread 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.5999 0.6006 0.5674 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.5999 0.6019 0.3127 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3278E+09 2.3289E+09 0.7025 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3278E+09 2.3353E+09 0.3188 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9009E+08 9.9423E+08 0.2575 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9009E+08 9.9013E+08 0.9173 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 
VAR Granger Causality Test - Volatility of Equal Weighted Index 
Return 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of equal weighted index return are 
shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results of the two-variable system for insider 
trading defined as number of transactions; Panel B reports those of the two-variable 
system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of transactions; Panel C displays 
those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions; Panel D shows those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and 
sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. In each Panel, the first column indicates 
the volatility measure (standard deviation or high-low spread). The second is the sample 
period of time series (entire sample period (from 93 to 97), pre-Asian Financial Crisis 
period (from 93 to June 97) or Asian Financial Crisis period (from July 97 to 98)). The 
remaining are the results of Granger causality test. The third column states the null 
hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and sixth display the unrestricted sum of squares (SSEu), 
restricted sum of squares (SSEr) and p-value of the Granger causality test (F-test) on the 
null hypothesis. (XE+Y means XxlO^). 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0631 0.0643 0 . 0 6 1 0 。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4071 E+05 3.4822E+05 0.0356 " 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0470 0.0471 0.3874 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3599E+05 2.3689E+05 0.3489 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0169 0.0171 0.2768 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 1.0403E+05 1.0683E+05 0.1602 
Q 
High-low spread 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.3626 0.3688 0.0754 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.3511 E+05 3.4822E+05 0.0028 ^ 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
山II Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0640 0.0643 0.4795 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4228E+09 3.4486E+09 0.3161 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0471 0.0471 0.9957 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.3933E+09 3.4043E+09 0.3890 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0170 0.0171 0.4528 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 1.5040E+07 1.5909E+07 0.0408 b 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.3812 0.3819 0.4465 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4363E+09 3.4640E+09 0.1157 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0670 0.0671 0.4427 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0670 0.0675 0.1177 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1128E+05 2.1294E+05 0.1208 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1128E+05 2.1170E+05 0.4334 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8351 E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.4168 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8351 E+04 8.8532E+04 0.4281 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0469 0.0469 0.7532 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0469 0.0470 0.4126 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1126E+05 1.1149E+05 0.4932 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1126E+05 1.1195E+05 0.2337 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2521 E+04 7.2780E+04 0.3665 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2521 E+04 7.2600E+04 0.6175 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0162 0.0169 0 .1000。 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0162 0.0165 0.2874 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 9.1728E+04 9.4908E+04 0.1135 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 9.1728E+04 9.2231 E+04 0.5260 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.4536E+04 1.4548E+04 0.8031 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.4536E+04 1.4657E+04 0.4342 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.3789 0.3791 0.6584 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.3789 0.3819 0.1168 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0915E+05 2.1294E+05 0.0188 匕 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.0915E+05 2.0945E+05 0.5057 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.7939E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.1476 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.7939E+04 8.8069E+04 0.5001 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0673 0.0674 0.8560 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0673 0.0676 0.3320 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3221 E+09 2.3289E+09 0.3450 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3221 E+09 2.3283E+09 0.3648 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.8985E+08 9.9423E+08 0.2439 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.8985E+08 9.8986E+08 0.9659 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0470 0.0470 0.6748 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0470 0.0471 0.5361 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3082E+09 2.3121 E+09 0.5335 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3082E+09 2.3134E+09 0.4723 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.7065E+08 9.7225E+08 0.5395 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.7065E+08 9.7065E+08 0.9726 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0073 0.0111 0.2538 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0073 0.0113 0.2200 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 3.0196E+05 3.8339E+05 0.7423 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 3.0196E+05 1.2031E+06 0.0000 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.0692E+06 1.6991E+06 0.1689 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.0692E+06 1.4450E+06 0.5498 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.3808 0.3809 0.7614 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.3808 0.3818 0.3772 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3197E+09 2.3289E+09 0.2717 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3197E+09 2.3258E+09 0.3699 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.8969E+08 9.9423E+08 0.2356 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.8969E+08 9.8970E+08 0.9648 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 11 
VAR Granger Causality Test 一 Aggregate Total Volatility 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of aggregate total return 
(aggregate total volatility) are shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results of the 
two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions; Panel B 
reports those of the two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions; Panel C displays those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and 
sale defined as number of transactions; Panel D shows those of the three-variable system 
for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. In each Panel, the 
first column indicates the volatility measure (standard deviation or high-low spread). 
The second is the sample period of time series (entire sample period (from 93 to 97)， 
pre-Asian Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) or Asian Financial Crisis period 
(from July 97 to 98)). The remaining are the results of Granger causality test. The third 
column states the null hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and sixth display the unrestricted sum 
of squares (SSEu), restricted sum of squares (SSEr) and p-value of the Granger causality 
test (F-test) on the null hypothesis. (XE+Y means XxlO^). 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volat"ity Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0245 0.0255 0.0013 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4176E+05 3.4822E+05 0 . 0 5 6 9 。 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0080 0.0084 0.0016 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3679E+05 2.3689E+05 0.7548 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0127 0.0143 0.0029 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 1.0633E+05 1.0683E+05 0.5574 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1633 0.1685 0.0079 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4029E+05 3.4822E+05 0.0294 b 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
y^l^^lity Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0262 0.0262 0.5534 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4615E+09 3.4640E+09 0.6398 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0084 0.0084 0.8015 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.3151 E+09 3.4043E+09 0.0136 b 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0070 0.0104 0 .0811。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.6181E+06 3.5525E+06 0.2656 
High-low spread 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1712 0.1713 0.5860 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4620E+09 3.4640E+09 0.6713 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0256 0.0260 0.0459 匕 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0256 0.0258 0.1858 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1146E+05 2.1294E+05 0.1435 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1146E+05 2.1217E+05 0.3111 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8540E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.9562 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8540E+04 8.8725E+04 0.4229 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0079 0.0080 0.1502 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0079 0.0082 0.0091 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1119E+05 1.1149E+05 0.4354 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1119E+05 1.1204E+05 0.1887 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2741 E+04 7.2780E+04 0.7280 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2741 E+04 7.2818E+04 0.6240 
a 
standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0131 0.0159 0.0002 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0131 0.0148 0.0026 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0428E+05 1.0462E+05 0.6225 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0428E+05 1.0886E+05 0 .0735。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.5424E+04 1.5526E+04 0.4846 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.5424E+04 1.5426E+04 0.9184 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1685 0.1701 0 .0856。 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1685 0.1692 0.2627 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1069E+05 2.1294E+05 0 .0710。 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1069E+05 2.1138E+05 0.3182 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8540E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.9686 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8540E+04 8.8705E+04 0.4496 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0262 0.0262 0.5093 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0262 0.0262 0.9532 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3218E+09 2.3289E+09 0.3326 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3218E+09 2.3294E+09 0.3154 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.931 OE+08 9.9423E+08 0.5540 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.931 OE+08 9.9312E+08 0.9450 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0083 0.0083 0.5514 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0083 0.0083 0.6545 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2379E+09 2.3121 E+09 0.0063 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2379E+09 2.2422E+09 0.5086 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.7166E+08 9.7225E+08 0.7104 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.7166E+08 9.7167E+08 0.9807 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0026 0.0066 0.0012 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0026 0.0051 0.0259 b 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3148E+05 3.8338E+05 0.9508 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3148E+05 9.5173E+05 0.0002 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.2290E+06 1.6991E+06 0.4812 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale O.OOOOE+00 0.4912 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1711 0.1713 0.5538 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1711 0.1711 0.9400 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3226E+09 2.3289E+09 0.3615 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3226E+09 2.3300E+09 0.3214 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9305E+08 9.9423E+08 0.5452 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9305E+08 9.9306E+08 0.9470 
a: significant at 1% level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 12 
VAR Granger Causality Test 一 Aggregate Abnormal Return Volatility 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of aggregate abnormal return 
(aggregate abnormal return volatility) are shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the 
results of the two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions; 
Panel B reports those of the two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar 
amount of transactions; Panel C displays those of the three-variable system for insider 
purchase and sale defined as number of transactions; Panel D shows those of the 
three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions. In each Panel, the first column indicates the volatility measure (standard 
deviation or high-low spread). The second is the sample period of time series (entire 
sample period (from 93 to 97)，pre-Asian Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) or 
Asian Financial Crisis period (from July 97 to 98)). The remaining are the results of 
Granger causality test. The third column states the null hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and 
sixth display the unrestricted sum of squares (SSEu), restricted sum of squares (SSEr) 
and p-value of the Granger causality test (F-test) on the null hypothesis. (XE+Y means 
X x l C f ) . 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Q 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0197 0.0207 0.0029 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.2455E+05 3.3529E+05 0.0197 b 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0080 0.0081 0.4517 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3688E+05 2.3689E+05 0.9214 
g 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0099 0.0113 0.0018 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 1.0670E+05 1.0683E+05 0.7699 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1343 0.1393 0.0113 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.2433E+05 3.3529E+05 0.0179 b 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0221 0.0221 0.6626 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4638E+09 3.4640E+09 0.8923 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0081 0.0081 0.7193 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.3830E+09 3.4043E+09 0.2304 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0043 0.0077 0.0077 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.4604E+06 3.4662E+06 0.1905 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1462 0.1463 0.6168 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4640E+09 3.4640E+09 0.9582 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0217 0.0219 0.1578 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0217 0.0219 0.1514 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1180E+05 2.1294E+05 0.1998 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1180E+05 2.1265E+05 0.2678 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8231 E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.2990 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8231 E+04 8.8588E+04 0.2653 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0079 0.0079 0.3624 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0079 0.0081 0.0219 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1094E+05 1.1149E+05 0.2877 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1094E+05 1.1185E+05 0.1714 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2331 E+04 7.2780E+04 0.2347 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2331 E+04 7.2381 E+04 0.6929 
g 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0102 0.0126 0.0001 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0102 0.0124 0.0002 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0459E+05 1.0462E+05 0.8851 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0459E+05 1.0809E+05 0.1175 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.5019E+04 1.5526E+04 0.1160 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.5019E+04 1.5066E+04 0.6305 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1443 0.1451 0.2075 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1443 0.1452 0.1816 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1131E+05 2.1294E+05 0.1249 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1131E+05 2.1218E+05 0.2608 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8319E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.3802 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8319E+04 8.8653E+04 0.2814 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
y^^t i l i ty Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 93 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0220 0.0221 0.5525 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0220 0.0220 0.9070 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3257E+09 2.3289E+09 0.5192 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3257E+09 2.3334E+09 0.3139 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9272E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4939 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9272E+08 9.9274E+08 0.9432 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0081 0.0081 0.6309 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0081 0.0081 0.9324 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2855E+09 2.3121 E+09 0.1038 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2855E+09 2.2918E+09 0.4257 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.7201 E+08 9.7225E+08 0.8133 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.7201 E+08 9.7201 E+08 0.9833 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0025 0.0048 0.0233 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0025 0.0042 0.0934 e 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3974E+05 3.8339E+05 0.9768 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3974E+05 9.5650E+05 0.0003 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.1944E+06 1.6991E+06 0.4002 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.1944E+06 1.6753E+06 0.4394 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1461 0.1463 0.4944 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1461 0.1461 0.8910 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3265E+09 2.3289E+09 0.5760 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3265E+09 2.3340E+09 0.3195 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9254E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4696 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9254E+08 9.9256E+08 0.9420 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 13 
VAR Granger Causality Test - Aggregate Firm Specific Volatility 
The findings of Granger causality test using volatility of aggregate firm specific return 
(aggregate firm specific volatility) are shown in this Table. Panel A exhibits the results 
of the two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions; Panel B 
reports those of the two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions; Panel C displays those of the three-variable system for insider purchase and 
sale defined as number of transactions; Panel D shows those of the three-variable system 
for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of transactions. In each Panel, the 
first column indicates the volatility measure (standard deviation or high-low spread). 
The second is the sample period of time series (entire sample period (from 93 to 97)， 
pre-Asian Financial Crisis period (from 93 to June 97) or Asian Financial Crisis period 
(from July 97 to 98)). The remaining are the results of Granger causality test. The third 
column states the null hypothesis. The fourth, fifth and sixth display the unrestricted sum 
of squares (SSEu), restricted sum of squares (SSEr) and p-value of the Granger causality 
test (F-test) on the null hypothesis. (XE+Y means Z x 1 ( f ) . 
Panel A: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as number of transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0166 0.0174 0.0021 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.2730E+05 3.3529E+05 0.0624 ^ 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0067 0.0067 0.3907 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.3689E+05 2.3689E+05 0.9947 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0087 0.0097 0.0040 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 1.0670E+05 1.0683E+05 0.7698 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1157 0.1206 0.0062 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.2614E+05 3.3529E+05 0.0385 b 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-variable system for insider trading defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0187 0.0187 0.7690 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4636E+09 3.4640E+09 0.8491 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0067 0.0067 0.9327 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.3788E+09 3.4043E+09 0.1896 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.0041 0.0065 0.0389 b 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 2.5161E+06 3.5524E+06 0.1709 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Transaction non-Granger causes volatility 0.1271 0.1271 0.7855 
Volatility non-Granger causes Transaction 3.4639E+09 3.4640E+09 0.9272 
Panel C: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as number of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0185 0.0186 0.1917 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0185 0.0186 0.1902 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1199E+05 2.1294E+05 0.2415 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1199E+05 2.1286E+05 0.2613 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8211E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.2841 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8211 E+04 8.8576E+04 0.2600 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0065 0.0065 0.3859 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0065 0.0067 0.0169 " 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1115E+05 1.1149E+05 0.4057 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.1115E+05 1.1207E+05 0.1702 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 7.2408E+04 7.2780E+04 0.2793 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 7.2408E+04 7.2461 E+04 0.6830 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0090 0.0110 0.0001 ® 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0090 0.0108 0.0002 ® 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0461E+05 1.0462E+05 0.9435 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 1.0461E+05 1.0834E+05 0.1062 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.4942E+04 1.5526E+04 0 .0910。 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.4942E+04 1.4999E+04 0.5940 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1257 0.1263 0.2288 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1257 0.1263 0.2398 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1138E+05 2.1294E+05 0.1334 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.1138E+05 2.1228E+05 0.2534 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 8.8265E+04 8.8541 E+04 0.3272 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 8.8265E+04 8.8619E+04 0.2676 
a: significant at 1 % level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel D: Three-variable system for insider purchase and sale defined as dollar amount of 
transactions 
Volatility Period Null hypothesis SSEu SSEr p-value 
measure 
Standard deviation 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0187 0.0187 0.6357 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0187 0.0187 0.8509 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3248E+09 2.3289E+09 0.4614 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3248E+09 2.3324E+09 0.3141 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9251 E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4650 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9251 E+08 9.9252E+08 0.9430 
Standard deviation 93 - June 97 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0067 0.0067 0.7985 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0067 0.0067 0.8160 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2804E+09 2.3121 E+09 0 . 0 7 5 7 。 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.2804E+09 2.2866E+09 0.4321 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.7195E+08 9.7225E+08 0.7920 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.7195E+08 9.7196E+08 0.9838 
Standard deviation July 97 - 98 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.0020 0.0040 0.0169 ^ 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.0020 0.0035 0 . 0 7 4 4 。 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3815E+05 3.8339E+05 0.9728 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 3.3815E+05 9.3158E+05 0.0003 ^ 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 1.1493E+06 1.6991E+06 0.3040 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 1.1493E+06 1.6751E+06 0.3377 
High-low spread 9 3 - 9 8 Purchase non-Granger causes volatility 0.1270 0.1271 0.6221 
Sale non-Granger causes volatility 0.1270 0.1270 0.7998 
Volatility non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3258E+09 2.3289E+09 0.5234 
Sale non-Granger causes Purchase 2.3258E+09 2.3333E+09 0.3195 
Volatility non-Granger causes Sale 9.9227E+08 9.9423E+08 0.4354 
Purchase non-Granger causes Sale 9.9227E+08 9.9228E+08 0.9447 
a: significant at 1% level 
b: significant at 5% level 
c: significant at 10% level 
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Figure 1 
Event Study 一 Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1A: Insider purchase event, total volatil ity 
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Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1B: Insider purchase event, abnormal return volatility 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1C: Insider purchase event, firm specific volatility 
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Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1D: Insider sale event, total volatility 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1E: Insider sale event, abnormal return volatility 
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Figure 1F: Insider sale event, firm specific volatility 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 1G: Total insider trading event, total volatility 
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Figure 1H: Total insider trading event, abnormal return volatility 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Volatility Surrounding Event Occurrence 
Figure 11: Total insider trading event, f irm specific volati l i ty 
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